SUPPORT FOR WHICH KIND OF DEMOCRACY? WHAT EUROPEAN CITIZENS WANT FROM THEIR DEMOCRACIES, AND WHY THEY ARE (DIS)SATISFIED

Thesis (cumulative thesis)
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
of the University of Zurich
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by
Lea Heyne

Accepted in the Fall Semester 2017
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee:
Prof. Dr. Daniel Bochsler, University of Zurich (main supervisor)
Prof. Dr. Jan van Deth, University of Mannheim
Prof. Dr. Marco Steenbergen, University of Zurich

Zurich, 2017

Preface

This dissertation is the result of four years of research in the context of the NCCR Democracy Project "Democracy Barometer" at the University of Zurich and the Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau (ZDA). Just like me, this thesis is also a bit of a cosmopolitan: Important parts of this work were carried out during research stays at the University of Mannheim (MZES) and at the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) at the University of Irvine. Over the last years, I was lucky to receive the support and feedback of many people in many different places, who contributed substantially to the development of this thesis.

At the University of Zurich and the ZDA, I have to thank my supervisor Daniel Bochsler for his reliable and constructive feedback at all the different stages of this project, for always being available for questions and discussions, and for continually finding new ways to challenge me. I am also thankful to Marco Steenbergen for agreeing to be on my committee, and for his helpful inputs to my dissertation. Most of all, I am very grateful to all the colleagues and friends I met here: In particular, to Saskia Ruth for being a great mentor, and to Doreen Spörer-Wagner for her constant administrative and emotional support. To Nino Abzianidze, Karima Bousbah, Zarina Burkadze, Miriam Hänni, Christian Rubba, Michael Strebel, Kushtrim Veseli and Rebecca Welge for their help, support, and friendship. To Alice el-Wakil and Lukas Peter for letting me see the world (and especially democracy) through the eyes of political philosophy, and for an amazing year of bridging facts and norms.

At the University of Mannheim, I am first and foremost grateful to Jan van Deth, my second supervisor, for his incredible patience, passion and dedication not just to helping me with my PhD, but also to political science in general. Thank you for investing so much time and for reminding me of what I love about academia. Many thanks also to the rest of the MZES team, especially to Sarah Perry and Katerina Vrablikova, for welcoming me.

At the Center for the Study of Democracy in Irvine, I am grateful to Russell Dalton for inviting, welcoming and inspiring me, and to all the great scholars I met there, particularly, to Bernhard Grofman and Doh Shull Chin for their feedback on my work. And to the best colleagues and friends I could have wished for - Matheus Mazzilli, Lukas Okado, Sam Power, and Gaby Santos - for making the CSD a place I will always remember.

Finally, I am very thankful to all the other amazing people I met in different places around the world who have given me and my dissertation some of their time and resources, such as Monica Ferrìn, Arndt Leininger, and Jennifer Oser.

I also owe a special thank you to Franz Walter at the University of Göttingen for sparking my interest in research when I was a B.A. student, and to Wolfgang Merkel at the WZB in Berlin for supporting and mentoring me since I was a M.A. student.

On a more personal level, I am of course thankful to my great family: To my parents Antje Schloen and Reinhard Heyne who taught me to be curious and open-minded, to love books, and to doubt everything. To my big sister Marie Schloen, for showing me to be ambitious, assertive and unapologetic. Lastly, I am grateful to my chosen family: To Anne Michaelis for her unconditional love and support, and to Nina Wienkoop for being with me every step of the way from our first semester at university with her wisdom and friendship. And to Luca Manucci, for making Zurich a home, for countless inspiring discussions, and for always reminding me that good research is nothing without a good story.

Zurich, October 2017

Table of contents

List of figures

Chapter One: Synopsis

Chapter Two: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific socialization shapes Europeans' expectations from democracy

Chapter Three: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to support for democracy

Chapter Four: Why perceived deprivation matters: Socio-economic background and support for democracy in Europe

List of tables

Chapter One: Synopsis

Chapter Two: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific socialization shapes Europeans' expectations from democracy

Chapter Three: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to support for democracy

Chapter Four: Why perceived deprivation matters: Socio-economic background and support for democracy in Europe

Chapter One: Synopsis

1. Research question: What am I studying, and why?

> *"Indeed, most of our fellow citizens believe that all is not well. Due regard for their view, as well as a prudent concern for the future, suggests that we should explore the sources of this democratic discontent." (Pharr and Putnam 2000, 27)*

Democracy is all but a new concept in political science and the public debate, and it certainly is a popular term. After all, even North Korea officially calls itself a democracy (visible in its official name 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea'), and almost 90% of Chinese citizens find that democracy is working well in their country (Wang 2007). The Sydney Democracy Network found that there are currently 2'234 different ways to describe or label democracy.[1] At the same time, the notion that democracy is somehow threatened, under attack, or in crisis seems to enjoy similar success: Scholars, journalists and politicians alike have been warning since decades that there is a 'legitimacy crisis' in established democracies (Offe 1972; Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Merkel 2014; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). These warnings usually identify citizens and their lack or decrease of support as the problem, arguing that citizens are more and more distrustful of democracy. A recent example are Foa and Mounk (2016, 16), who claim that "citizens of democracies are less and less content with their institutions; they are more and more willing to jettison institutions and norms that have traditionally been regarded as central components of democracy; and they are increasingly attracted to alternative regime forms". Wilhelm Heitmeyer, in an interview about the 2017 German elections, speaks of a "deflation of democracy", where "the democratic apparatus works perfectly, but the substance of trust vanishes"[2]. Survey data, however, does not support these claims, but rather shows 'trendless fluctuations' of public support for democracy over time (Norris 1999, 5; see also Norris 2017 for recent data).

At the origin of this debate is the growing availability of data: Since the 1970s, people all around the world have been surveyed about levels of support for their democracies, and by now there is data available for almost every single country in the world (according to Inglehart and Welzel 2005, the World Values Survey alone covers more than 80% of the world population). Support for democracy has become a very popular concept in the political

[1] http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/portfolio_page/many-names-democracy/

[2] Süddeutsche Zeitung: Soziologe zur AfD: Sozial Schwache sehen auf noch schwächere herab. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/soziologe-zur-afd-erwachen-aus-wutgetraenkter-apathie-1.3687762-2

science literature, and the body of publications is increasing each year: As Figure 1 shows, the year 2016 alone has seen almost 1500 publications on democratic support, more than in all the previous years. The interest has grown especially since 1990, when the so-called "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991) raised scholars attention to the "attitudinal consolidation of democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6ff), the development of democratic support amongst citizens of newly democratized, post-authoritarian countries.

Figure 1: The growing interest of political scientists in democratic support.



Notes: Number of scientific publications that match the search "support&democracy". Source: Web of Science.

Given that there is already a considerable amount of research, why should we still study democracy and citizens' support for it at all? To begin with, although there might not be much empirical proof for the steep decline in public support for democracy that some have predicted, there are still signs that citizens in Western democracies are not as happy as their Chinese counterparts: Recent political developments such as the success of (right-wing) populism in established democracies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Kriesi and Pappas 2015) and the resurrection of anti-liberal ideologies like nationalism, authoritarianism and identitarian movements show a certain level of popular dissatisfaction with the democratic status quo (see for example Norris and Inglehart 2016; Kriesi 2017). This points to another issue: Increasing or not, what is democratic dissatisfaction actually about? In other words,

what do citizens expect from their democracies, what are they satisfied with, and what do they want improved? As Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a, 11) have remarked, most existing research on democratic support does not account for the views of citizens, and the question how individuals define a good democracy is both theoretically and empirically barely explored (some exceptions are Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Canache 2012; Ferrín 2012; Welzel and Alvarez 2014; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a).

In this thesis, I want to find out what exactly European citizens want from their democracies. Why is that important? Because if we want to react to worrying trends like the increasing electoral success of right-wing populist parties, and find a way to make (or keep) democracy more popular and convincing than its illiberal ideological counterparts, we first need to understand citizens' views, ideas and expectations about democracy. If we know how and where democracy is failing its citizens, and how and where it is actually satisfying them, we can come up with strategies to fix its shortcomings. The populist case against liberal democracy, claiming that 'the elites' are ignoring the needs, grievances and will of 'the people' (Mudde 2004, 543) seems to increasingly attract voters, and democracies should take it seriously by asking how they could do better for their citizens. This is what the following dissertation does. I argue that to understand how democracies can ensure and improve their support amongst European citizens, we need to answer several questions: What do citizens expect from a democracy? How do they like their democracies? What makes them satisfied or dissatisfied? And are there differences between countries, and between groups of citizens?

To begin with, I show that support for democracy is not unidimensional: Citizens' attitudes are structured by two dimensions, liberal and social democracy, and individuals differ in their position on these scales. I then develop a spatial model of democratic support based on three elements: Expectations from democracy, evaluations of the democratic reality, and satisfaction with democracy to understand what actually causes (dis)satisfaction. I further use literature on political socialisation and democratic learning (Almond and Verba 1963; Rohrschneider 1999; Mishler and Rose 2002; Fuchs and Roller 2006), democratization and modernization theory (Linz and Stepan 1996; Kitschelt 1999; Diamond 2008; Dalton and Welzel 2014), models of democracy (Lijphart 1999; Bochsler and Kriesi 2013), political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Quintelier and Hooghe 2013; Quintelier and van Deth 2014) as well as relative deprivation and social dominance theory (Gurr 1970; Pettigrew 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006) to understand the factors that explain varying levels of support. Both the democratic regime (defined as the democratic history, quality and the model of democracy) on the macro-level and the social status on the micro-

level systematically affect the way citizens understand, perceive, and evaluate their democratic system, which explains patterns of support across different groups of citizens and countries, and, consequentially, causes of dissatisfaction. I find that there are both good and bad news: On the one hand, liberal democracy - electoral freedom, competition, and transparency - is universally agreed upon in Europe, and there are little reasons to worry that these democratic principles are losing support. However, while citizens do express continuous support for diffuse principles of liberal democracy, the more specific realization of social democratic output criteria is a source of dissatisfaction, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe, and most strongly amongst those that feel disadvantaged in society. Particularly social justice, or the perceived lack of its realization, seems to compromise the legitimacy of democratic procedures for many Europeans. And most importantly, democracy is a matter of perceptions: Subjective status compared to other citizens substantially affects individual support. As a result, there is no such thing as an objectively good democracy for all citizens. People are socialized in different ways, they want different things from a democratic system, and they see different sides of democracy depending on who they are and where they grew up. Democracy, in other words, is not the same thing for each of its citizens.

I contribute to existing research by (a) disentangling the attitudes that form democratic support and comprehending the linkages between them, (b) taking into account different dimensions of democracy, and (c) understanding the effect of the macro-level and micro-level context on support. Thereby, my contribution to the study of democratic support is both theoretical and empirical: Theoretically, I bring together the literature on political culture and socialization, political psychology, relative deprivation as well as democratic models to explain how citizens' democratic support is formed. Empirically, I develop a two-dimensional space of democratic support which structures citizens' attitudes and makes them comparable across countries. My research design is comparative and aiming to explaining variance in democratic support both across countries and across individuals. To be able to do that, I need data on individual support for democracy in different countries as well as data on country-level democratic regimes. I focus on established European democracies for two reasons: First, European countries share a similar level of democratic quality, and fulfil standards of liberal democracy such as political freedom, political equality and vertical and horizontal control mechanisms, as Bühlmann et al. (2012) have established. And second, Europe nevertheless offers a wide range of countries with different democratic models and democratization histories, allowing me to compare their effects. On the individual level, I use data from the European Social Survey Round 6 (ESS 2012), which has the unique advantage of offering

extensive items on citizens expectations from and evaluations of democracy in addition to the traditional measure on satisfaction with democracy. This data allows me to test my spatial model of democratic support. On the country level, I primarily use data from the Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), which offers not just an aggregate measure of the democratic quality of established democracies, but also fine-grained measures on democratic functions that can be used to differentiate between different models of democracy.

2. Support for democracy and how to define it

State of the art: What do we know about support for democracy?

Since a long time, public support has been considered highly relevant for the legitimacy of a political system: Max Weber wrote in the early 20th century that "every system of domination attempts to instil in its subordinates the belief in its legitimacy" (Weber 1968, 213), implying that both the legitimacy claims of the rulers and the legitimacy beliefs of their subjects are worth studying (Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek 2007, 6). Support for democracy is about the latter, legitimacy beliefs - as Thomassen (2007, 418) states, a democratic regime "almost by definition is a legitimate regime", as it is supposed to be based on the consent of the people. With the rise of political science as a discipline after the Second World War, citizens' support for their democracies became an important topic especially for American scholars: Lipset (1959) discussed the *social prerequisites for democracy,* Almond and Verba (1963) introduced the notions of *civic culture* as a crucial factor for the persistence of a democratic regime and David Easton (1957, 1965) originated the concept of *political support.* Democracies, as all of them agree, have to convince their citizens with politics that are both effective and legitimate to maintain their stability (Almond and Verba 1963, 230; Lipset 1959, 86; Easton 1965, 119). As Campbell (2013, 1) has put it, "few claims of 20th-century political science have proved as enduringly relevant as the notion that stable democracy depends upon a concordant wellspring of supportive citizen attitudes". This points to two big challenges that research in this area faces: First of all, to conceptualize and measure support for democracy, and second, to understand the sources of this support across individuals, time, and countries.

To begin with, there are different approaches to define what support is: Easton (1965, 267ff.) claims that political support can be conceptualized (and measured) on different levels, ranging from specific support for political actors (such as parties and courts) to diffuse support for the political regime and its principles. While the Eastonian concept of support is the most used and cited approach in the literature, it has also been persistently revised (see for example Norris 1999; 2011), and many scholars have questioned the division between diffuse and

specific support, arguing that citizens do not distinguish between these concepts, which makes them difficult to use empirically (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007, 44), and that the two are confusingly intertwined given that each political object might be subject to both specific and diffuse support (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b, 9). Most recent studies, however, agree on the conceptualization of different types or levels of support for democracy (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004; Torcal and Montero 2006a). Shin (2007, 269) argues that support for democracy is a multi-layered phenomenon because "citizens simultaneously comprehend democracy as an ideal system and as a political system-in-practice", and distinguishes between normative and practical support for democracy. Normative support refers to a positive attachment to the idea of democracy, while practical support refers to favourable evaluations of the democratic structure and institutions. Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 268ff) differentiate between instrumental and intrinsic support for democracy, where the latter is supposedly more widespread in advanced, post-industrial democracies (see also Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Consequently, it also remains a matter of debate how support for democracy should be operationalized and measured. In advanced democracies, large majorities of respondents agree that "democracy is the best form of government" (in Europe around 90%, see Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b, 11). The expression of general support for democracy as a regime, at the same time, does not imply satisfaction with its functioning, or the necessary rejection of its alternatives (Ariely and Davidov 2011). The most commonly used indicator for democratic support, but also one of the most criticized ones, is satisfaction with democracy (see for example Linde and Ekman 2003; Ariely and Davidov 2011). Given that this indicator has been used to measure both 'diffuse' support for regime principles, and 'specific' support for the functioning of institutions, some authors recommend avoiding this indicator altogether (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). Other authors prefer to use preferences of democracy over its (non-democratic) alternatives as a measure for practical support (Shin 2007, 271), especially in non-democratic contexts. Further indicators such as political confidence and trust have indistinctly been labelled as support for regime institutions or support for political authorities (Dalton 2004; Norris 2011), although it remains unclear whether trust is a component of diffuse support or an independent variable explaining support for democracy (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b, 10).

The second challenge is finding out which factors explain support for democracy - or, in other words, what are the sources of citizens' legitimacy beliefs. Substantially, this research is based on the question whether support is intrinsic or instrumental, normative or practical: Do people

support democracy because they believe in its procedures, or because it delivers desired outcomes (Magalhães 2014; Wessels 2016)? Consequently, two main approaches can be distinguished in the respective literature: First, a democratic history and political culture approach which focuses on the ways in which different democratic (or authoritarian) experiences and concomitant political values affect support for the political system (Almond and Verba 1980; Mishler and Rose 1996; Anderson 1998; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Fuchs and Roller 2006; Oskarsson 2010), and second, a system performance approach which claims that political and economic performance as well as institutional quality determines whether citizens are satisfied with their democracy (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Magalhães 2014; Dahlberg and Linde 2016). Both approaches have some empirical leverage, but the results differ considerably due to the data and methods they build on (Wells and Krieckhaus 2006). The best explanatory power, however, seems to be reached with models that combine both factors (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009).

While both cultural and performance-based approaches traditionally focus on the macro-level to explain individual support, other authors have started to also take individual characteristics into account. Their findings suggest that individual factors such as being part of the political majority and a favourable individual economic situation lead to higher degrees of satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012). In addition to such direct effects of individual-level conditions on support, these characteristics also interact with macro-level conditions: For instance, when it comes to government performance and institutional quality, several studies have found interaction effects with respondents' winner-loser status (Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Campbell 2013), as well as with socio-economic variables (Schäfer 2012). Similar results apply for political cultural and socialization effects, which interact for example with individual age and cohort effects (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014) and with individual social status (Mishler and Rose 2001b). In sum, in addition to macro-level cultural and institutional factors, micro-level factors clearly have an impact on citizens' support from democracy as well. This effect can be both direct and in interaction with macro-level factors, pointing to the fact that both levels of analysis should be taken into account.

Lastly, there is some disagreement about the interpretation of the results concerning those citizens that are dissatisfied with democracy: On the one hand, proponents of the crisis-interpretation claim that citizens are increasingly alienated from democracy and its representatives, hence, compromising the legitimacy of the system as a whole (Crozier,

Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Petring and Merkel 2011; Foa and Mounk 2016). On the other hand, several scholars have argued that 'dissatisfied' or 'critical' citizens (Norris 1999, 2011) are actually a benefit for democratic regimes, as they help improving democracy: “The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as less a threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures” (Klingemann 1999, 32; see also Klingemann 2014). Similarly, authors such as Welzel attest that we have shifted from an allegiant democratic culture to one of "assertive" citizens, which do not (just) defer to political elites, but challenge them (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013; Dalton and Welzel 2014). While this literature supposes that dissatisfaction is caused by a combination of high expectations, postmaterialist values and critical outlooks on politics amongst citizens with above-average education and political interest, leading to high levels of electoral and non-electoral participation (Norris 1999, 21; Geissel 2008), the pessimistic approach, in contrast, assumes that dissatisfied democrats are not confident about or interested in politics, but “simply more alienated and confused” (Doorenspleet 2012, 287), and can rather be labelled as “disaffected democrats” (Montero, Günther, and Torcal 1997, 17ff.; Magalhães 2005; Torcal and Montero 2006b), given their low levels of participation and involvement in the political system.

Conceptualizing support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction

A first step in each analysis of democratic support, thus, should be to conceptualize what exactly support for democracy means, and how it is operationalized and ultimately measured. As the previous section has shown, most existing studies focus on either support for the ideal of democracy, or satisfaction with its functioning to conceptualize support for democracy. This dissertation, following Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), attempts a more precise conceptualization. In accordance with Pippa Norris' observation that it is essential to distinguish "attitudes that operate at different levels rather than treat political support as though it is all of one piece" (Norris 2011, 241), I use three attitudes to conceptualize political support.

The first component is *expectations from democracy*, which refer to the normative model of democracy favoured by an individual - in other words, what should democracy be like and what should it do for me? I assume that citizens, in a more a less precise way, have an idea in mind of how a good democracy should look like. Expectations are thus a normative concept; they are not about a judgement of what democracy 'has done for me lately', but about the

expectations what a democracy in general 'should do for me'.[3] Secondly, *evaluations of democracy* express how citizens see their own democracy; they thus refer to the perceived performance of the respective democratic regime someone lives in. Finally, *satisfaction with democracy (SWD)*, an often-used concept in the political support literature: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?" This concept refers to an overall assessment of the functioning of the democratic regime in one's country - am I satisfied with what democracy has done for me lately? It captures citizens' general legitimacy beliefs.

Figure 2: Support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction.



How are these three components of support linked to each other? Common sense would propose that satisfaction is an outcome of what we want - expectations - and what we get - evaluations. Satisfaction, then, would be expectations minus evaluations. As Figure 2 shows, I indeed suppose that these three attitudes are linked in a systematic way: Satisfaction is a function of the distance between expectations and evaluations. What are the substantial arguments for this assumption? Expectations and evaluations, if we want to follow Eastons approach, are located on a specific level of support: Normative expectations, which I assume to be formed primarily, serve as a yardstick for evaluations of the reality. But in addition to that, both can take place in different dimensions of democracy: First of all, do I want democracy to be representative? Fair? Competitive? Participatory? Efficient? And, secondly, do I perceive democracy to be like that in reality? Satisfaction with democracy, which is a more diffuse form of support, should then be an outcome of the comparison of normative expectations with evaluations of the reality. Does the democracy I live in fit my yardstick(s) in different dimensions? If it does, that should make for a general sense of satisfaction with democracy. Chapter Three of this dissertation explains my conceptualization of satisfaction in more detail, and elaborates a spatial model of democratic support. A similar approach is taken by Ferrín and Kriesi (2016b), who assume that "it is the comparison between the democratic ideals and the actual functioning of democracy that makes for the judgment about the

[3]Ferrín and Kriesi (2016b, 10) use the same definition, but prefer the term "views of democracy" instead of expectations.

legitimacy of a democratic regime". A comparable idea is also used by Norris (2011), who talks about a "democratic deficit".

In sum, I define support for democracy as citizens' legitimacy beliefs: Do they consent to the democratic regime that they are subjected to? These legitimacy beliefs consist of the democratic expectations citizens hold, their evaluations of the democratic reality, and their judgment about the consistency of the two, expressed as satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with democracy. Voicing satisfaction, then, is granting legitimacy to your democracy - expressing that you do believe in its legitimacy, given that your evaluations sufficiently match with your expectations. Notably, this model of democratic support is one that is targeted rather at existing developed democracies (whether young or old), and not at authoritarian or transitioning countries, in which it is more important to measure citizens' aspirations for democracy as compared to authoritarian alternatives, and their ability to define democracy as a concept (cf. Shin 2015). My model aims at citizens in democratic regimes, who are dealing with real-life democracy every day.

3. Support for democracy in Europe - some empirical puzzles

After giving an overview of the state of the art in research on support for democracy, and explaining my concept of support, this section gives a first glance at the available data on democratic support to illustrate some of the empirical puzzles this dissertation addresses. My geographical focus, as previously explained, is on European democracies, which cover a wide range of democratic models and histories while having a comparable level of democracy, and to which the previously developed model of support applies. The Democracy Barometer data is available for all countries that are considered democratic[4], while the European Social Survey 2012, my main individual-level data source, limits my dataset to 26 European democracies[5]. The first question that I address is: *How and why does support for democracy differ across countries?* An important factor, according to the literature cited in the previous section, is the quality of democratic institutions: In which way and how well are democratic principles put into place? Democracies differ in the way they realize democratic principles, as for example Bühlmann et al. (2012) show. Such differences in democratic performance could

[4]Meaning that they are rated as democracies since 1995 by both Polity IV and Freeedom House, see Bühlmann et al. 2012.

[5]Albania (AL), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DN), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Ukraine (UA) and Great Britain (GB). The ESS 2012 sample includes three more countries (Israel, Russia, and Kosovo), which I exclude - Israel because it is not in Europe, Russia because it is not democratic, and Kosovo due to the almost total lack of country-level data.

also explain variance in satisfaction. Figure 3 shows the distribution of citizens' average satisfaction with democracy as well as democratic quality in the 26 European democracies in my sample in one plot.[6] As can be seen, mean levels of satisfaction do differ quite considerably across countries, ranging from a low of around 3 in Bulgaria to more than 7 in Switzerland, Norway and Denmark on an overall 10 point scale. Looking at the distribution of countries, low satisfaction seems more predominant in Southern and Eastern Europe, while Western Europe, especially Scandinavia, dominates the top ranks. Looking at the level of democratic quality, the picture of countries is similar: Many countries are actually on or close to the 45° line, implying that those with the most satisfied citizens are also those performing best in the Democracy Barometer. Yet, country-level democratic quality does not explain all the differences either, as some examples show: Switzerland has more satisfied citizens than it should have considering its democratic quality, and Bulgaria, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal and Italy should have higher levels of satisfaction given their democratic quality.

Figure 3: Satisfaction with democracy and democratic quality in Europe (2012).



Notes: Satisfaction with democracy measured on a scale from 0 to 10, depicted is the mean for all citizens of a country. Democratic quality measured on a scale from 0 to 100, rescaled to 0 to 10. Year: 2012. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. Line=45°.

[6] 3 of these 26 countries do not appear in this graph as there is no aggregate data on democratic quality for them (Albania, Slovakia and Ukraine).

This picture is a static one though, that looks only at levels and not at changes. To understand whether changes in both variables are related to each other, I look at the development of satisfaction and democratic quality over time. I randomly selected 8 of the 26 democracies[7], limiting the amount of figures and tables. Figure 4 shows the development of satisfaction with democracy and democratic quality in these selected countries over time. Levels of satisfaction change over time - in some cases they vary rather little (i.e. Italy with almost constant values since the 1970s) and in other cases quite a lot (i.e. Belgium with fluctuations between 3.5 and 6). While some show an upward trend over time (Czech Republic), others follow a decreasing trend (Slovenia). At first sight, the common claim that support for democracy is strongly decreasing since the 1970s cannot be supported; we can rather confirm Norris' depiction of trendless fluctuations. But can the quality of democracy explain these fluctuations over time? If we look at the developmentof democratic quality to understand whether they can explain changes in satisfaction, the picture is rather mixed: In Italy, France and Czech Republic, there is a very similar trend in both lines. At the same time, Germany experienced a downturn of satisfaction in the 2000s followed by an increase since 2010, and Slovenia experienced strongly declining levels of satisfaction since 2008, despite stable democratic performances in both countries. Consequently, the quality of democracy, while contributing to citizens' satisfaction, is clearly not the only factor explaining its variation.

[7]Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Slovenia.

Figure 4: Satisfaction with democracy and democratic quality in Europe (1970-2014).



Notes: Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, depicted is the mean for all citizens of a country. Democratic quality is originally measured on a scale from 0 to 100, which has been rescaled to 0 to 10. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), Eurobarometer trend file (Schmitt and Scholz 2005), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS and Eurobarometer post-stratification weights.

As pointed out in Section 2, the literature on support for democracy has established that country-level factors are often conditional on individual-level dynamics. Hence, the deciding factor might not be how experts rate a democracy, but how citizens do. This brings us to a question which my conceptualization of democratic support in the previous section has raised: *Is satisfaction a product of expectations and evaluations*? Figure 5 shows data from the ESS 2012 that provides some insights into the question of how exactly the different attitudes that form support for democracy are linked, and if staisfaction is a product of what citizens want from their democracy, and what they (believe to) get. While democratic expectations are rather high across all countries, evaluations seem to be more closely linked to levels of satisfaction. Interestingly though, the highest levels of expectations from democracy can be found in those countries that have the least satisfied citizens. Indeed, the distance between what 'should be' and what 'is' seems to explain variying levels of satisfaction in Europe.

Figure 5: Support for democracy in Europe, 2012 (means per country).



Notes: Expectations from, evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, depicted is the mean for all citizens of a country. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight.

So far, these patterns all refer to country-level differences, but I also want to understand if and why individuals differ in their patterns of support. *How does support for democracy vary across individuals?* Figure 6 shows how the socio-economic status of individuals affects their support for democracy. Out of the three variables usually used to measure socio-economic status (income, education and occupation), I pick one indicator to illustrate its effects, the household income.

Figure 6: Support for democracy in different socio-economic groups (distributions).



Notes: Expectations from, evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Low income: 1st to 5th decile, high income: 6th to 10th decile. The plots show minimum/maximum, first quartile to third quartile range, and the median of the distribution, the dots show outliers. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight.

In the boxplots that illustrate the variable distributions, we can see that citizens' income levels influence the way they see democracy: In all countries, evaluations of and especially satisfaction with democracy are higher for persons with a high income - apparently, low-income citizens evaluate their democracy more critical, and are also less satisfied. Expectations, though, do not differ considerably according to income. Further, it is interesting to see that the distribution differences between low- and high-income citizens are not the same in each country: In Germany and Italy, for example, satisfaction differs quiet substantially between the two groups, while the differences in Belgium, the Netherlands or France are less strong.

In sum, support for democracy clearly does vary across countries and individuals, and a first look at the data raises some questions: Why does support differ across countries? How are expectations, evaluations and satisfaction linked to each other? And why do individuals conceive of democracy in different ways according to their status? In the following chapters, I try to find answers to those puzzles. The first step, however, is to define what democracy actually means, and how it is structured in the attitudes of citizens. This is what the next chapter does.

4. Understanding dimensions of democracy

Dimensions of democracy in theory and empirics

From a normative point of view, the fact that “democracy” can mean different things has long been established - democratic theory offers plenty of different and often opposed conceptions of what 'government of the people, by the people and for the people' is supposed to mean and how it is to function. For proponents of the *minimalist perspective*, democracy is merely a means to elect skilled elites capable of making public decisions, and protecting individual liberties (Schumpeter 1943, 269; Dahl 1971, 23). In a *participatory conception of democracy*, involvement in politics is valued for its own sake and is considered the core of a democracy (Barber 1984, 153). A *social democratic approach to democracy* also considers political outcomes like social equality as essential for fair and meaningful democratic participation (cf. Held 1987, 274ff). According to scholars such as Fuchs (1999, 125ff.), the distinction between liberal and social(ist) democracy is the most important one when it comes to normative models of democracy. He sees the main difference between the two models in the emphasis of the organization principle of relationships between individuals: While in the liberal model this principle is competition, in the socialist model it is solidarity (*ibid.:* 128). Similarly, Thomassen (2007, 423ff) sees democratic models on a continuum between

individualism and collectivism, where a libertarian and a socialist model oppose each other. The literature on *varieties of democracy* further assumes that also empirically, established democracies diverge in the way they realize democracy: They have implemented democratic principles through different formal institutional arrangements as well as informal practices and procedures. As Bochsler and Kriesi have put it, “they are all variations on a general theme” (2013, 69). Democracy, in this argumentation, consists of several dimensions, and existing democracies emphasize these dimensions differently. For instance, as Lijphart (1984, 1999) has famously stated, some democracies rely more on majoritarian decision-making, whereas others emphasize consensus-oriented forms of power-sharing. Collier and Levitsky (1997) speak of democracies "with adjectives".

Support for democracy, as previously established, is about legitimacy beliefs - based on what criteria do citizens believe their democracy is legitimate? These criteria have been analysed by Scharpf (1999, 7), who, based on Easton (1965, 199ff.), divides democratic legitimation into output legitimacy - the effectiveness of policy outcomes for the people - and input legitimacy - the responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people. Schmidt (2013) has added throughput legitimacy, which is judged in terms of the efficacy, accountability and transparency of governance processes along with their inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people. Why does all this matter for my dissertation? It matters because this research shows that democracy is a multidimensional and multifaceted concept that researchers approach from different angles, and I argue that we should expect citizens to do the same. If researchers can make out differences between democratic models, and between sources of democratic legitimacy, they should matter for citizens, too. If we want to understand their attitudes towards democratic institutions and processes and their ideas about democratic legitimacy, we need to find out first how they conceive of democracy.

Dimensions of democracy in citizens' attitudes

Democracy should thus be treated as multidimensional also in citizens' attitudes. In order to analyse it in that way, data is needed that covers both different dimensions of democracy and different dimensions of support, as introduced in Section 2. Survey data which differentiates between types of support, and types of democracy, is not very common, but can be found in the 2012 round of the European Social Survey (ESS 2012). This dataset, accordingly, will build the main data source of my dissertation. On top of the traditional satisfaction with democracy indicator (SWD), it covers two other types of support along a wide range of democratic attributes. Concretely, it contains a set of questions about citizens' expectations

from democracy in general. They all start with the wording: "And now thinking about democracy in general: How important do you think it is for a democracy…", followed by a democratic attribute such as "…that national elections are free and fair?", and can be answered on a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). In total, there are 15 items on different democratic characteristics[8], ranging from input criteria such as the voting system to output criteria such as social policies (see Table 1).

Table 1: Items on expectations from democracy, European Social Survey (ESS 2012).

	Concept[9]	"Please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general that…" (Scale 0-10)
1	**Free and fair elections**	…that national elections are free and fair?
2	**Deliberation**	...that voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote?
3	**Party alternatives:**	...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another?
4	**Freedom of the opposition**	...that opposition parties are free to criticize the government?
5	**Freedom of the press**	…that the media are free to criticize the government?
6	**Transparency: Media information function**	...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government?
7	**Minority rights**	...that the rights of minority groups are protected?
8	**Direct participation: Referenda**	...that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?
9	**Inclusiveness of participation**	....that immigrants only get the right to vote in national elections once they become citizens?
10	**Rule of law**	...that the courts treat everyone the same?
11	**Horizontal accountability**	...that the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority?
12	**Retrospective accountability (vertical)**	...that governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job?
13	**Protection against poverty**	...that the government protects all citizens against poverty?
14	**Transparency of the government**	...that the government explains its decisions to voters?
15	**Equality: Redistribution**	...that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels?

Doing separate analyses for all these items would be possible, but also rather complex, especially if country-level variables are included as well. Furthermore, several items refer to similar functions of democracy (such as freedom, transparency, or accountability); hence, assuming that they can be reduced to common factors is evident. As mentioned before, the idea that democracy is multidimensional has been established both normatively and empirically. While I could use these established concepts of democracy to structure my

[8]The original questionnaire has another item referring to multilevel accountability, hence democracy on the supranational level, which I do not take into consideration as I only analyse national democracy.
[9]Source of the concepts: ESS Round 6 Question Module Design Final Template (European Social Survey 2013).

analysis, I am interested in the way citizens' reason about and make sense of democracy, and not in theoretical approaches. Therefore, I begin with identifying empirical dimensions of democracy on the level of citizens' attitudes first, and try to understand their way of associating democratic attributes. As the question how individuals conceptualize democracy is theoretically and empirically barely explored, I base my analysis on an exploratory factor analysis. The goal of this analysis is to include the biggest possible subset of items in as little dimensions of democracy as possible - based on the data, and not on theoretical notions. I use the items measuring citizens' expectations from democracy (and not the ones referring to their evaluations), for two reasons: First of all, as explained previously in section 2, I suppose that citizens first form their ideas about how a democracy should be like, and then evaluate existing democracies based on these criteria. And secondly, from a more practical perspective, the items for expectations appear first in the questionnaire, implying that they give a more unbiased picture of citizens' beliefs.

Another option to uncover the structure of the same set of ESS 2012 items, as proposed by Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta (2016, 68), is a Mokken scaling analysis, assuming the items to have a hierarchical order. This approach has some shortcomings: First of all, Kriesi et al. pre-select dimensions of democracy in which they test their scales based on theoretical considerations (liberal democracy, electoral democracy, social justice, and direct democracy), without knowing whether these dimensions also correspond to citizens' attitudes. Further, the scaling approach requires a dichotomized indicator, so that the authors recode all items into 10=1, and 0-9=0 (*ibid.*, 67). This approach, which seems to be based on the empirical fact that the support for all expectations items is very high, creates an unnatural dichotomy for which the indicators were not created, and could lead to blown-up differences between citizens. Lastly, the authors only show the aggregate results and do not report whether the scaling hierarchy is different across individual countries, but mention that there are only minor violations of scalability. Given that the aggregate model shows only very small differences between items' positions in the hierarchy (*ibid.*, 73), I would assume that these positions are different across countries, making the use of an aggregate model problematic. In sum, this makes a factor analytical approach which does not rescale any items, or make previous assumptions about dimensions, a more appropriate way to understand the ESS 2012 items.

My sample, as described before, consists of 26 European democracies. Given that these countries are quite different in their democratic, social, and economic performance, one could expect that the structure of their citizens' orientations towards democracy may differ as well. Hence, I perform the factor analysis separately in each country, and report the results. From

the 15 initial items, I exclude two for practical reasons.[10] The 13 remaining items build two factors that have Eigenvalues higher than 1.[11] As this solution still includes several items with rather low factor loadings, I then proceeded to exclude them one by one, to refine the factor solution. In steps, I exclude six items: Three of them (deliberation, minority rights, and rule of law) load on the first factor, but not strong enough (below 0.3). Government transparency loads on the second factor, but again not strongly. Two items, direct participation and vertical accountability, have low loadings on both factors. This results in a clear seven-item solution with loadings of above 0.35 for all items. Table 2 shows the pooled solution over all countries. While this solution only shows aggregate results that could hide country-level variance, I use it to illustrate the factor compositions, which are the same in each individual country.[12]

Table 2: Principal component analysis, factors and factor loadings, pooled solution over all countries, reduced set of items.

Variable	Factor 1: Liberal	Factor 2: Social
Elections free and fair	0.4042	0.0498
Party alternatives	0.3643	0.0683
Opposition free	0.5153	-0.0869
Media free	0.4964	-0.0813
Transparency media	0.4082	0.0815
Protection poverty	-0.0131	0.6113
Redistribution	-0.0772	0.624
Eigenvalue	3.98413	1.30181
% Variance	39.05	27.02

Notes: Varimax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

The two resulting factors are substantially interpretable and in line with existing arguments about dimensions of democracy, which often rely on a juxtaposition of a liberal and a social model of democracy (Fuchs and Roller 2006): Factor one includes typical dimensions of liberal democracy - fair elections, political freedom, party alternatives, transparency, and factor two assembles the items referring to the social components of democracy: Protection

[10]They only appear in the item list of expectations but not in the list of evaluations (inclusiveness of participation and horizontal accountability).

[11]For a plot showing all Eigenvalues of the factor solution, see Figure 9 in the appendix. A possible third factor would only have split up factor 1, and has an Eigenvalue of just below 1.

[12]For the pooled solution with the full set of items, see Table 6 in the appendix. For the same table with Promax (oblique) rotation, see Table 7 in the appendix. As the different rotation methods change the results only minimally, I stick to orthogonal Varimax rotation - assuming factors to be non-correlated - in the remainder of the analysis.

against poverty and redistribution. The two factors also correspond to Scharpfs (1999) and Schmidts (2013) concept of *input*, *throughput*, and *output* legitimacy: Input and throughput figure in the liberal dimension, and output in the social dimension. Another interpretation would be to see the liberal dimension as procedural democracy and the social dimension as democratic performance, or substantial democracy. But what about the items that were excluded during the factor analysis? Substantially, most of them fit in a liberal rather than a social model, and most of them also loaded rather on factor 1 - this applies to deliberation, minority rights, and the rule of law. Government transparency loaded slightly more strongly on social democracy, but substantially fits rather with the other transparency items in factor one. Generally, none of them represents a different dimension of democracy theoretically, or a different factor empirically, which justifies to not use them further in the analysis. From the two items that did not load clearly on any of the two factors, vertical accountability, again, is substantially part of liberal democracy, which already has an election and competition component, making its exclusion justifiable, too. The only item which actually represents a different democratic dimension, but got excluded because it did not make for an own actor empirically, is direct participation.

Looking at the separate solutions for each country (Table 3), we can see that they show a very consistent structure also across countries. Each of the 26 countries has two factors composed of the same items as in the aggregate solution. The explained variance reaches a minimum of 0.51, and a maximum of 0.75, which means that this solution explains between half and 75% of the variance across countries. Interestingly, the highest explained variance can be found in Eastern European, former communist countries such as Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. This could be interpreted as a sign that citizens of young democracies perceive democracy stronger along the contrast between procedural and performance-based democracies, while citizens in older democracies have either a more uniform, or an even more multidimensional view on democracy. Indeed, a possible third factor (although it never reaches Eigenvalues of more than 1) is stronger in established democracies. Factor loadings generally vary between 0.3 and 0.6 for Factor 1, and between 0.5 and 0.7 for Factor 2. There are a few exceptions where factor loadings fall under 0.3 for Factor 1, notably in Germany, Iceland and Sweden. These all concern item 3 (the offer of policy alternatives by parties) an item that is part of the potential third factor in some established democracies. Yet, given that this factor is not strong enough to improve explanatory power in any of these countries, and that this item still loads strongest on Factor 1, I decided to keep this structure.

Table 3: Results of principal component analysis in each country separately, Eigenvalues, explained variance and factor loadings, reduced set of items.

Country	Eigenvalues (>1)		Explained variance in %			Range of factor loadings	
	Factor 1 liberal	Factor 2 social	Factor 1 liberal	Factor 2 social	Total	Factor 1 liberal	Factor 2 social
Albania	1.30	3.98	27	39	66	0.33-0.54	0.52-0.54
Belgium	5.48	1.61	32	20	52	0.40-0.48	0.61-0.63
Bulgaria	5.53	1.53	29	22	51	0.35-0.49	0.62-0.63
Cyprus	4.72	1.30	34	23	57	0.41-0.50	0.53-0.60
Czech Republic	6.35	1.45	45	24	69	0.39-0.46	0.64-0.69
Denmark	3.89	1.82	32	23	55	0.42-0.52	0.57-0.62
Estonia	6.42	1.44	41	27	68	0.39-0.50	0.63-0.64
Finland	3.57	1.41	33	28	61	0.32-0.56	0.59-0.60
France	5.24	1.49	38	23	61	0.40-0.48	0.59-0.65
Germany	4.56	1.75	34	24	58	0.28-0.52	0.61-0.63
Great Britain	6.03	1.31	37	27	64	0.33-0.52	0.57-0.64
Hungary	7.21	1.43	43	31	74	0.36-0.52	0.59-0.60
Iceland	4.58	1.62	34	25	59	0.26-0.51	0.60-0.61
Ireland	7.09	1.10	40	28	68	0.38-0.51	0.54-0.63
Italy	5.01	1.61	35	26	61	0.39-0.50	0.60-0.61
Lithuania	7.77	1.17	43	32	75	0.39-0.54	0.59-0.61
Netherlands	5.29	1.62	41	22	63	0.38-0.48	0.63-0.67
Norway	4.43	1.79	36	25	61	0.32-0.50	0.59-0.60
Poland	4.19	1.39	32	21	53	0.38-0.49	0.63-0.64
Portugal	1.03	4.02	27	35	62	0.32-0.42	0.45-0.49
Slovakia	7.06	1.49	42	31	73	0.38-0.50	0.60-0.61
Slovenia	4.72	1.61	32	27	59	0.32-0.55	0.58-0.60
Spain	1.43	5.72	28	30	58	0.34-0.59	0.52-0.56
Sweden	4.49	1.75	36	24	60	0.26-0.52	0.61-0.62
Switzerland	4.44	1.60	31	25	56	0.43-0.51	0.58-0.60
Ukraine	1.48	6.22	31	34	65	0.31-0.61	0.55-0.57

Notes: Varimax rotation. Eigenvalues >1. N(total)=47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight.

To finalize the analysis, I also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis for the full model (including all 13 items) as well as the reduced one in each country, to understand how well they fit the data. The two-factor model with all 13 items shows an RMSEA between 0.058 and 0.072, which could not be improved by including further covariates. The reduced model, which includes only 7 items, brought a better fit (RMSEA between 0.041 and 0.056, and better values for the other fit indexes as well), as Table 4 shows.

Table 4: Confirmatory factor analysis, goodness of fit statistics across countries.

Fit Indexes (ranges across countries)	2-factor model, full set of items	2 factor model, reduced set of items
X^2 (df)	2756.1***-3943.3***	1789.2***-2128.8***
RMSEA	0.058 -0.072	0.041-0.056
CFI	0.976-0.988	0.985-0.991
TLI	0.962-0.969	0.970-0.975
CD	0.961-0.971	0.981-0.989

*Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. N(countries)=26, N(total)=47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight.*

Given that the reduced two-factor model seems to fit the data best, I continue the analysis with this solution. I proceed by forming additive indices for the two factors, which express the mean of all five (respectively two) items for each respondent, measuring individual support for liberal and social democracy on a scale from 0 to 10[13].

A two-dimensional space of democratic support

What does this mean substantially? The resulting factors - liberal, procedural democracy and social, performance-based democracy - are two dimensions which structure citizens' democratic support. I assume, in other words, that individuals vary in their ideas of a 'good' democracy, and that this variance can be captured on a scale along two dimensions. Not their idea of democracy per se is different, but their position in a two-dimensional space of democratic ideals. The development of this two-dimensional space with a factor-analytical approach allows me to compare citizens' democratic support across countries and to generalize my findings. Moreover, the two dimensions also refer to two substantially different ways to define democracy: A procedural and a substantial approach. In a liberal version, democracy is seen as merely a procedure and social justice rather as a prerequisite for or a potential outcome of these procedures. From a substantive perspective, social justice is seen as a substantial and intrinsic part of democracy. This finding is in line with scholars such as Thomassen (2007, 425ff.), who differentiate between freedom, characterized by individual liberties and competition, and (social) equality, characterized by solidarity and collectivism, as the main poles of democratic values. As the following chapters will show, the contrast

[13]Additive indices correlate highly with factors scores, especially when the loadings in each factor are similar. As Table 8 in the appendix shows, the correlation for my two factors is above 0.95. Factor scores are standardized weighted averages, which makes the interpretation difficult, while an additive index can be interpreted easily as a respondents' position on a scale (0=lowest possible expectations, 10=highest possible expectations). Based on this, I decided to continue using additive scores. The indices are only computed for cases with no missing values.

between these two approaches is indeed fundamental if we want to understand how European citizens feel about their democracies.

Figure 7: Dimensions of democracy in citizens' expectations.



Notes: Expectations from democracy are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights. Line=45°.

Figure 7 illustrate the scale - or space - of democratic support: On the left, we can see how citizens place themselves along the liberal democratic and the social democratic dimensions. Generally, expectations are high on both dimensions, but even higher for liberal democracy. If we look at the 45° line, we can see that some citizens value liberal democracy stronger than social democracy and some vice versa. More precisely, 37.45 percent of citizens value liberal over social democracy, and show above the 45° line, while 43.53 percent value social democracy higher than liberal and show below the line. 19.02 percent actually value both dimensions exactly the same. On the right, the aggregates of citizens' expectations per country are plotted, showing that also countries vary on the two scales. Some, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia and Ukraine, score higher on the social democratic scale than on the liberal one. Countries like Denmark, Norway, Czech Republic and the Netherlands on the other hand have a more liberal than social focus. In sum, citizens differ in their opinion on what a democracy should be like - mostly procedures, mostly substance, or both. The following chapters of this dissertation are using the two-dimensional democratic scale, and try to understand why citizens differ in their democratic expectations, and what these differences mean for their satisfaction with democracy.

Lastly, as explained previously, from all the items excluded during the factor analysis, the item 'direct participation' represents a different model of democracy, but did not load strongly on any factor, and was hence excluded during the item reduction process. While all the other items that got excluded refer to aspects already covered by the liberal dimension, or at least very similar ones, direct democracy is not included in the two-dimensional solution. This case

shows the limits of an empirically driven procedure that does not take theoretical considerations into account. As direct participation is theoretically interesting though, because it refers both to a different type of input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) and to a different democratic model (Vatter 2009), I decided to include it as a unitary item in my analysis to complement the two dimensions of democracy.

5. Main findings and contributions

The first issue I address in this thesis is the variance of democratic support across countries. Chapter Two starts from the question of democratic ideals: What do citizens actually expect from a democracy? Or, in other words, how does an ideal democracy look like for citizens? Based on the literature on democratic learning (Rohrschneider 1999; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Mishler and Rose 2002; Fuchs and Roller 2006), I assume that such expectations are contingent upon the country one lives in - democracies, just as other political regimes, form their citizens (Rose 2008). I assume that the meaning of democracy, which ideas and values are linked to the very term, and which associations someone has in mind when hearing the word (for example in a survey) depend on the way citizens are socialized. Effects of national socialization on the meaning of political concepts have been established for example for left-right placement (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016; Dinas 2017). I show that regime-specific socialization differs according to democratic history, and affects democratic expectations: Citizens of established Western European democracies are more likely to have a procedural idea of democracy, where the perceived fairness of rules leads to support for democracy independently of its outputs, supporting findings for example by Huang, Chang, and Chu (2008) and Rothstein (2009). At the same time, Eastern European citizens are still influenced by their Communist socialization, implying that the state, and consequentially also democracy, is responsible for providing outputs like social justice, and (as we know from other research such as Brender 2007; Bochsler and Hänni 2015) economic growth. While differences in political attitudes between citizens in Eastern and Western Europe have been established in the literature for quite a while (Mishler and Rose 1997; Anderson 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001a; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014), I can show for the first time that these differences exist on the level of *democratic ideals* as well, and that socialization effects are persistent and do not substantially decrease over time. Supporting findings from Sack (2016) about reunited Germany, there is no convergence of values between Eastern and Western Europeans, and democratic expectations still differ substantially more than 20 years after the fall of the iron curtain. Further, these macro-level effects are

independent of individual characteristics, and not affected by the length of or age during the socialization experience. Accordingly, rather than an interaction between macro and micro effects, socialization, in this case, is a direct macro-level phenomenon.

Additionally, I extend the socialization approach to empirical models of democracy - the way democracy is realized in specific countries. Democratic models have found some attention when it comes to their impact on satisfaction with democracy, especially amongst winners and losers (i.e. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Aarts and Thomassen 2008), but their socialization effects on democratic values have not been investigated yet. I show that the term 'democracy' is linked to different ideas depending on the type of democracy one grew up in: Citizens in majoritarian systems believe that democracy means two parties rather than a proportionally elected multiparty system, while those socialized in a consociational system link democracy to coalition governments. If citizens grow up in a purely representative democracy, they believe that democracy means representation, while growing up in a context that provides direct democratic institutions makes them more prone to see referenda as an essential feature of popular rule. These macro effects actually interact with micro-level conditions: Participating in democratic processes makes citizens more likely to orient their democratic expectations towards the regime they live in. Individual factors, therefore, moderate the macro-level effects, a factor that should be taken into account when analysing support for democracy across countries. Consequently, researchers should keep in mind that democracy can mean different things to survey respondents, depending on how and where they were socialized.

Secondly, I deal with the question what exactly makes citizens satisfied or dissatisfied. I test the model of democratic support presented in Section 2, which defines satisfaction as an outcome of expectations and evaluations. Is satisfaction simply the distance between what citizens expect and what they (think to) get? Taking into account negative and positive distances, Chapter Three shows that satisfaction with democracy is indeed affected by both the size and the direction of the distance between expectations and evaluations. I also test whether a spatially defined distance is a better measure than the arithmetic gap, and find that indeed, distance is a better predictor of satisfaction with democracy. Yet, satisfaction is not simply a product of supply and demand matching, but dimensions of democracy matter as well: While liberal democratic criteria are a rather generally agreed upon concept amongst citizens which cannot be 'too much', democratic input dimensions like direct participation as well as output criteria like social justice are more disputed, and lead to dissatisfaction among those who want more as well as those that want less of them. Apparently, reality is more

complex than surveys imply: When we ask citizens about their 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' in their country, we do not just get a simple, one-dimensional answer that reflects the difference between two factors. Rather, dissatisfaction arises from different sources: First, through high expectations that are not met by reality. Second, through low democratic expectations in general, even when combined with higher evaluations. Finally, through living in the 'wrong' type of democracy; one that is too liberal, too social or too direct for some of its citizens.

But why do individuals have such different expectations from and evaluations of their democracies? Chapter Two has established that the country-level context plays an important role in shaping democratic values, but this cannot explain individual-level differences. In Chapter Four, I first address the effects of social status on support for democracy, to then understand how it differs across countries. Based on the concept of perceived relative deprivation, I find that low-status citizens diverge systematically from higher status citizens: The former want democracy to be substantial rather than procedural, and they evaluate their own democracy more critically in all dimensions compared to their high-status counterparts. Perceived status, interestingly, matters more than objective socio-economic status. As a result, citizens who see themselves as losers in society have a substantially higher distance between expected and realized democracy, especially in the social dimension, which makes them more prone to dissatisfaction with democracy. Why is that the case? Socially dominant groups benefit from the status quo: They are more likely to have the (social) capital, influence, and knowledge to make their demands and needs heard in a political system, and are thus also more satisfied with its outcomes. Socially disadvantaged groups, or at least those that feel they are, do not benefit from the mostly liberal democratic status quo, and see democracy through the lens of societal losers: As something that does not work in their interest, does not take their opinions into account, and does not provide them with just outcomes.

Taking the macro-level into the equation, I find that social status actually matters most strongly in Western European countries. Post-communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis, on the other hand, show consistently higher levels of expectations (especial for social democracy), and lower levels of evaluations. Hence, while all citizens in Eastern and Southern Europe tend to have a more substantial view of democracy, and to be critical of their own democratic system, Western European citizens differ more strongly according to their status in what they want from a democracy. These findings also prove that taking into account the macro and micro level of analysis, and understanding their interaction effects is important.

6. Implications and outlook

What do these finding mean for the state of European democracies according to their citizens? There are both good and bad news: On the one hand, liberal democratic procedures show stable and high support amongst citizens in all parts of Europe. While Western Europeans show more support for liberal principles than their counterparts in former Communist countries, levels are generally high everywhere. Liberal democracy, in the sense of electoral freedom, competition, and transparency, is clearly universally agreed upon in Europe. At the same time, an important insight from this thesis is that democracy is not the same everywhere and for everyone - it is a multidimensional concept, in the conception of citizens as much as in political theory. Further, perceptions matter: How people 'feel' substantially affects their attitudes, and their view on reality. There is no such thing as an objectively good democracy, as people are socialized in different ways. They want different things from a democracy, and they see different sides of a democracy depending on who they are and where they grew up. Democracy, in other words, is not the same thing for each of its citizens.

As a result, there are also different 'causes' of dissatisfaction - not having enough democracy, having the wrong type of democracy, or being unhappy with the outcomes it provides. Some, and as Chapter Four shows, especially citizens in the East and the South of Europe, evaluate their own democracy critically, and want 'more' democracy in a liberal sense of democratic quality. Others want not merely more, but mainly a different type of democracy - more inputs or more outputs. This is again especially the case in younger democracies in Eastern Europe, and in the crisis-affected Southern Europe. It is also disproportionally the case for those Western Europeans who feel marginalized in their society. For these citizens, it is the responsiveness that is lacking, not the responsibility. Substantially, this finding also brings us back to the distinction between democracy as a procedure and democracy as substance introduced in Section 4 of this chapter. Apparently, the two-dimensional space of democracy that structures citizens' attitudes is also relevant in explaining dissatisfaction: While the importance of democratic procedures is not challenged by most citizens and a perceived lack of procedural quality leads to dissatisfaction, the same is true for a perceived lack of substance. While one can argue theoretically whether substantial claims for social justice apart from procedural justice are part of democracy, empirically, many citizens do believe so, and citizens perceive that social inequality, and the states unwillingness (or inability) to tackle it, delegitimizes democracy (cf. Mair 2013).

7. Content and structure of the dissertation

Figure 8 visualizes the content and structure of this dissertation: Paper One deals with the assumption that individual democratic ideals are systematically affected by the political system citizens live in; because collective and individual socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria we expect a democracy to fulfil. Paper Two then develops and tests a spatial model to understand the determinants of satisfaction with democracy in different dimensions of democracy, claiming that dissatisfaction is caused by under-, over- and misperformance of democracy. Paper Three, lastly, turns to the individual background of citizens by investigating how perceived as well as objective socio-economic status affects democratic support.

Figure 8: Content and structure of the dissertation



Paper 1: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific socialization shapes Europeans' expectations from democracy

I start my analysis by asking what democracy actually means to citizens, and where such democratic values come from. Popular support is essential for the legitimacy of modern democracies, and citizens' views are important to assess the quality of a democratic regime. Yet, when analysing support for democracy, researchers tend to assume that 'democracy' is a concept that travels across countries. This paper, to the contrary, argues that individual democratic ideals are systematically affected by the political system that citizens experience.

Democracy is thus not the same for every citizen in each context, because collective and individual socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria we expect a democracy to fulfil. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature on varieties of democracy, I argue that individual expectations from democracy differ across countries, and that they are influenced by two factors: The democratic history, consisting of age and quality of institutions as well as authoritarian legacies, and the prevalent democratic model. Hence, the specific democratic context in which a citizen lives matters - due to socialization and democratic learning, individuals acquire democratic preferences and value those dimensions more which they experience in their own democracy. Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test how the national democratic context in 26 European democracies influences these individual democratic ideals. Indeed, I find evidence for both socialization and participation effects of the democratic context on citizens' democratic ideals.

Paper 2: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to support for democracy

In the next paper, I deal with the individual-level relationship of the different attitudes underlying democratic support. Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a commonly used indicator in political opinion research, and its determinants have been analysed extensively in the literature. But what does dissatisfaction with democracy substantially mean? This paper wants to understand if satisfaction is actually a coherent consequence of citizens considering democratic supply and demand. It departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the distance between what 'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and democratic reality. I capture this idea in a spatial model of democratic support, where the size and direction of the distance between citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy determines their levels of satisfaction. To test this model, I use data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6. Taking into account both expectation-surplus and evaluations-surplus distances, I find that satisfaction is indeed affected by both the size and the direction of the distance between expectations and evaluations. Yet, satisfaction with democracy is not simply a product of supply matching demand. Dimensions of democracy matter as well: While liberal criteria of democratic quality are a generally agreed upon concept amongst citizens, democratic input dimensions like direct participation as well as output criteria like social justice are more disputed, and create dissatisfaction amongst those who want more of them as well as those that want less. Democracy, in other words, cannot only be too little, but also of the wrong type.

Paper 3: Why perceived deprivation matters: Socio-economic background and support for democracy

In the third paper of my dissertation, I pay a closer look to individual-level determinants of democratic support. Why do losers like democracy less than winners? The fact that social status has an impact on satisfaction with democracy is, while empirically established, often overlooked in the literature. This paper analyses the effects of subjective and objective social status on citizens' expectations from democracy and evaluations democracy. I argue that relative deprivation, defined as the notion of being left behind in society and disadvantaged by social inequality, systematically affects the way citizens judge their own democracy: The lower their status, the more they support substantive over procedural democracy, and the more critical they see their own democracies. Using data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6, I test whether citizens' attitudes towards democracy are affected by perceived deprivation as well as objective socio-economic status. Results show that a low status leads citizens to value democratic dimensions differently - they prefer social justice over liberal criteria. Additionally, low status citizens also evaluate the performance of their own democratic system in all dimensions significantly more critical than their higher status counterparts. These two effects combined create a bigger 'distance' between low-status citizens' expectations and evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be more prone to democratic dissatisfaction. I further find differences across countries: Citizens in former communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis generally have higher expectations from democracy, while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems more negatively. In Western Europe, on the other hand, social status affects citizens' attitudes more strongly than in the other country groups.

References

Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. “Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter?” *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 5–18. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.005.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1980. *The civic culture revisited: An analytic study.* 1. print. The little, Brown series in comparative politics. Boston: Little Brown.

Anderson, Christopher J. 1998. “Political satisfaction in old and new democracies.” *Institute for European Studies Working Paper* 98.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems.” *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66–81. doi:10.2307/2952259.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Yuliya V. Tverdova. 2001. “Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies.” *International Political Science Review* 22 (4): 321–38. doi:10.1177/0192512101022004003.

Ariely, Gal, and Eldad Davidov. 2011. “Can we rate public support for democracy in a comparable way? Cross-national equivalence of democratic attitudes in the World Value Survey.” *Social indicators research* 104 (2): 271–86.

Armingeon, Klaus, and Kai Guthmann. 2014. “Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011.” *Eur J Polit Res* 53 (3): 423–42. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12046.

Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age.* Berkeley, Calif: Univ. of California Press.

Bernauer, Julian, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. “Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy.” *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (4): 435–68.

Bochsler, Daniel, and Miriam Hänni. 2015. “Converting the crisis into political capital: Voting for oppositions in established and in new democracies.” *Working paper, University of Zurich*.

Bochsler, Daniel, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. “Varieties of democracy.” In *Democracy in the age of globalization and mediatization*, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg Matthes, Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann, and Frank Esser, 69–104. Challenges to democracy in the 21st century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bratton, Michael, and Robert Mattes. 2001. “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?” *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (03): 447–74. doi:10.1017/S0007123401000175.

Brender, Adi. 2007. “Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? Affecting Attitudes About Democracy.” *Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? Affecting Attitudes About Democracy*.

Bühlmann, Marc, Wolfgang Merkel, Lisa Müller, and Bernhard Wessels. 2012. “The democracy barometer: A new instrument to measure the quality of democracy and its potential for comparative research.” *European political science*. 11 (2012), H. 4, 519-536.

Campbell, R. 2013. “Winners, losers and the Grand Coalition: Political satisfaction in the Federal Republic of Germany.” *International Political Science Review*. doi:10.1177/0192512113505246.

Canache, Damarys. 2012. “Citizens’ Conceptualizations of Democracy: Structural Complexity, Substantive Content, and Political Significance.” *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (9): 1132–58. doi:10.1177/0010414011434009.

Canache, Damarys, Jeffery J. Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2001. “Meaning And Measurement In Cross-National Research On Satisfaction With Democracy.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (4): 506–28.

Clarke, Harold D., Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg. 1993. “The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies.” *The Journal of Politics* 55 (04): 998–1021. doi:10.2307/2131945.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” *World Politics* 49 (3): 430–51.

Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The crisis of democracy: Report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral Commission.* New York NY: New York University Press.

Curini, Luigi, Willy Jou, and Vincenzo Memoli. 2012. “Satisfaction with Democracy and the Winner/Loser Debate: The Role of Policy Preferences and Past Experience.” *Brit. J. Polit. Sci.* 42 (02): 241–61. doi:10.1017/S0007123411000275.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition.* New Haven Conn. u.a: Yale Univ. Press.

Dahlberg, Stefan, and Jonas Linde. 2016. “Losing Happily? The Mitigating Effect of Democracy and Quality of Government on the Winner–Loser Gap in Political Support.”

International Journal of Public Administration 39 (9): 652–64. doi:10.1080/01900692.2016.1177831.

Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies.* Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J., Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Robert E. Goodin, eds. 2007. *The Oxford handbook of political behavior.* The Oxford handbooks of political science. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel. 2014. "From allegiant to assertive citizens." In Dalton and Welzel 2014, 282–306.

Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel, eds. 2014. *The civic culture transformed: From allegiant to assertive citizens.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2008. *How people view democracy.* A journal of democracy book. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dinas, Elias. 2017. "Political Socialisation and Regime Change: How the Right Ceased to be Wrong in Post-1974 Greece." *Political Studies*, 0032321717697345. doi:10.1177/0032321717697345.

Dinas, Elias, and Ksenia Northmore-Ball. 2016. "The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism." *Working paper, University of Oxford*.

Doorenspleet, R. 2012. "Critical citizens, democratic support and satisfaction in African democracies." *International Political Science Review* 33 (3): 279–300. doi:10.1177/0192512111431906.

Easton, David. 1957. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems." *World Politics* 9 (3): 383–400. doi:10.2307/2008920.

Easton, David. 1965. *A systems analysis of political life.* New York NY u.a: Wiley.

ESS. 2002. "European Social Survey Round 1 Data: Data file edition 6.5." *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2004. "European Social Survey Round 2 Data: Data file edition 3.5." *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2006. "European Social Survey Round 3 Data: Data file edition 3.6." *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2008. “European Social Survey Round 4 Data: Data file edition 4.4.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2010. “European Social Survey Round 5 Data: Data file edition 3.3.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2012. “European Social Survey Round 6 Data: Data file edition 2.3.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

ESS. 2014. “European Social Survey Round 7 Data: Data file edition 2.1.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway.Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

European Social Survey. 2013. “Round 6 Module on Europeans’ Understandings and Evaluations of Democracy – Final Module in Template.” *Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

Ferrín, Mónica. 2012. *What is Democracy to Citizens? Understanding Perceptions and Evaluations of Democratic Systems in Contemporary Europe.* Florence: European University Institute.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. 2016a. *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy*. First edition. Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016b. “Introduction: Democracy - the European verdict.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a, 1–20.

Finkel, Steven E., Edward N. Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1989. “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica.” *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (3): 329–51. doi:10.2307/193845.

Foa, Roberto S., and Yascha Mounk. 2016. “The Democratic Disconnect.” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (3): 5–17. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0049.

Fuchs, Dieter, and Edeltraut Roller. 2006. “Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.” *International journal of sociology* 36 (3): 70–96.

Geissel, Brigitte. 2008. “Democratic Resource or Democratic Threat? Profiles of Critical and Uncritical Citizens in Comparative Perspective.” *Comparative Sociology* 7 (1): 4–27. doi:10.1163/156913307X233692.

Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why men rebel.* Princeton N. J: Princeton Univ. Press.

Held, David. 1987. *Models of democracy.* Cambridge: Polity Pr.

Hofferbert, Richard I., and Hans–Dieter Klingemann. 1999. “Remembering the bad old days: Human rights, economic conditions, and democratic performance in transitional regimes.” *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (2): 155–74. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00466.

Huang, Min-hua, Yu-tzung Chang, and Yun-han Chu. 2008. “Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis.” *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 45–62. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.002.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* 4. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.

Hurrelmann, Achim, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek. 2007. “Introduction: Legitimacy in an age of global politics.” In *Legitimacy in an age of global politics*, edited by Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek, 1–18. Transformations of the state series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1999. *Post-communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation.* Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2014. “Dissatisfied Democrats. Evidence from Old and New Democracies.” In Dalton and Welzel 2014.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.” In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 31–56: Oxford University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2017. “The implications of the euro crisis for democracy.” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–24. doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1310277.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Takis S. Pappas, eds. 2015. *European populism in the shadow of the great recession.* Studies in European political science / ECPR. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Willem Saris, and Paolo Moncagatta. 2016. “The structure of Europeans' views of democracy: Citizens models of democracy.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries.* New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Linde, Jonas, and Joakim Ekman. 2003. “Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 391–408.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe.* Baltimore Md. u.a: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *The American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69–105. doi:10.2307/1951731.

Magalhães, Pedro C. 2005. “Disaffected democrats: Political attitudes and political action in Portugal.” *West European Politics* 28 (5): 973–91. doi:10.1080/01402380500310626.

Magalhães, Pedro C. 2014. “Government effectiveness and support for democracy.” *Eur J Polit Res* 53 (1): 77–97. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12024.

Mair, Peter. 2013. *Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy.* London: Verso.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2014. “Is there a crisis of democracy?” *Democratic theory : an interdisciplinary journal*. 1 (2014), H. 2 : Special issue : The crisis of democracy : which crisis? which democracy? 11-25.

Merkel, Wolfgang, Daniel Bochsler, Karima Bousbah, Marc Bühlmann, Heiko Giebler, Miriam Hänni, Lea Heyne, Lisa Müller, Saskia Ruth, and Bernhard Wessels. 2016. “Democracy Barometer: Version 5.” *Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie*, www.democracybarometer.org.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1996. “Trajectories of Fear and Hope: "Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe".” *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (4): 553–81.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies.” *The Journal of Politics* 59 (02): 418–51. doi:10.2307/2998171.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001a. “What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1): 30–62. doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001b. “Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures.” *International Political Science Review* 22 (4): 303–20. doi:10.1177/0192512101022004002.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2002. “Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes.” *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (1): 5.

Montero, José R., Richard Günther, and Mariano Torcal. 1997. “Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent and disaffection.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32124–32160.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” *Government & Opposition* 39 (4): 542–63. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. 2012. *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1206/2012003069-d.html.

Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government:* Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. “Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks.” *Journal of Democracy Online Exchange*, Available online at http://journalofdemocracy.org/online-exchange-%E2%80%9Cdemocratic-deconsolidation%E2%80%9D.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2016. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” *HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series* (RWP16-026): https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659.

Offe, Claus. 1972. *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates: Aufsätze zur politischen Soziologie.* Edition Suhrkamp. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Verlag.

Oskarsson, Sven. 2010. “Generalized trust and political support: A cross-national investigation.” *Acta Polit* 45 (4): 423–43. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.3.

Petring, Alexander, and Wolfgang Merkel. 2011. “Auf dem Weg zur Zweidrittel-Demokratie: Wege aus der Partizipationskrise.” *WZB-Mitteilungen* 143(2011): 30–33.

Pettigrew, T. F. 2002. “Summing up: Relative deprivation as a key social psychological concept.” In *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration*, edited by I. Walker and H. J. Smith, 351–73. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries?* Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2014. “Communist socialization and post-communist economic and political attitudes.” *Electoral Studies* 33 (0): 77–89. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.008.

Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin. 2006. “Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward.” *European Review of Social Psychology* 17 (1): 271–320. doi:10.1080/10463280601055772.

Quintelier, Ellen, and Marc Hooghe. 2013. “The Impact of Socio-economic Status on Political Participation.” In *Democracy in Transition: Political Participation in the European Union*, edited by Kyriakos N. Demetriou, 273–89. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30068-4_14.

Quintelier, Ellen, and Jan van Deth. 2014. “Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data.” *Polit Stud* April 2014 (56): 153–71. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12097.

Rohrschneider, Robert. 1999. *Learning democracy: Democratic and economic values in unified Germany*. 1. publ. Comparative European politics. Oxford u.a: Oxford Univ. Press.

Rose, Richard. 2008. “Learning to support new regimes in Europe.” In *How People View Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 45–58. Journal of democracy book. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rothstein, Bo. 2009. “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (3): 311–30. doi:10.1177/0002764209338795.

Sack, Benjamin C. 2016. “Regime change and the convergence of democratic value orientations through socialization. Evidence from reunited Germany.” *Democratization*, 1–19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1220940.

Schäfer, Armin. 2012. “Consequences of social inequality for democracy in Western Europe.” *Z Vgl Polit Wiss* 6 (S2): 23–45. doi:10.1007/s12286-010-0086-6.

Scharpf, Fritz W. 1999. *Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?* Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0605/98040777-d.html.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2013. “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’.” *Political Studies* 61 (1): 2–22. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00962.x.

Schmitt, Hermann, and Evi Scholz. 2005. *The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002:* Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1943. *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Shin, Doh C. 2007. “Democratization: Perspectives from global citizenries.” In Dalton, Klingemann, and Goodin 2007, 259–82.

Shin, Doh C. 2015. “Assessing Citizen Responses to Democracy: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Public Opinion Research.” *CSD Working Papers, Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine*, http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/89k3z6q2.

Thomassen, Jacques. 2007. “Democratic values.” In Dalton, Klingemann, and Goodin 2007, 418–34.

Torcal, Mariano, and José R. Montero, eds. 2006a. *Political disaffection in contemporary democracies: Social capital institutions and politics.* Routledge research in comparative politics 13. London: Routledge.

Torcal, Mariano, and José R. Montero. 2006b. “Some basic conclusions about political disaffection in contemporary democracies.” In *Political disaffection in contemporary democracies: Social capital institutions and politics*, edited by Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero, 335–43. Routledge research in comparative politics 13. London: Routledge.

Vatter, Adrian. 2009. “Lijphart expanded: three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries?” *Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 1 (01): 125. doi:10.1017/S1755773909000071.

Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics.* Cambridge Mass. u.a. Harvard Univ. Press.

Wagner, Alexander F., Friedrich Schneider, and Martin Halla. 2009. “The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe — A panel analysis.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 25 (1): 30–41. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.001.

Wang, Zhengxu. 2007. “Public Support for Democracy in China.” *Journal of Contemporary China* 16 (53): 561–79. doi:10.1080/10670560701562283.

Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. New York: Bedminster press.

Wells, Jason M., and Jonathan Krieckhaus. 2006. “Does National Context Influence Democratic Satisfaction? A Multi-Level Analysis.” *Political Research Quarterly* 59 (4): 569–78.

Welzel, Christian. 2013. *Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Welzel, Christian, and Alejandro M. Alvarez. 2014. “Enlightening People: The Spark of Emancipative Values.” In Dalton and Welzel 2014, 59–90.

Wessels, Bernhard. 2016. “Democratic legitimacy: Concepts, measures, outcomes.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a, 235–56.

Zmerli, Sonja, Kenneth Newton, and José R. Montero. 2007. “Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.” In *Citizenship and involvement in*

European democracies: A comparative analysis, edited by van Deth, Jan W., José R. Montero, and Anders Westholm. Digital print, 35–67. Routledge research in comparative politics 17. London: Routledge.

Appendix

Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations.

Item	Expectations		Evaluations		Distance (Exp – Ev)		Correlation Exp*Ev
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Elections	8.949523	1.702014	6.95595	2.959624	1.977608	3.070281	0.2164*
Deliberation	7.419647	2.510764	6.480478	2.519164	.9480088	3.113696	0.2236*
Alt. Parties	7.968063	2.131868	5.521686	2.592031	2.439566	3.221178	0.0722*
Opposition free	8.284824	2.07081	7.366821	2.493478	.9116504	2.757665	0.2751*
Media free	8.228963	2.166624	7.227161	2.61433	.9961322	3.012013	0.2133*
Transp. Media	8.733631	1.830343	5.895409	2.564048	2.832973	2.959166	0.1208*
Minority rights	8.310089	2.100685	6.173339	2.682609	2.149264	3.227654	0.0898*
Direct participation	8.267416	2.058519	4.875933	3.159092	3.369363	3.593515	0.0962*
Inclusive participat.	*7.874494*	*2.551331*	-	-	-	-	-
Equality of law	9.213778	1.569258	4.87601	3.212638	4.326183	3.517421	0.040
Horizontal account.	*8.773655*	*1.903972*	-	-	-	-	-
Vertical account.	8.379632	2.073795	5.453698	3.115248	2.920189	3.585131	-0.0875*
Protection poverty	8.683792	1.913726	3.902401	2.937047	4.773775	3.639998	-0.0023
Trans. government	8.835507	1.703983	4.592632	2.821769	4.232424	3.294763	-0.1423*
Redistribution	8.242191	2.194355	3.92065	2.801982	4.315633	3.789483	0.0391*

Notes: N=47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Table 6: Principal component analysis, factors and factor loadings, pooled solution over all countries, complete set of items.

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
Elections free and fair	0.3547	-0.0019
Deliberation	0.305	-0.0585
Party alternatives	0.3408	-0.0185
Opposition free	0.4749	-0.1498
Media free	0.4466	-0.1325
Transparency media	0.3377	0.0479
Minority rights	0.2611	0.0826
Direct participation	0.1941	0.2669
Equality before the law	0.2483	0.1319
Vertical accountability	0.1779	0.1923
Protection poverty	-0.1115	0.5461
Transparency Government	0.0398	0.3087
Redistribution	-0.1639	0.5456
Eigenvalue	**5.84351**	**1.36334**
% Variance	**29.88**	**21.52**

Notes: Varimax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Figure 9: Screeplot of Eigenvalues after PCA, pooled solution over all countries, complete set of items (Full PCA see Table 6).



Notes: N = 47956. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012).

Table 7: Principal component analysis, aggregate solution over all countries, complete set of items (Promax rotation).

Variable	Factor 1: Liberal	Factor 2: Social
Elections free and fair	0.3547	-0.0019
Deliberation	0.305	-0.0585
Party alternatives	0.3408	-0.0185
Opposition free	0.4749	-0.1498
Media free	0.4466	-0.1325
Transparency media	0.3377	0.0479
Minority rights	0.2611	0.0826
Direct participation	0.1941	0.2669
Equality before the law	0.1683	0.1319
Vertical accountability	0.1779	0.1923
Protection poverty	-0.1115	0.5461
Transparency Government	0.0398	0.4087
Redistribution	-0.1639	0.5456
Eigenvalue	**5.84351**	**1.36334**
% Variance	**29.88**	**21.52**

Notes: Promax rotation. N=47956, Eigenvalues>1. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Table 8: Correlations between factor scores and additive indices.

	Additive indices	
Factor scores	Liberal democracy	Social democracy
Liberal democracy	**0.9609***	0.4056*
Social democracy	0.5401*	**0.9618***

Notes: N=47956. Factor scores calculated for each country individually after PCA, see Table 3. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification weight.

Chapter Two: The making of democratic citizens: How regime-specific socialization shapes Europeans' expectations from democracy

Abstract

Popular support is essential for the legitimacy of modern democracies, and citizens' views are important to assess the quality of a democratic regime. Yet, when analysing support for democracy, researchers tend to assume that 'democracy' is a concept that travels across countries. This paper, to the contrary, argues that individual democratic ideals are systematically affected by the political regime that citizens experience. Democracy is thus not the same for every citizen in each context, because collective and individual socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria we expect a democracy to fulfil. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature on varieties of democracy, I suppose that individual expectations from democracy differ across countries, and that they are influenced by two regime-specific factors: The democratic history, consisting of age and quality of institutions as well as authoritarian legacies, and the prevalent democratic model. Hence, the specific democratic context in which a citizen lives matters - due to socialization and democratic learning, individuals acquire democratic preferences and value those dimensions more which they experience in their own democracy. Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test how the national democratic context in 26 European democracies influences these individual democratic ideals. Indeed, I find evidence for both socialization and participation effects of the democratic context on citizens' democratic ideals.

1. Introduction

Democracy is not a simple thing to define: Collier and Levitsky (1997, 431) speak of the "hundreds of adjectives of democracy" to refer to the attempts of scholars to classify and identify diverse forms and subtypes of democracy. According to the Sydney Democracy Network and their database entitled "The many names of democracy", there are actually no less than 2'234 expressions of democracy in 2017 - from "Accountable democracy" to "Zionist democracy".[1] But when researchers analyse if citizens are satisfied with “the way democracy works” in their country, or whether they support specific democratic institutions, they implicitly suppose that democracy means the same for individuals all over the world. This is a problematic assumption, given the many meanings, ideas and dimensions democracy can hold. In this paper, I argue that in order to be able to analyse support for democracy in a meaningful way, we need to take a step back and ask what democracy actually means to citizens, what they expect from a democracy, and how such expectations are formed. I propose that democracy is not the same for every citizen, but that collective and individual socialization experiences strongly shape the criteria they expect a democracy to fulfil.

When it comes to explaining country-level differences in citizens' support for democracy, the literature is quiet broad (i.e. Anderson 1998; Mishler and Rose 1996; Oskarsson 2010; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Yet, rather little evidence is available that could answer the question what ordinary citizens think democracy is and what it should be about. Several studies imply that most people, even in authoritarian countries, identify democracy in terms of political rights such as freedom and civil liberties (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Cho (2014) even finds that the better citizens are able to conceptualise and understand democracy, the more they support it. But apart from that, no systematic analysis of citizens' expectations from democracy is available. Hence, although there is a large body of research on the political cultures of Western democracies, “little is known about what democracy actually means to average citizens […] or the relevance of these beliefs for understanding how satisfied people are with the operation of democracy in their country" (Kornberg and Clarke 1994, 557). In the light of this theoretical and empirical gap, research about citizens’ support for democracy is potentially misleading (cf. Canache 2012, 1150), given that it is based on the assumption that democracy is a clearly defined and thus internationally comparable notion. If we want to know more about the factors that explain individual support for democracy, we need to consider citizens' definitions of and

[1] http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/portfolio_page/many-names-democracy/

expectations from democracy first. Otherwise it might well be that we measure different things across countries and across individuals when we try to capture support for democracy.

In this paper, I contribute to the theory-building and the empirical knowledge in this under-researched area by exploring what citizens expect from a democracy, and why they do so. *Expectations from democracy*, as explained in Chapter One, are defined as the normative idea of how a democracy in general should work, and what it should deliver. I suppose that every citizen - in a more or less precise way - has a picture in mind of how a good democracy should look like. In other words, citizens expect a democracy to fulfil specific criteria. Based on socialization and democratic learning theories, I then argue that these individual expectations from democracy are influenced by the *democratic regime* that citizens experience: First, the *democratic history* of a country, referring to the age and quality of its institutions as well as its authoritarian legacies. Second, the *democratic model*, designating the way democracy is realized in a specific country - referring to the literature on 'varieties' or 'models' of democracy, I suppose that each country implements democracy in a different way by emphasizing some principles more than others. Democracies influence their citizens in distinctive ways - through regime-specific socialization, citizens interiorize those (democratic) principles they are exposed to, developing their democratic expectations accordingly. Democracy, thus, is a different ideal for each citizen depending on socialization experiences made during their lifetime. Using individual-level data from the European Social Survey Round 6 as well as country-level data from the Democracy Barometer, I test if and how citizens' expectations are influenced by the democratic regime in their respective country.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I discuss the notion of democratic regimes. Then, I explain my theoretical model of regime-specific socialization, and my hypotheses concerning the impact of democratic regimes on individual expectations. Further, I introduce the data and methodology I use to test these hypotheses empirically. Subsequently, I present and discuss the results, to then finish with a general conclusion.

2. Democratic regimes in Europe: Authoritarian legacies and models of democracy

Democracy is not the same as democracy - as explained in Chapter One, political theory provides many different approaches of what government of the people, by the people, and for the people should mean, and the list of adjectives for democracy is long. This variety of democratic definitions is not just a theoretical, but also an empirical matter: Existing modern democracies have diverse historical legacies, political cultures and institutional arrangements.

I assume that such democratic regimes influence citizens' expectations from democracy.

To start with, European democracies have been democratized in different time periods, and following different histories of authoritarian regimes - Huntington (1991, 15ff) speaks of "waves of democratization", Dorenspleet (2000, 400) of "steps of democratization". 'Old' democracies such as Switzerland or the United Kingdom democratized in the early 'first wave' during the 19th century, and many other Western countries followed in the early 20th century. The end of World War Two brought democracy to countries like Germany and Italy, the 1970ies to former military dictatorships in Southern European countries, and the end of the Soviet Union 1990 to Eastern Europe. The trajectories of democratization as well as the resulting democratic institutions, their strength and consolidation are the topic of an extensive literature (for example Diamond 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013). Some of this literature focuses on what has been labelled "attitudinal consolidation of democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6ff): The development of democratic values amongst citizens of newly democratized, post-authoritarian countries. Within Europe, this literature has focused mainly on former communist countries, which show different democratic dynamics than their older democratic counterparts in Western Europe (Mishler and Rose 2002; Rose 2008). But also communist legacies are not necessarily the same across countries: Kitschelt et al. (1999, 39) claim that the historical legacies of communist regimes have shaped the post-communist democratic politics of these states. They argue that communist regimes differed largely in their bureaucratic apparatus as well as their strategies of repression and co-optation, leading to different institutional settings after their transition. Further, Southern European countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal share a different history of military dictatorships, which shapes their democratic cultures and has been shown to affect the citizens' attitudes (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016; Dinas 2017). In sum, authoritarian legacies, even decades after democratization, still matter for European citizens.

How can we assess differences between democratic regimes, apart from measuring how long they have been democracies? Since the end of the third wave of democratization and with the realization that even when they are not autocratic anymore, not all democracies are the same, the literature on the quality of democracy (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Morlino 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005) has tried to define what makes a democracy 'good' - the fulfilment of factors such as rule of law, accountability, responsiveness and freedom. The Democracy Barometer, based on the concept of “embedded democracy” (Merkel 2004), understands good democracy is as a combination of liberal and participatory elements which finds a balance between freedom and (political) equality (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 3ff). Using

this approach, existing democracies can be ranked based on the quality of their institutions: Some of them fulfil liberal democratic principles better than others. But while democratic quality can be a useful tool to determine how well a country has realized central democratic principles, democracy is not just a unidimensional concept simply ranging from democratic to non-democratic.

The literature on varieties of democracy assumes that established democracies also diverge in the way they realize democratic principles. Although they are all democratic, they have implemented different principles through formal institutional arrangements and informal practices and procedures. As Bochsler and Kriesi have put it, “they are all variations on a general theme” (2013, 69). Democracy consists of several dimensions, and existing democracies emphasize these dimensions differently. They approach the ‘general theme’, democracy, in different ways. The most famous typology of existing democracies is Lijphart's (1984, 1999) "patterns of democracy". He suggests that the variety of formal and informal democratic institutions and rules can eventually be reduced to a two-dimensional pattern based on the distinction between majoritarian and consensus-oriented forms of government. According to him, the majoritarian-consensual democratic space (measured on a vertical dimension between executive and legislative as well as on a horizontal dimension in form of federalism or unitarism) accounts for most of the variance among established democracies. This distinction also seems to play a role for citizens’ attitudes: As Anderson and Guillory (1997) as well as Anderson et al. (2005, 120ff) have found, living in consensus-oriented system attenuates differences between election winners and losers and increases satisfaction especially amongst losers. Although Lijpharts two-dimensional map has been criticized from many sides, it remains the most influential typology of modern democracies (Vatter 2009, 126). Authors such as Hendriks (2010, 26ff) have argued that to improve Lijphart's typology, the distinction between direct and representative democracies should be added, including the role and power of citizens to act as veto players (Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Vatter (2009) linked Lijpharts dimensions both theoretically and empirically to the direct-representative dimension. The impact of this dimension on citizens has been analysed as well: Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter (2012) find a positive effect of using direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy in general, and Bernauer and Vatter (2012) identify a negative effect on the difference in satisfaction between election winners and losers.

3. Explaining citizens' expectations from democracy

After establishing that democratic regimes in Europe differ according to their democratic history, democratic quality and institutional setup, this section establishes why these differences also matter for citizens' expectations from democracy. Expectations from democracy, as defined in Chapter One, refer to the *normative ideal* of how a democracy in general should be like and which criteria it should fulfil, and are part of my concept of support for democracy. As described in that chapter, several authors who have analysed democratic expectations have found that these normative ideals differ across citizens (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Ferrín and Kriesi 2016b; Wessels 2016). I want to find out if democratic regimes on the country-level are linked to citizens' democratic expectations on the individual level, and can explain some of this variance. I consider two factors: First, the *democratic history of a country,* referring to the democratic quality, age of the democratic regime, and authoritarian past; and second the *democratic model*, designating the way democracy is realized in a specific country.

In other words, I assume that there is interdependence between macro-level structures - the democratic regime - and individual attitudes. The idea of political structures interacting with individual behaviour has been present in the literature since the 1980s and 1990s (Anderson 2007, 591). Already in the 1960s, Almond and Verba (1963) assumed that a "civic culture" contributes to the stability of democratic regimes, and in a later version (*ibid.* 1980, 29) specified that political culture should be treated as both a dependent and an independent variable that interacts with the political structure. Anderson et al. (2005, 139) argue that citizens "form attitudes about politics in systemic contexts whose institutional structures mediate preferences and define the choices that are available". They find that historical trajectories (*ibid.*, 109) as well variance in democratic institutions (*ibid.*, 122) matter for the way citizens experience democratic politics, and, in consequence, their attitudes toward democracy. This approach mostly presupposes that macro-contexts are exogenous and political behaviour the dependent variable - an assumption that, while considered "safe under many conditions" (Anderson 2007, 605), can still be put into question. One could also argue that citizens' preferences affect the political culture and regime, and those structures are not exogenous. I this paper, I find a macro-micro approach adequate for several reasons: First of all, while in younger democracies in Eastern and Southern Europe, citizens could actually have had an impact on the design of their country's democracy, this is not the case for long-lasting liberal democracies with century-old democratic models such as Switzerland and the

UK, where all the citizens in my sample have been born and raised in the same democratic system, making for a certain stability of context factors. The same holds true for authoritarian legacies, which are exogenous to the extent that few people in my sample predate those authoritarian regimes. And secondly, as Anderson (2007, 601) has argued, treating context-level factors as not only direct, but also as contingent (moderating or interaction) effects can produce valid and novel insights. This is what I will do in this analysis - understanding the direct and indirect effects of context on behaviour.

Learning democracy

Citizens 'learn' democracy through socialization - that is, living under a democratic regime and adapting its values due to 'passive' exposure to the regime principles (Rohrschneider 1999; Mishler and Rose 2002). More generally, social constructivist approaches in sociology assume that individual norms and values are generated in a process of social experiences and interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 43ff.). Such processes can occur in micro-contexts such as families, schools or peer-groups as well as in macro-contexts - in a society or culture as a whole. As Fuchs (1999, 125) puts it, "ideas about what a democracy is and how it should look […] are instilled by primary and secondary socialization processes." Whereas micro-level socialization can lead to differing values among individuals of the same society, depending for example on their gender, class and education (Almond and Verba 1963, 380ff), macro-level socialization should have similar effects on all the members of a society or cultural sphere: "Everyone socialized into a culture is exposed to the same set of values supporting the regime and its basic rules of the game" (Mishler and Rose 2002, 7). Hence, democratic values are, at least partly, created through regime-specific socialization. This approach of system-internal learning (Rohrschneider 1999) assumes that value orientations towards democracy and civic virtues are transmitted through the institutional design of the political regime one lives in, as the practice of specific behaviour which is connected to specific values eventually causes an internalization of those fundamental values.

Democratic history

From the literature on the democratic culture in young democracies (Fuchs 1999; Mishler and Rose 1996; Fuchs and Roller 2006), we know that exposure to a democratic regime has an impact on individual attitudes towards democracy: The longer citizens have lived in a (functioning) liberal democracy, the higher their support for liberal democratic principles tends to be. Established democracies ideally dispose of a procedural legitimacy, where the perceived fairness of rules leads to support for democracy independently of outputs (Rothstein

2009). Over time, democracies build up a "reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to tolerate or accept outputs to which they are opposed" (Easton 1965, 273), a diffuse support for democracy that is less affected by specific performance and political outputs. In younger democracies, on the other hand, support for democracy is more likely based on the output which democracy creates for its citizens, and rules and procedures are less crucial (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Bochsler and Hänni (2015, 7) argue that there is a "life cycle effect" of the age of democratic regimes on the type of support of its citizens: The transition from performance-based support to procedural support for democracy is a matter of democratic experience, where new democracies first needs to build procedural support amongst its citizens. In a similar vein, Anderson et al. (2005, 90ff.) have argued that citizens of new democracies need to learn that the procedures can be trusted before they can accept to 'lose' in elections. Further, in countries democratized in the 'third wave' starting in the 1970s (Huntington 1991) the concept of democracy was often linked to the idea of economic reforms and development in order to catch up with Western Europe and North America. This connection between economic wellbeing and democracy, according to Bochsler and Hänni (2015), led citizens of third wave countries to see political rights and better economic life conditions as two sides of the same medal, leading to a more performance-based support for democracy.

More specifically, post-communist countries have been proven to have a long-lasting impact on the democratic attitudes of their citizens: Evidence from Germany shows that citizens in the former Eastern Germany, contrary to Western Germans, prefer socialist ideas of democracy over liberal principles (Sack 2016). While in the West an understanding of democracy near to the liberal model of democracy dominates, in the East the dominating understanding of democracy is one that corresponds to the socialist model of democracy. Other authors could confirm this result for additional post-communist states (Fuchs and Roller 2006; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). Hence, differences in democratic norms between Western Europe and former socialist regimes in a great part can be explained by diverging socialization experiences in these regimes (Fuchs 1999). Such differences in democratic values are attributed to the varying socialization in the former West and the former East, with socialization experiences in the latter being focused on socialist over liberal societal ideals: Communist socialization relies on notions of societal unity and solidarity, a penetration of the state into society and central role of the state in the economy (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014). Consequently, communist regimes gained their legitimacy mostly from policy outputs, in providing welfare, economic growth and securities to their citizens. Bochsler and Hänni

(2015) argue that even after transition to democracy, citizens will use these experiences under authoritarian regimes as a benchmark for the evaluation of the democratic regimes, so that citizens in post-communist democracies will expect their state to provide for social welfare.
When it comes to the democratic history in a country, we can thus assume that exposure to liberal democratic institutions should enhance support for procedural democratic principles. On the other hand we can expect citizens of post-authoritarian democracies to have rather performance and output-based expectations from democracy. These effects are very likely to be dependent on the length of exposure to a specific regime, which goes along with stronger socialization effects: The durability of a democratic regime should have positive effects on a citizens' support for procedural democratic principles, while the length of exposure to authoritarianism should increase support for performance-based democracy amongst citizens. This leads to hypotheses H1 and H2:

H1: Exposure to liberal democratic regimes leads to higher support for procedural democratic principles among citizens: The longer the exposure and the more developed the democracy, the stronger the effect.

H2: Exposure to authoritarian regimes leads to higher support for performance-based aspects of democracy among citizens: The longer the exposure, the stronger the effect.

Democratic models

Further, as explained previously, democracies differ not only in their regime history, but also in the way they decided to realize democratic principles. Based on Lijphart (1999) and Vatter (2007), I use the two main types of democracy, which are majoritarian vs. consensual and direct vs. representative democracies. I assume that growing up in a specific democratic model also leads to favourable attitudes towards these aspects of democracy. Be it via the media, through formal education or in interaction with other citizens, the way democracy is realized in a specific country will have an impact on individual conceptions of democracy. Such a macro-micro effect can also be caused by the mere definition of the term democracy: In a country with strong direct democratic institutions, speaking about “democracy” will often imply direct democracy. Hence, a citizen of such a country might immediately think of direct participation when hearing the word democracy. A more specific way of socialization is the adaptation of democratic attitudes through active participation in democratic processes: Participatory approaches to democracy (Barber 1984; Mansbridge 1999) presume that political participation has an educational component. In other words, participation in democratic processes serves to "form" the democratic citizens. Individual political interests

are thus seen as something that is not endogenous to a person, but develops in the course of democratic processes. As Quintelier and van Deth (2014) have found, political behaviour affects political attitudes, and not (just) vice versa. Their findings indicate that it is much more likely that political participation strengthens political attitudes than that attitudes trigger participation. Institutionalized social contacts are thus seen as a 'school of democracy' where people learn and internalize political attitudes (*ibid.,* 156). Hence, the type of democratic participation might also affect individual preferences from democracy. In addition to the passive socialization effect, there could thus also be a form of active (self)socialization. From a social psychology perspective, this means that people change their attitudes and emotions based on what they infer from their own (political) behaviour (Quintelier and Hooghe 2012). In other words, the democratic regime citizens experience in their political participation will have an effect on the democratic values they hold. In this context, we could speak of a procedural effect of democratic structures. Hence, citizens who actively participate in democratic processes should be more likely to orient their expectations from democracy towards the democratic regime that they currently experience. Someone who abstains from elections, referenda or other ways of democratic decision-making, on the other hand, is not subjected to a procedural effect of democratic participation. When it comes to democratic models, the most obvious example would again be direct democracy - someone who experiences direct participation in referenda themself might also develop positive attitudes towards this form of democracy, more than someone used to representative democratic elections. The same also applies for majoritarian and consensus-based democratic systems. Similar to the strength of authoritarian socialization being dependent on the length of exposure to the regime as described in the previous section, participation affects the strength of citizens' socialization into different democratic models. Yet, there is not just one form of participation: Traditionally, we distinguish between institutional - electoral - and alternative forms of participation, such as demonstrations or petitions. Given that electoral participation is very strongly linked to the democratic regime in place, while alternative forms of participation are a less institutionalized way of expressing political demands, I would expect electoral participation to have a stronger socialization impact. Citizens engaging in non-electoral forms of participation might be more critical of their government, and have a different ideal than the democratic reality they experience. This leads to hypotheses H3 and H4:

H3: Citizens tend to value those democratic principles more that they experience in their own model of democracy.

H4: Active participation in democratic decision-making reinforces the effect of democratic models on citizens' democratic principles: Institutional participation has a stronger effect than non-institutional participation.

4. Methodology

Data and operationalization

In order to analyse the effects of macro-level democratic regimes on individual attitudes towards democracy, data on two levels is needed. On the individual level, the European Social Survey Round 6 (ESS 2012), as introduced in Chapter One, contains a set of questions about citizens' expectations from democracy, and covers almost 50.000 respondents in 26 European democracies[2][3]. Some examples for these items are:

"And now thinking about democracy in general rather than about democracy in [country]: How important do you think it is for a democracy in general…

…that national elections are free and fair?

...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another?

Each question can be answered on an 11-point scale from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (very important). These items are used to capture citizens' expectations from democracy - the importance they attribute to specific democratic features. The second data source, covering country-level data, is the Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). It provides an aggregate measure for democratic quality, using more than 100 indicators to capture the fulfilment of liberal democratic standards. Further, it also allows to measure differences in the way democracies realize these standards in different models.

Dependent variables: As described in Chapter One, the expectations items can be reduced to two substantial factors, or dimensions, of democracy: A liberal factor, defined by free and fair elections, political alternative, freedom of the opposition and the media and transparency. This factor thus captures procedural aspects of democracy. The other factor, consisting of citizens' expectations concerning the protection against poverty and redistribution, stands for democratic output - in this case, social equality. For the two dimensions distinguishing democratic models, I use the item on direct participation ("How important do you think it is for a democracy that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by

[2]Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

[3]Excluding respondents under 18 and non-citizens reduces the sample to just under 45.000. This is necessary because I only consider those respondents that are able to participate in national elections.

voting on them directly in referendums?") for the direct-representative dimension, and the item asking for government preferences ("The government in some countries is formed by a single party; in other countries by two or more parties in coalition. Which is better?") to capture the majoritarian-consensual dimension.[4]

Explanatory variables: For the 26 democracies in my sample, I measure the democratic history as well as the democratic models on the country level. Democratic history consists of different variables: Democratic quality, first, is measured with the overall score of the Democracy Barometer, with values ranging from 0 to 100[5]. The age of a democracy is measured by the years since the country's transition to democracy[6]. Further, I code the country's authoritarian past – their non-democratic history, in other words: Former authoritarian countries are coded as 1, non-authoritarian countries as 0. In Europe, this includes on the one hand former communist countries in Eastern Europe, and on the other hand former military dictatorships in Southern Europe. In my sample, 12 out of 26 countries have an authoritarian legacy: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Ukraine. Further, Eastern Germany is coded as a former authoritarian country as well. Additionally, to account for the length of socialization effects, I use years of individual socialization under authoritarian regimes. The more time a citizen spent living in an authoritarian regime, the stronger should their socialization experience be. Following Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014, I code exposure to authoritarianism into early (# of years between age 6-17 living under authoritarian rule) and adult (# of years aged 18 and up spent living under authoritarianism) exposure. For a detailed list of countries with an authoritarian past and their respective authoritarian time periods see Table 4 in the appendix.

For the different *models of democracy*, I use two sets of variables from the Democracy Barometer: First of all, Lijpharts (1999: 5) distinction between majoritarian and consensus-oriented democracies is composed by two dimensions, executives-parties and federal-unitary. Given that my dependent variable covers just the executives-parties dimension, I only operationalize this dimension. To measure the majoritarian-consensual dimension, I follow Bochsler and Kriesi (2013), and use several indicators: Electoral proportionality is measured by three variables, the reversed Gallagher Index, the mean district magnitude and the effective

[4]For a list of all items and their operationalization, see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix.

[5]For each country, I take the mean of each variable over the time period covered by the Democracy Barometer (1990-2014). I use this approach because I want to measure stable institutional structures, as I assume that the perceptions and ideas citizens have about democracy are influenced by the experiences they make over a longer time period. I further recode them into a 0-10 scale.

[6]Source: Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016) and own coding.

electoral threshold. Further, I use the effective number of parties and the cabinet composition (percentage of coalition governments compared to single-party governments). And lastly, I use union density to measure integration of interest groups into the political system. All six indicators are recoded to an additive index with a theoretical range from 0 to 10, where 10 is the most consensus-oriented system.

To measure the direct-representative dimension, I use three indicators: first, constitutional provisions for direct democracy, consisting of one indicators for direct democratic institutions and one for participation quora, and second, the number of direct democratic votes per year as an indicator of effective use of direct democracy. All three indicators are transformed in an additive index ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 is the maximum level of direct democracy. To account for socialization into models of democracy, I use interaction effects between the country level-democratic model and individual level political participation. Participation is measured by two variables: Electoral participation is a dummy variable (1 = voted last election[7]), whereas non-electoral participation is a scale ranging from 0 (no non-electoral participation at all) to 7 (participation in seven different forms).

Control variables. I control for GDP per capita as well as population size on the country level[8], and for gender, age, education (in years), unemployment, left-right self-placement and being born in another country on the individual level. For descriptive statistics and coding of all variables see Table 1 in the appendix.

Analysis

As I test for the effect of macro-level variables on micro-level attitudes of citizens, I use cross-sectional hierarchical models where level-one units are citizens and level-two units are countries. Most of my dependent variables - citizens' expectations from democracy - are continuous on a scale from 0 to 10[9]. All data is weighted with the ESS post-stratification and population size weight, to make it comparable across population groups and countries.

In addition, political sophistication is an important factor in determining individual patterns of support. For example, Zaller (1992, 43ff), who speaks of "political awareness", argues that better-informed people will tap into a more homogeneous set of considerations when answering survey questions and therefore will give more consistent answers than will their less-informed peers. More sophisticated people should thus generally be more able to state

[7]Elections refer to the country's legislative assembly; participation in referenda is not included.

[8]Source for both: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017).

[9]The standard random-intercept model takes the form: $Yij = \alpha ij + \beta 1Xij + \gamma i + \varepsilon i$. Intercepts ($\alpha$) vary across countries, slopes (β) remain constant. The measure for government size however is a binary outcome variable, for which I use a logistic regression model. It takes the form: $\text{logit}\{Pr(Expij = 1|xij, \alpha i)\} = \alpha ij + \beta 1Xij + \varepsilon i$.

opinions that are ideologically consistent with their predispositions, they possess more political information, and are better able to relate their knowledge and preferences in a meaningful way to survey questions (*ibid.*). This is relevant for my analysis because I expect citizens to identify the democratic regime they experience, and to identify those items that best reflect their predispositions (for example, procedural or performance-based support). More politically sophisticated citizens should, in theory, be better able to do this and, as a result, show more consistent patterns of socialization through the democratic regime they experience. The literature generally suggests that factual knowledge about politics is the best single indicator of sophistication (Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993). However, the ESS does not offer any knowledge measures. Authors such as Gabriel and Keil 2013: 167-169ff) have argued that political interest (as measured in the ESS) differs considerably across European countries and can be seen as an adequate proxy for political sophistication. Luskin (1990) finds that political interest is strongly correlated with sophistication. Therefore, I also use political interest to measure sophistication at the individual level. The individuals are assigned to two groups: Low political sophistication = no/little interest in politics and high political sophistication = high/very high interest in politics. As a robustness check, I test my models in both groups to see whether sophistication changes the outcomes.

5. Results

Democratic history

In a first step, I test the hypotheses dealing with the effect of democratic history on citizens expectations: I assumed that exposure to functioning liberal democratic institutions should increase support for procedural democracy (H1), while exposure to authoritarian socialization increases support for democratic performance criteria (H2). To do so, I test the impact of the country-level context on two dependent variables: Liberal and social expectations from democracy. Figure 1 shows the effects of democratic history. As for the expectations towards liberal democracy (left panel), there is a positive (though not significant) effect of democratic quality on the importance citizens attribute to this dimension for a democracy in general. The age of democracy shows no effect, contrary to H1. Living in a post-authoritarian country however has a significant and negative effect on support for liberal democratic norms, confirming H2. When it comes to exposure to authoritarianism, the effects are comparatively small: We see a negative effect of adult exposure, and surprisingly a positive effect for early exposure. Looking at the right panel, we can see that the main effects are partly inversed: Democratic quality shows a very small, non-significant positive effect on support for social

democratic principles, while living in a post-authoritarian democracy significantly increases social democratic support. Authoritarian exposure effects remain small, with a negative effect of adult exposure and a positive effect for early exposure.

Figure 1: The effects of democratic history.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 5 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Given that the length of citizens' exposure to authoritarianism did not lead to significant results, I additionally pursue an exploratory analysis into the effects of different types of authoritarianism to see weather this can give us more insights. First of all, I distinguish between different ideologies: Communist regimes on the one hand, and right-wing military dictatorships on the other. Figure 2 shows that the effect of authoritarianism on citizens' expectations is mainly driven by former communist countries, while former military dictatorships actually not differ significantly from other democracies:

Figure 2. The effects of democratic history, including types of authoritarianism.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 6 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

As a next step, to differentiate the rather large group of former communist countries, I test only for communist socialization, but also account for the type of communist regime by using Kitschelt et al's (1999) distinction between patrimonial communism (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine), national accommodative communism (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) and bureaucratic-authoritarian communism (Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Slovakia). Figure 3 shows the results: We can see that the effects remain largely the same as before - democratic quality is positively related to liberal values, and negatively to social democratic values, yet not significant. A (post)communist socialization tends to decrease citizens' liberal democratic expectations, and increases social democratic expectations. Kitschelt et al's types of communism also matter: While all three types show the same direction, the effects are strongest (and significant only) for bureaucratic-authoritarian communism.

Figure 3. The effects of democratic history, including types of communism.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full table see Table 7 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

This type of communism is the most open form of communist rule. Why are communist socialization effects stronger in these countries? On the one hand, living in a relatively open and modernized regime that allows for some degree of political pluralism, and an economically stronger and more educated society might make for a more efficient adaptation of socialist values than in other countries, and more appreciation of the advantages of that regime, especially compared to the liberal democratic regime that followed. On the other hand, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are also characterized by a strong organizational consistency and control of the ruling party, which hence had the power to repress the rather strong opposition movement instead of making concessions to their demands, and could retain a more ideologically orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine than the other types of communism

until the 1980ies (Kitschelt et al 1999, 27). Together, these factors could explain why citizens in these countries support democratic outputs over democratic procedures more strongly that other post-communist citizens.

In sum, the analysis of democratic history could partly confirm my initial hypotheses: The assumption that exposure to functioning liberal democratic institutions should increase support for procedural democracy amongst citizens (H1) was not confirmed, as age of democracy had no effects and democratic quality only non-significant effects on citizens expectations from democracy. H2 on the other hand was confirmed: Exposure to authoritarian socialization indeed significantly increases citizens' support for democratic outputs, and reduces support for procedural democracy. This effect takes place independently of the length of exposure, but is specific to some types of authoritarian regimes - post-communist countries, and amongst them especially those characterized by Kitschelt et al. as bureaucratic-authoritarian.

Democratic models

In a next step, I test hypotheses 3 and 4, which assume that national democratic models have a direct influence on citizens' expectations from democracy (H3), and that these socialization effects are stronger for citizens who actively participate in democratic decision-making processes (H4). Figure 4 shows the results for the two types of democratic models that I use: Direct-representative democracy, and consensus-majoritarian democracy.

Figure 4. The effects of democratic models.



Notes: Plot of non-standardized regression coefficients (left), logged odds (right). Full table see Table 8 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

In the direct-representative dimension (left panel), there is no significant socialization effect of living in a country with direct democratic institutions on the importance citizens attribute to this dimension. In the majoritarian-consensus dimension (right panel), however, we see a

significant effect of the national democratic model on individual preferences: Citizens living in a more consensus-oriented democracy are more likely to find a consensual system better for democracy in general than those living in majoritarian democracies. Hypothesis 3 is thus supported, but only in one of the cases.

Hypothesis 4 then assumes that socialization effects of the national democratic model should be reinforced for those citizens who actively participate in democratic processes, where electoral participation should have stronger effects that non-electoral participation[10]. In Figure 4 we can see that there are significant interaction effects between the national democratic model and individual voting and non-electoral participation. To illustrate them better, Figures 5 and 6 show marginal effects plots of these interaction effects. In Figure 5, we can see the interaction between direct democracy on the national level, and individual voting behaviour.

Figure 5. Marginal effects of democratic models with voting.



Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Figure 4. Full table see Table 8 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

As we can see in the left panel, the effect of direct democratic institutions on citizens' expectations towards democracy differs significantly between voters and non-voters, and is positive. Hence, respondents who participate in elections are more likely to orient their democratic ideals towards the democratic model they experience. The more direct democracy a country has, the bigger the difference. The same applies to consensus democracy (right panel): The effect of living in a country with consensus democracy is significantly different between voters and non-voters (but decreases for strongly consensual democracies). These results confirm hypothesis H4, participation in elections apparently reinforces the socialization effect of democratic models. Figure 6 displays the same interaction effect, but

[10]Of course citizens can participate both in elections and in non-institutional forms of participation, and the two effects are not mutually exclusive.

for non-electoral forms of participation, such as demonstrations, petitions and political activism.

Figure 6. Marginal effects of democratic models with non-electoral participation.



Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Figure 4. Full table see Table 8 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Both graphs show similar directions as the ones in Figure 5, so there are also significant differences between politically active citizens and non-active ones in the way the democratic model influenced their expectations. Yet, the effects are less strong than for voting (as we can see in the coefficient sizes on the y axis), and in the case of consensus democracy (right panel) even insignificant for countries with strong consensus democracy. This provides support for the assumption in H4 that non-institutional participation has a less strong socialization effect into democratic structures than electoral participation.

In sum, I provide support for the assumption that citizens are socialized into a specific democratic model which affects their democratic ideals (H3), especially if they actively participate in political processes (H4). The results however raise the question why, other than consensus democracy, direct democracy shows no direct socialization effect on citizens' expectations. A possible reason for the non-significance of the positive effect of direct democracy is the fact that, especially in the last years, support for direct democracy has grown also in countries that have not (yet) included them in their political system, becoming a commonly supported ideal that is, rather than an alternative to representative democracy, a supplement to it. A majoritarian compared to a consensus-based government, on the other hand, is more of a trade-off, where a democracy can only realize one of the alternatives. Another possible interpretation is the phrasing of the questionnaire - while the direct-democracy question has an 11-point scale, the consensus democracy question only has two options, forcing citizens to decide. A similar 0-1 coding might have made the effect on citizens' expectations towards direct vs. representative democracy more clear, and the effect

significant.

Lastly, as a robustness check, Tables 9 to 11 in the appendix show all analyses with separate models above for respondents with high and low sophistication. Generally, effects are stronger and more significant in the group with high sophistication: In Table 10, we can see that the interaction effects of participation and direct democracy are not significant in the low sophistication group. This result is confirmed in the second dimension, the type of government. As table 11 shows, the interaction effect of voting and government type is also only significant in the group of sophisticated respondents, while the direct effect remains in both groups. These findings are in line with theoretical expectations on the effects of political sophistication. An interesting finding are the effects of democratic history (Table 9), which remain strong also for less sophisticated citizens. Apparently, an authoritarian socialization has similar effects on all citizens, independent of their level of sophistication. In the group of sophisticated respondents, further, socialization in a military dictatorship has a significant positive effect on social democratic expectations, which was not the case for the whole sample.

6. Conclusion

Public support has long been known to be highly relevant for the legitimacy of a political system. But what do citizens expect from a democracy, and how are these expectations formed? Answering these questions is crucial for the analysis of individual support for democracy. In this paper, I claim that citizens' expectations from democracy are, at least partly, the result of regime-specific socialization. Based on the notion that democracy is not a unidimensional concept, but can take different forms, I suppose that citizens also conceive of democracy in variable terms, and expect it to fulfil different criteria. These criteria then are shaped by the democratic context they experienced during their lifetime. Indeed, my results support the hypothesis that national democratic structures affect citizens' perceptions of how a democracy is supposed to be: As for *democratic history*, citizens are more likely to value social democracy, and less likely to support liberal democracy when they were socialized in a post-authoritarian, and specifically in a former communist country. Interestingly, however, this effect does not depend significantly on the duration of exposure to a communist regime. Further, effects are strongest for those citizens from countries which, according to Kitschelt et al. (1999) fall in the group of former bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. When it comes to *democratic models*, citizens are more likely to expect from a democracy what they experience in their own country: Consensual power-sharing or majoritarian democracy. Additionally,

those citizens actively participating in democratic processes are more likely to align their expectations with the democracy they experience, both for the direct-representative and for the majoritarian-consensus dimension.

How can these results be interpreted? First of all, they show that differences in citizens' expectations from democracy - that is, their conception of how an ideal democracy is supposed to be like - are not only determined by individual-level factors, they also seem to systematically differ between countries, depending on their democratic regime. Citizens' expectations from democracy are apparently influenced by the real-world democracy they experience. Both regime-specific socialization and participation in democratic processes shape what citizens demand from a democracy, supporting the idea that learning effects of participation also apply to individual democracy perceptions. Hence, these findings imply that on the one hand, the democratic ideals citizens hold are influenced by the democratic history in their home country: In line with the theoretical expectations from the literature on democratic learning, citizens of young and especially those of post-communist democracies have a more performance-based view of legitimacy, and expect democracies to deliver outputs, not (just) procedures. The fact that the length of exposure to authoritarianism did not matter for this implies that rather than a (fading) generational socialization effect, we can speak of a consistent framing effect anchored in the political cultures of those regimes, which leads citizens of new democracies to a) compare democracy to the former regime in terms of outputs, and b) see democracy as a promise that is strongly intertwined with economic and social wellbeing. On the other hand, empirical varieties of democracy also matter for citizens, as they provide them with a 'blueprint' of how a democracy is supposed to function. Citizens ideas of how democratic principles should be implemented are apparently shaped by the democratic setting they experience: The dimensions of direct participation vs. representation (Vatter 2009), and majoritarian vs. consensual decision-making (Lijphart 1999), which are the most fundamental dimensions that distinguish established democracies.

What does this imply for research on democratic support? Researchers should keep in mind that when we are asking citizens about 'democracy', if they support and how they evaluate it, their conception of democracy might differ systematically across countries, depending on the regime they Given that also democracy researchers rarely agree on what a democracy is supposed to be like, these results are hardly surprising. Accordingly, including citizens' ideas of democratic quality as well as the country-level democratic context in cross-sectional analyses of support for democracy is important. Of course, as it is usually the case when investigating values and attitudes, theoretical models are rarely complex enough to perfectly

capture the reality. This does however not mean that we should not try to analyse them - only that results need to be interpreted with a certain caution.

References

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1980. *The civic culture revisited: An analytic study.* 1. print. The little, Brown series in comparative politics. Boston: Little Brown.

Altman, D., and A. Pérez-Liñán. 2002. "Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries." *Democratization* 9 (2): 85–100. doi:10.1080/714000256.

Anderson, Christopher J. 1998. "Political satisfaction in old and new democracies." *Institute for European Studies Working Paper* 98.

Anderson, Christopher J. 2007. "The interaction of structures and voter behavior." In *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*, edited by Russell J. Dalton, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Robert E. Goodin, 589–609. The Oxford handbooks of political science. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Anderson, Christopher J., André Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Ola Listhaug. 2005. *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy.* Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66–81. doi:10.2307/2952259.

Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age.* Berkeley, Calif: Univ. of California Press.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge.* Garden City NY: Doubleday.

Bernauer, Julian, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. "Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy." *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (4): 435–68.

Bochsler, Daniel, and Miriam Hänni. 2015. "Converting the crisis into political capital: Voting for oppositions in established and in new democracies." *Working paper, University of Zurich.*

Bochsler, Daniel, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. "Varieties of democracy." In *Democracy in the age of globalization and mediatization*, edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Daniel Bochsler, Jörg

Matthes, Sandra Lavenex, Marc Bühlmann, and Frank Esser, 69–104. Challenges to democracy in the 21st century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bühlmann, Marc, Wolfgang Merkel, Lisa Müller, and Bernhard Wessels. 2012. "The democracy barometer: A new instrument to measure the quality of democracy and its potential for comparative research." *European political science*. 11 (2012), H. 4, 519-536.

Canache, Damarys. 2012. "Citizens' Conceptualizations of Democracy: Structural Complexity, Substantive Content, and Political Significance." *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (9): 1132–58. doi:10.1177/0010414011434009.

Cho, Youngho. 2014. "To Know Democracy Is to Love It." *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (3): 478–88. doi:10.1177/1065912914532721.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics* 49 (3): 430–51.

Dalton, Russell J., Doh C. Shin, and Willy Jou. 2007. "Understanding Democracy: Data from unlikely places." *Journal of Democracy* 18 (4): 142–56.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1993. "Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First Things First." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (4): 1179–1206. doi:10.2307/2111549.

Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2005. *Assessing the quality of democracy.* A journal of democracy book 17. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry J. 1999. *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dinas, Elias. 2017. "Political Socialisation and Regime Change: How the Right Ceased to be Wrong in Post-1974 Greece." *Political Studies*, 0032321717697345. doi:10.1177/0032321717697345.

Dinas, Elias, and Ksenia Northmore-Ball. 2016. "The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism." *Working paper, University of Oxford*.

Doorenspleet, Renske. 2000. "Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization." *World Politics* 52 (3): 384–406.

Easton, David. 1965. *A systems analysis of political life.* New York NY u.a: Wiley.

ESS. 2012. "European Social Survey Round 6 Data: Data file edition 2.3." *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway.Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. 2016. *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy.* First edition. Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “Introduction: Democracy - the European verdict.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016, 1–20.

Fuchs, Dieter. 1999. “The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany.” In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 123–45: Oxford University Press.

Fuchs, Dieter, and Edeltraut Roller. 2006. “Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.” *International journal of sociology* 36 (3): 70–96.

Gabriel, Oscar W., and Silke I. Keil, eds. 2013. *Society and democracy in Europe.* Routledge advances in European politics 89. London: Routledge.

Hendriks, Frank. 2010. *Vital democracy: A theory of democracy in action.* Oxford: Univ. Press.

Huang, Min-hua, Yu-tzung Chang, and Yun-han Chu. 2008. “Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis.” *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 45–62. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.002.

Hug, Simon, and George Tsebelis. 2002. “Veto Players and Referendums Around the World.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14 (4): 465–515. doi:10.1177/095169280201400404.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* 4. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1999. *Post-communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation.* Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Kornberg, Allan, and Harold D. Clarke. 1994. “Beliefs about Democracy and Satisfaction with Democratic Government: The Canadian Case.” *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (3): 537–63. doi:10.2307/448843.

Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries.* New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe.* Baltimore Md. u.a: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Luskin, Robert C. 1987. “Measuring Political Sophistication.” *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (4): 856–99. doi:10.2307/2111227.

Luskin, Robert C. 1990. “Explaining political sophistication.” *Political Behavior* 12 (4): 331–61. doi:10.1007/BF00992793.

Mansbridge, Jane J. 1999. “On the idea that participation makes better citizens.” In *Citizen competence and democratic institutions*, edited by Stephen L. Elkin and Karol E. Sołtan, 291–317. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Marshall, Monty, and Ted R. Gurr. 2016. “POLITY™ IV PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015.” *Centre for Systemic Peace.* 1st ed. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. “Embedded and defective democracies.” In *In: Aurel Croissant, Wolfgang Merkel (Hrsg.). Consolidated or defective democracy? Problems of regime change. London. Frank Cass, 2004. S. 33-58*, 33–58.

Merkel, Wolfgang, Daniel Bochsler, Karima Bousbah, Marc Bühlmann, Heiko Giebler, Miriam Hänni, Lea Heyne, Lisa Müller, Saskia Ruth, and Bernhard Wessels. 2016. “Democracy Barometer: Version 5.” *Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie*, www.democracybarometer.org.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1996. “Trajectories of Fear and Hope: "Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe".” *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (4): 553–81.

Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2002. “Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes.” *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (1): 5.

Morlino, Leonardo. 2004. “‘Good’ and ‘bad’ democracies: how to conduct research into the quality of democracy.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20 (1): 5–27. doi:10.1080/13523270410001687082.

O'donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 2013. *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies.* Baltimore: John hopkins University Press.

Oskarsson, Sven. 2010. “Generalized trust and political support: A cross-national investigation.” *Acta Polit* 45 (4): 423–43. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.3.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2014. “Communist socialization and post-communist economic and political attitudes.” *Electoral Studies* 33 (0): 77–89. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.008.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Ferdinando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and development: Political institutions and material well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quintelier, Ellen, and Marc Hooghe. 2012. “Political attitudes and political participation: A panel study on socialization and self-selection effects among late adolescents.” *International Political Science Review* 33 (1): 63–81. doi:10.1177/0192512111412632.

Quintelier, Ellen, and van Deth, Jan W. 2014. “Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data.” *Polit Stud* April 2014 (56): 153–71. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12097.

Rohrschneider, Robert. 1999. *Learning democracy: Democratic and economic values in unified Germany.* 1. publ. Comparative European politics. Oxford u.a: Oxford Univ. Press.

Rose, Richard. 2008. “Learning to support new regimes in Europe.” In *How People View Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 45–58. Journal of democracy book. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rothstein, Bo. 2009. “Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (3): 311–30. doi:10.1177/0002764209338795.

Sack, Benjamin C. 2016. “Regime change and the convergence of democratic value orientations through socialization. Evidence from reunited Germany.” *Democratization*, 1–19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1220940.

Schedler, Andreas, and Rodolfo Sarsfield. 2007. “Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect measures of democratic support.” *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (5): 637–59.

Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. “Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland.” *Polit Behav* 34 (3): 535–59. doi:10.1007/s11109-011-9164-y.

Vatter, Adrian. 2009. “Lijphart expanded: three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries?” *Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 1 (01): 125. doi:10.1017/S1755773909000071.

Wessels, Bernhard. 2016. “Democratic legitimacy: Concepts, measures, outcomes.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016, 235–56.

World Bank. 2017. “World Development Indicators 2017.” *Washington, DC: World Bank.*, https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The nature and origins of mass opinion.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary statistics of all variables.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Expectations from democracy (individual- level)					
Liberal democracy	42363	8.460954	1.513251	0	10
Social democracy	43643	8.428454	1.861542	0	10
Direct democracy	43492	8.291686	2.022645	0	10
Consensus democracy	37814	.7657746	.4235193	0	1
Democratic regime (country-level)					
Democratic quality	26	5.877004	.6914762	4.87662	7.304686
Age of democracy (years)	26	53.21561	35.62039	21	164
Direct democracy	26	2.158963	2.20655	0	9.174709
Consensus democracy	26	6.152506	1.652362	1.492406	8.309596
Authoritarian exposure, in years					
Early authoritarian exposure (6-17)	44966	3.852956	5.004039	0	11
Adult authoritarian exposure (from 18)	44966	5.948895	10.89493	0	45
Total authoritarian exposure (from 6)	44966	9.80185	14.5151	0	48
Control variables					
Population	26	2.14e+07	2.48e+07	319000	8.17e+07
GDP per capita	26	26243.63	9572.182	6365.21	46981.56
Gender (1=male)	44949	.4576075	.4982052	0	1
Age	44859	50.07613	17.96483	18	103
Education (years)	44966	12.58133	3.912896	0	20
Unemployment (1=yes)	44702	.3034764	.4597643	0	1
Political sophistication (1=high)	44785	.4545049	.4979314	0	1
Voted last election (1=yes)	43420	.7821741	.4127732	0	1
Non-electoral participation[11]	44325	.8273209	1.278782	0	7
Left-Right scale (0 = left, 10=right)	38993	5.161362	2.306064	0	10
Born in other country (1=yes)	44940	.0503115	.2185894	0	1

Notes: Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

[11] Consists of the following variables: "During the last 12 month, have you (1) contacted a politician, (2) worked in a political party or group, (3) worked in another organization, (4) worn a campaign badge/sticker, (5) signed a petition, (6) taken part in a lawful demonstration, (7) boycotted certain products?" Given that signing a petition can be considered institutional participation (in a popular referendum) in Switzerland, this item is excluded here.

Table 2: Operationalization of democratic expectations.

Variable	Items (ESS)
Liberal/procedural	…that national elections are free and fair? ...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another? ...that opposition parties are free to criticize the government? …that the media are free to criticize the government? ...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government?
Social/substance	...that the government protects all citizens against poverty? ...that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels?
Majoritarian-consensus	The government in some countries is formed by a single party; in other countries by two or more parties in coalition. (Which is best?)
Representative-direct	...that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?

Table 3: Operationalization of the democratic regime

Variable	Items
Democratic history	
Age of democracy	Years of democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2016 and own coding).
Quality of democracy	Democratic quality (Merkel et al. 2016).
Authoritarian past	Post-authoritarian country (own coding).
Democratic models	
Direct democracy	Constitutional provisions for direct democracy (existence of direct democratic institutions and participation quora), number of direct democratic votes per year (Merkel et al. 2016).
Consensus democracy	Gallagher Index (reversed), mean district magnitude, effective electoral threshold, effective number of parties, cabinet composition (percentage of coalition governments compared to single-party governments), trade union density (Merkel et al. 2016).

Table 4: Authoritarian legacies.

Country	***Period***	***Type of communism*** *(Source: Kitschelt et al 1999, 39)*
Former communist		
Albania	1945-1992	Patrimonial communism
Bulgaria	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Czech Republic	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
East Germany	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
Estonia	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Hungary	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Lithuania	1945-1990	Patrimonial communism
Poland	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Slovakia	1945-1990	Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
Slovenia	1945-1990	National accommodative communism
Ukraine	1945-1991	Patrimonial communism
Former military dictatorship		
Spain	1939-1977	
Portugal	1926-1975	

Table 5: Authoritarian exposure effects (full tables to Figure 1).

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	**Model 2: Expectations social** b/se
Democratic quality	0.144	0.0364
	(0.167)	(0.237)
Age of democracy	-0.00307	-0.00152
	(0.00287)	(0.00408)
Former authoritarian country	-0.276***	0.411***
	(0.0642)	(0.0803)
Early authoritarian exposure	0.0151***	0.00920*
	(0.00338)	(0.00416)
Adult authoritarian exposure	-0.00341*	-0.000938
	(0.00125)	(0.00153)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000186	-0.00000205
	(0.0000162)	(0.0000230)
Population size	-1.18e-09	4.56e-09
	(3.20e-09)	(4.55e-09)
Gender (male)	0.165***	-0.208***
	(0.0153)	(0.0191)
Age	0.00646***	0.00668***
	(0.000552)	(0.000686)
Education (years)	0.0756***	-0.0230***
	(0.00218)	(0.00272)
Unemployed	0.0312+	0.215***
	(0.0174)	(0.0216)
Left-right placement	-0.0227***	-0.113***
	(0.00348)	(0.00433)
Born in other country	0.00402	0.0949*
	(0.0353)	(0.0439)
Constant	7.160***	8.653***
	(0.769)	(1.093)
Var (Constant)	-1.098***	-0.744***
	(0.150)	(0.151)
Var (Residual)	0.338***	0.565***
	(0.00385)	(0.00382)
N Level 1	33692	34252
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	118509.3	136029.6
BIC	118644.1	136164.6
Chi2	1425.2	1313.9
ICC	0.05357	0.06807

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 6: Authoritarian exposure effects, including type of authoritarianism (full tables to Figure 2).

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	**Model 2: Expectations social** b/se
Democratic quality	0.143	0.0342
	(0.166)	(0.224)
Age of democracy	-0.00305	-0.000546
	(0.00289)	(0.00389)
Former communist country	-0.202***	0.483***
	(0.0570)	(0.0712)
Former military dictatorship	0.0120	0.593
	(0.258)	(0.346)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000186	-0.00000117
	(0.0000162)	(0.0000217)
Population size	-1.25e-09	3.58e-09
	(3.22e-09)	(4.33e-09)
Gender (male)	0.166***	-0.207***
	(0.0153)	(0.0191)
Age	0.00638***	0.00688***
	(0.000465)	(0.000577)
Education (years)	0.0762***	-0.0225***
	(0.00218)	(0.00271)
Unemployed	0.0396*	0.219***
	(0.0173)	(0.0215)
Left-right placement	-0.0223***	-0.113***
	(0.00346)	(0.00431)
Born in other country	0.00226	0.0955*
	(0.0352)	(0.0438)
Constant	7.161***	8.532***
	(0.769)	(1.033)
Var (Constant)	-1.100***	-0.803***
	(0.150)	(0.151)
Var (Residual)	0.338***	0.565***
	(0.00385)	(0.00382)
N Level 1	33692	34252
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	118531.1	136029.7
BIC	118657.5	136156.4
Chi2	1400.4	1312.0
ICC	0.05333	0.06089

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016) WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 7: Authoritarian exposure effects, including types of communism (full tables to Figure 3).

	Model 1: Expectations liberal b/se	**Model 2: Expectations social** b/se
Democratic quality	0.126	-0.0433
	(0.171)	(0.230)
Age of democracy	-0.00286	-0.000714
	(0.00290)	(0.00390)
Patrimonial communism	-0.265	-0.249
	(0.321)	(0.430)
Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism	-0.203***	0.478***
	(0.0574)	(0.0716)
National accommodative communism	-0.149	0.343
	(0.271)	(0.364)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000196	-0.0000193
	(0.0000173)	(0.0000256)
Population size	-1.10e-10	-6.84e-10
	(3.02e-09)	(4.45e-09)
Gender (male)	0.166***	-0.207***
	(0.0153)	(0.0191)
Age	0.00638***	0.00689***
	(0.000465)	(0.000577)
Education (years)	0.0762***	-0.0225***
	(0.00218)	(0.00271)
Unemployed	0.0396*	0.219***
	(0.0173)	(0.0215)
Left-right placement	-0.0223***	-0.113***
	(0.00346)	(0.00431)
Born in other country	0.00222	0.0955*
	(0.0352)	(0.0438)
Constant	7.267***	9.694***
	(0.887)	(1.190)
Var (Constant)	-1.104***	-0.808***
	(0.150)	(0.151)
Var (Residual)	0.338***	0.565***
	(0.00385)	(0.00382)
N Level 1	33692	34252
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	119948.4	143854.9
BIC	120092.5	143999.4
Chi2	1710.5	1284.5
ICC	0.05654	0.07605

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 8: The effect of democratic models (full tables to Figures 4, 5, and 6).

Model 1: Expectations direct democracy	b/se	**Model 2: Expectations consensus democracy**	b/se
Direct democracy in country	0.0125 (0.0371)	Consensus democracy in country	0.259* (0.112)
Voting*Direct democracy	0.0329** (0.0114)	Voting*Consensus democracy	0.0720*** (0.0208)
Participation*Direct democracy	0.00706* (0.00342)	Participation*Consensus democracy	0.00474 (0.00776)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000205* (0.00000827)	GDP per Capita	0.0000245 (0.0000192)
Population size	2.56e-09 (3.80e-09)	Population size	-9.89e-09 (5.46e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.125*** (0.0207)	Gender (male)	-0.111*** (0.0289)
Age	-0.00107 (0.000658)	Age	0.0449*** (0.00427)
Education (years)	-0.0171*** (0.00306)	Education (years)	0.0450*** (0.00427)
Experience unemployment	0.112*** (0.0232)	Experienced unemployment	0.0329 (0.0323)
Voted last election	0.0498 (0.0389)	Voted last election	-0.400** (0.124)
Non-electoral participation	0.0308** (0.0108)	Non-electoral participation	0.0563 (0.0385)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0152*** (0.00453)	Placement on left right scale	-0.0250*** (0.00617)
Born in other country	0.0787 (0.0446)	Born in other country	-0.0361 (0.0616)
Constant	9.029*** (0.278)	Constant	-1.261 (0.807)
Var (Constant)	-0.903*** (0.142)	Var (Constant)	-0.214 (0.142)
Var (Residual)	0.674*** (0.00371)		
N Level 1	36448	N Level 1	32495
N Level 2	26	N Level 2	26
AIC	152734.1	*AIC*	29977.0
BIC	152861.7	*BIC*	30094.4
Chi2	167.6	Chi2	214.6
ICC	0.04868	ICC	0.165326

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression (Model 1), Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept model (Model 2). Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 9: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Democratic history.

	Sophistication high		**Sophistication low**	
	Model 1 **Expectations liberal** b/se	**Model 2** **Expectations social** b/se	**Model 1** **Expectations liberal** b/se	**Model 2** **Expectations social** b/se
Democratic quality	0.0698 (0.136)	-0.0906 (0.203)	0.104 (0.189)	0.182 (0.227)
Age of democracy	-0.00335 (0.00237)	-0.000440 (0.00354)	-0.00412 (0.00332)	-0.00120 (0.00398)
Former communist country	-0.137*	0.502***	-0.279*	0.299*
	(0.0597)	(0.0847)	(0.105)	(0.121)
Former military dictatorship	-0.0101	0.711*	0.0308	0.450
	(0.213)	(0.317)	(0.296)	(0.355)
GDP per Capita	-0.00000888 (0.0000133)	0.00000327 (0.0000198)	-0.0000243 (0.0000185)	-0.0000140 (0.0000222)
Population size	-3.87e-10 (2.64e-09)	1.75e-09 (3.93e-09)	-3.28e-09 (3.66e-09)	4.82e-09 (4.40e-09)
Gender (male)	0.0917*** (0.0187)	-0.269*** (0.0264)	0.129*** (0.0245)	-0.168*** (0.0280)
Age	0.00294*** (0.000578)	0.00871*** (0.000818)	0.00443*** (0.000744)	0.00469*** (0.000847)
Education (years)	0.0544*** (0.00261)	-0.0425*** (0.00369)	0.0672*** (0.00369)	-0.00840* (0.00421)
Unemployed	0.0627** (0.0214)	0.211*** (0.0303)	0.0330 (0.0267)	0.230*** (0.0305)
Left-right placement	-0.0328*** (0.00396)	-0.143*** (0.00559)	-0.00535 (0.00588)	-0.0764*** (0.00671)
Born in other country	-0.0142 (0.0415)	0.145* (0.0588)	0.0414 (0.0570)	0.0400 (0.0651)
Constant	8.071*** (0.635)	9.586*** (0.946)	7.583*** (0.889)	7.810*** (1.065)
Var (Constant)	-1.307*** (0.153)	-0.906*** (0.156)	-0.978*** (0.151)	-0.795*** (0.154)
Var (Residual)	0.194*** (0.00538)	0.544*** (0.00537)	0.430*** (0.00554)	0.577*** (0.00546)
N Level 1	17298	17377	16331	16803
N Level 2	26	26	26	26
AIC	55918.3	68342.3	60492.3	67192.2
BIC	56034.7	68458.8	60607.8	67308.1
Chi2	551.8	1246.0	368.1	290.8
ICC	0.04728	0.05214	0.05647	0.06048

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 10: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Direct democracy.

	Model 1: High sophistication only b/se	**Model 2: Low sophistication only** b/se
Direct democracy in country	0.0309	0.0303
	(0.0471)	(0.0392)
Voting*Direct democracy	0.0627**	0.0178
	(0.0195)	(0.0148)
Participation*Direct democracy	0.0109*	-0.00388
	(0.00417)	(0.00674)
Voted last election	-0.192*	0.115*
	(0.0704)	(0.0478)
Non-electoral participation	0.00128	0.0972***
	(0.0136)	(0.0198)
GDP per Capita	-0.0000210*	-0.0000202*
	(0.0000100)	(0.00000869)
Population size	2.72e-09	5.35e-10
	(4.17e-09)	(3.60e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.223***	-0.0407
	(0.0297)	(0.0291)
Age	-0.000253	-0.00141
	(0.000960)	(0.000925)
Education (years)	-0.0487***	0.0149***
	(0.00427)	(0.00450)
Experience unemployment	0.169***	0.0657*
	(0.0340)	(0.0315)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0209***	-0.00882
	(0.00615)	(0.00672)
Constant	9.806***	8.519***
	(0.346)	(0.299)
Var (Constant)	-0.712***	-0.863***
	(0.155)	(0.156)
Var (Residual)	0.690***	0.648***
	(0.00523)	(0.00527)
N Level 1	18339	18019
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	77610.1	74730.2
BIC	77727.4	74847.2
Chi2	264.7	108.7
ICC	0.05702	0.04648

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 11: Robustness tests with high and low sophistication separately: Consensus democracy.

	Model 1: High sophistication only b/se	**Model 2: Low sophistication only** b/se
Consensus democracy in country	0.287*	0.231*
	(0.122)	(0.109)
Voting*Consensus democracy	0.0708*	0.0651
	(0. 0.0264)	(0.0365)
Participation*Consensus democracy	0.00205	-0.0000838
	(0.00785)	(0.0125)
Voted last election	-0.419+	-0.341*
	(0.217)	(0.158)
Non-electoral participation	0.0708	0.0761
	(0.0472)	(0.0757)
GDP per Capita	0.0000214	0.0000187
	(0.0000177)	(0.0000163)
Population size	-8.71e-09	-8.81e-09
	(7.54e-09)	(6.92e-09)
Gender (male)	-0.198***	-0.0139
	(0.0422)	(0.0409)
Age	0.00502***	0.00344*
	(0.00137)	(0.00131)
Education (years)	0.0357***	0.0533***
	(0.00602)	(0.00631)
Experienced unemployment	0.0412	0.0103
	(0.0477)	(0.0443)
Placement on left right scale	-0.0335***	-0.0168
	(0.00838)	(0.00926)
Constant	-1.262	-1.231
	(0.875)	(0.791)
Var (Constant)	-0.161	-0.250+
	(0.144)	(0.147)
N Level 1	16760	15671
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	14554.6	15357.5
BIC	14662.8	15464.7
Chi2	128.4	123.9
ICC	0.1804484	0.15571

*Notes: Logistic Hierarchical Random-Intercept model. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p <0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), WDI (World Bank 2017). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Chapter Three: Do citizens want too much? A spatial model approach to support for democracy

Abstract

Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is a commonly used indicator in political opinion research, and its determinants have been analysed extensively in the literature. But what does dissatisfaction with democracy substantially mean? This paper wants to understand if satisfaction is actually a coherent consequence of citizens considering democratic supply and demand. It departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the distance between what 'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and democratic reality. I capture this idea in a spatial model of democratic support, where the size and direction of the distance between citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy determines their levels of satisfaction. To test this model, I use data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6. Taking into account both expectation-surplus and evaluations-surplus distances, I find that satisfaction is indeed affected by both the size and the direction of the distance between expectations and evaluations. Yet, satisfaction with democracy is not simply a product of supply matching demand. Dimensions of democracy matter as well: While liberal criteria of democratic quality are a generally agreed upon concept amongst citizens, democratic input dimensions like direct participation as well as output criteria like social justice are more disputed, and create dissatisfaction amongst those who want more of them as well as those that want less. Democracy, in other words, cannot only be too little, but also of the wrong type.

1. Introduction

At least since the 1970s, people all around the world have been surveyed about their levels of support for their democracies. Especially the satisfaction with democracy question (SWD) has been included in most national and cross-national surveys, and by now there is data for almost every single country in the world - even the non-democratic ones (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 1). Citizens' satisfaction with their democracy, often used as a proxy for regime support in general, has become one of the most commonly used survey indicators in comparative research (Linde and Ekman 2003, 391). Consequentially, the amount of studies trying to find the determinants of satisfaction with democracy is numerous too: We know that the quality of institutions and regime performance matter (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009; Dahlberg, Linde, and Holmberg 2013; Ruiz-Rufino 2013; Magalhães 2014), as well as the democratic culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Fuchs and Roller 2006; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014), and the socio-economic status (Schäfer 2013) and winner-loser status of citizens (Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Campbell 2013). We know that other political attitudes such as trust are linked to satisfaction (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007), and also that satisfaction with democracy, sadly, does not increase general happiness (Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012).
In the light of all this literature, is there still something left to write about satisfaction? This paper argues that there is, and tackles a basic question: What does dissatisfaction with democracy substantially mean? Does it mean that people want too much, or at least more than they can get? I want to understand if satisfaction with democracy is actually a coherent consequence of citizens considering democratic 'supply' and 'demand'. Based on the assumption that support for democracy consists of three attitudes - expectations from, evaluations of and satisfaction with democracy - I develop a spatial model to explain satisfaction. This model departs from the simple idea that satisfaction equals the distance between what 'should be' and what 'is'; between democratic expectations and democratic evaluations. The idea of ‘congruence’ (Almond and Verba 1963, 20) or a 'democratic deficit' (Norris 2011, 5) has been present in the literature since decades and refers to the assumption that persons whose expectations about democracy are in accordance with the (perceived) political realities in their country are more satisfied with democracy than those whose beliefs are at odds with prevailing practices. I capture this idea by modelling the distance between citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy in three different dimensions: Liberal, social, and direct democracy, using data from the ESS 2012. I want to shed more

light on the question *why* and on what grounds citizens are dissatisfied with democracy: Do they want more than they (can) get? Should they lower their expectations? Or is there a dissonance between the type of democracy they want and the one they get? These questions are important because they form the, often implicit, basis for a lot of the studies on satisfaction with democracy cited above: The notion that there is a coherent connection between the demands citizens make to democracy, the quality of institutions that is realized in their country, and their levels of satisfaction. This very basic idea is mostly overlooked or taken for granted, but it deserves a more systematic assessment.

This paper starts by explaining the attitudes underlying democratic support as well as the three dimensions of democracy used in my analysis. Next, I present my spatial model of democratic support as well as its theoretical background and substantial implications. In the following, I present the data and operationalization, to then proceed to the empirical analysis. Lastly, I discuss and interpret the results.

2. Concepts: Support for and dimensions of democracy

Dimensions of support: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction

As Chapter One of this dissertation has explained, I assume that it is essential to distinguish the attitudes that form democratic support rather than treat it as one piece. I use three attitudes to conceptualize support for democracy: Expectations from democracy, evaluations of democracy, and satisfaction with democracy. This section serves as a short recapitulation of these concepts and their meaning.

Expectations from democracy describe the normative model of democracy favoured by an individual. Expectations, as Seyd (2014, 3) has claimed, can refer to two dimensions: The first sense of expectation relates to an anticipatory judgment – a belief that an actor or body will deliver a particular quality or outcome. The second sense relates to a normative or desirability judgment - a belief that a particular quality should exist or an outcome should be delivered. Expectations from democracy relate to that second sense, a normative ideal: How should a good democracy be like, and what should it do for me? What should democracy mean? Secondly, *evaluations of democracy* refer to the performance of respective democratic regime someone lives in. Whereas the 'objective democratic performance or democratic quality of a regime is an attribute that can be measured on the country-level, subjective evaluations differ across citizens, as they are dependent on individual characteristics such as the socio-economic background and individual values (Mishler and Rose 2001; van der Meer and Dekker 2011).

They refer to the perceived system performance, and do not have to coincide with objective democratic performance.[1]

Satisfaction with democracy, thirdly, is a general judgement on the functioning of democracy - that is, whether citizens are, overall, content with their national democratic system: Am I satisfied with what democracy has done for me lately? I define satisfaction with democracy as the outcome of expectations and evaluations, in other words, the difference between what 'should be' and what actually 'is'. Section 3 will detscribe the exact relationship between expectations and evaluations in more detail, but first, another recapitulation on the multidimensional nature of support for democracy.

Support for which kind of democracy?

Chapter One of this dissertation has also introduced the notion that democracy is multidimensional, in citizens' attitudes as much as in democratic theory and empirical research. Using an exploratory factor analytical approach, I have identified two main dimensions which structure citizens' support for democracy: Liberal democracy and social democracy. Liberal democracy refers to democratic inputs and procedures: Fair elections, political freedom, party alternatives, and transparency. Social democracy, on the other hand, to democratic outputs: Protection against poverty and redistribution. I assume that individuals vary in their ideas of a 'good' democracy, and that this variance can be captured on a scale along two dimensions. The two dimensions also refer to two substantially different ways to define democracy: A procedural and a substantial approach. In a liberal version, democracy is seen as merely a procedure, and social justice rather as a prerequisite for or a potential outcome of these procedures. From a substantive perspective, social justice is seen as a substantial and intrinsic part of democracy. Additionally, I use direct democracy as a third dimensions, as it refers to a different type of democratic inputs (popular votes), and a different, or additional model that complements representative democracy. Support for democracy, thus, can take place in three dimensions - liberal, social, and direct democracy.

Citizens, therefore, differ in their support for democracy along dimensions. While satisfaction with democracy is a unidimensional concept that captures the overall happiness with one's own democracy, expectations and evaluations are more specific, and can refer to different types of democracy. Chapter Two of this dissertation has shown that the democratic regime citizens' experience is related to their expectations from democracy: Socialization experiences shape the way we see democracy. This supports research by a number of authors who have

[1]See Chapter Four for an analysis of the effects of socio-economic status on individual evaluations of democracy.

analysed individual attitudes towards democracy and mapped different types of democrats, or "democrats with adjectives" (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). Their findings suggest that citizens' beliefs which model of democracy is desirable diverge (Ferrín 2012; Hernández 2016; Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016). These insights are relevant for this chapter, too: If we want to understand the link between expectations, evaluations and satisfaction, we also need to take into account what kind of democracy we are talking about. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the three democratic dimensions in citizens' expectations and evaluations on the aggregate level.

Figure 1: Dimensions of democracy in citizens' expectations and evaluations.



Notes: The plots show minimum/maximum, first quartile to third quartile range, and the median of the distribution, dots show outliers. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). N=47956. N(countries)=26. Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

We can see that dimensions matter: While expectations do not differ strongly in the three dimensions and are, at least at the aggregate level, consistently rather high, evaluations do differ - they are highest in the liberal dimensions, and lowest in the social dimension. The direct democratic dimension, at the same time, shows the largest variance. This points to the fact that citizens want different kinds of democracy, and, even more strongly, (perceive to) have different kinds of democracy in their countries. Accordingly, it is important to separate democratic dimensions when trying to understand citizens' support for democracy. If we want to know what causes satisfaction and dissatisfaction, we should ask which kind of democracy citizens want first. This is what this paper does: Explaining satisfaction with democracy

through expectations and evaluations in different dimensions of democracy. The following section specifies my theoretical model.

3. Explaining satisfaction with democracy: A spatial model of support

What makes citizens (dis)satisfied?

In this paper, I want to understand how the different attitudes that form support for democracy are linked. I take a rather naïve approach and assume that satisfaction with democracy is simply the difference between expectations from and evaluations of democracy. The main assumption is of course that citizens' attitudes towards democracy are related in a systematic way - the difference between what 'should be' and what actually 'is' explains satisfaction. Do I want democracy to be liberal? Social? Direct? And do I perceive democracy to be like that in reality? Satisfaction with democracy is the outcome of this comparison of normative expectations with evaluations of the reality: Does the democracy I live in fit my yardstick(s)? Figure 2 from Chapter One illustrates this simple model.

Figure 2: Support for democracy: Expectations, evaluations and satisfaction.



The idea of satisfaction as an outcome of reality confronted with normative demands can be found in the literature on political support and political culture since several decades: The concept of 'congruence' (Almond and Verba 1963, 20) refers to the assumption that persons whose beliefs about democracy are in accordance with the (perceived) political realities in their country make more favourable evaluations of democracy than those whose beliefs are at odds with prevailing practices (Kornberg and Clarke 1994). This approach is also taken by Ferrín and Kriesi (2016b, 10), who assume that "it is the comparison between the democratic ideals and the actual functioning of democracy that makes for the judgment about the legitimacy of a democratic regime". Norris talks about a "democratic deficit", which she defines as the gap between the public's aspirations for democracy and the actual performance of a democratic regime (Norris 2011, 5). The 'critical citizens' literature generally supposes that dissatisfaction is caused by a combination of high expectations and critical outlooks on

politics amongst citizens with above-average education and political interest, leading to high levels of electoral and non-electoral participation (Norris 1999, 21). Dalton (2004, 66) speaks of a "representation gap" between citizens' preferences and government policy outputs.

The idea of rising or changing criteria for the evaluation of democracy are also part of the 'crisis of democracy' interpretation, provided for instance by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975, 162): "If public demands on government spiral insatiably upward, satisfaction could fall even if performance remains unchanged". Similar considerations can be found in the literature on political trust (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 55), which assumes that distrust arises from a sense among citizens "that something should be happening but is not happening" - hence, high public demands or expectations that are not met by the perceived outputs of the political process. Seyd (2014, 3) supposes that support for politicians is "held to reflect the perceived performance of politicians relative to the outcomes or forms of behaviour that citizens value or desire". Curini, Jou, and Memoli (2012) use the distance between voters' ideological position and government policy to explain satisfaction with democracy.

How to conceptualize distance

But how can we conceptualize this idea to test it empirically? I develop a simple spatial model (Figure 3), to express that the distance between what someone expects a democracy to be or to deliver, and what they consider to be realized, equals satisfaction with democracy. In other words, if a citizens' expectations are not met by their evaluations of the democracy they live in, distance, and hence dissatisfaction, should rise. In general, spatial models refer to the positions of political actors, whether these are citizens, voters or politicians, in a cognitive or ideological space. Common spatial models in political competition for example assume that citizens have policy preferences while politicians compete for their support by offering policy packages at elections. This implies an ideal point for each citizen, characterizing their most-preferred policy package in a given choice setting and describing increasingly less-preferred policies as points in some cognitive space that are increasingly far from this ideal (Laver and Schilperoord 2007). Hence, the critical factor here is distance.

In my model, the two dimensions are expectations from and evaluations of democracy. If the two are on the same level, the distance between them is 0, like in case 1 in Figure 3. This should, following the assumptions from the literature, go along with high satisfaction. If expectations and evaluations do not match, but one exceeds the other, the distance grows. But what exactly is then distance?

Figure 3: A spatial model of expectations and evaluations.



As Figure 3 also shows, there are different ways to conceptualize this notion. Using a simple geometric approach, distance is simply the shortest possible line between citizens' views and democratic policies - titled as D in the graph. Case 2 and case 3 show the distance vector D in two different cases - once, for a case where expectations exceed evaluations, and once with the opposite case of evaluations exceeding expectations. While the size of the distance is the same, the direction is different.

Another approach, also shown in the figure, would be to measure the gap between expectations and evaluations - G -, which is the simple mathematical difference between the levels of the two. While this measure is even simpler, applying the spatial logic consequentially implies that the distance is a better measure: It represents the direct distance between the best possible outcome, a distance of zero, and the reality. While the gap follows a one-dimensional logic, the distance measure is two-dimensional, and fits better to the model I use. I also keep the gap measure though, to test if and how it differs from the spatial distance.

What does this model then imply substantially about (dis)satisfaction? The simplest possible approach is to assume that individual-level satisfaction equals distance: If the expectations a citizen holds diverge from their evaluations of the democratic reality, dissatisfaction evolves. Or, as Norris (2011, 5) puts it: "The most plausible potential explanations for the democratic deficit suggest that this phenomenon arises from some combination of growing public expectations […] and/or failing government performance." This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: The bigger the distance between citizens' expectations and evaluations, the lower is their satisfaction with democracy.

This simple approach further assumes that the size of the distance matters, and nothing more. But there are two different types of distances: Those with an expectations-surplus (someone expects more from a democracy than they see realized, like case 2), and those with an evaluations-surplus (someone's expectations are exceeded by the perceived reality, like case 3). Are they the same? The literature cited above offers rather little insights on the potential effects of an evaluations-surplus distance where the 'is' exceeds the 'should be'. Referring to trust in politicians, Seyd (2014, 4) states that "where perceived performance exceeds expectations, a positive discrepancy exists that induces a positive attitude towards the object." In this line of interpretation, there is no specific effect of an evaluations-surplus: As soon as the expectations are met, the positive effect stays the same. Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), and specifically Wessels (2016, 240) argue the same by claiming that "an excess of evaluation over meaning means that *ought* is realized to 100 percent", which leads them to recode all such cases into a distance of zero.

This does make sense if one assumes that democracy is something as inherently good that you cannot possibly have 'too much' of it. But democracy is not just about quality, and about how well democracy is realized - as explained in Chapter One and Two of this dissertation, democracy is also about different models and different ways to realize democratic principles. While the goal - being democratic - might be the same amongst all existing democratic systems, the means to get there differ. As the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 524) assumes, because "democracies are systems whose development is perpetually negotiated by political as well as societal forces, […] a variety of different democracies exist". This is why I take a different approach, and consider that there can be 'too much' of specific democratic dimensions - in other words, that an evaluation-surplus is not necessary a good thing. What does this mean? If we conceptualize democracy as more than unidimensional, one

could also argue that the (perceived) existence of a certain democratic feature which is not valued highly by a person could lead to negative attitudes about democracy in general. To put it differently: Someone who thinks that democracy should be representative and majoritarian might be unsatisfied when living in Switzerland, and someone who would prefer a consensual, proportional democracy with strong minority protection might be unhappy with the British model. Someone who opposes strong welfare and social redistribution could be deceived by Scandinavian democracies. Hence, citizens could be dissatisfied because they - perceivably - live in the *wrong type* of democratic system, or because their system delivers the wrong outputs. Democracy could create dissonance. This is why I will also test whether an evaluations-surplus has a different effect than a perfect match between expectations and evaluations. I do, however, think that this effect varies according to the dimensions: While the liberal democratic dimension is predominantly about *democratic quality*, and an absence of its realization would imply non-democraticness, the other two dimensions are more 'elective'. Social and direct democracy are possible democratic models, but not necessary conditions for democraticness. I thus assume that an evaluations-surplus matters more in these two dimensions than in the liberal dimension, where the notion that one cannot have too much democracy seems more justifiable.

H2: Evaluations-surplus distances cause dissatisfaction in the social and direct democratic dimension, but not in the liberal dimension.

Importantly, my approach also implies that levels do not matter: Whether expectations are low or high is not relevant for satisfaction, just how close they are to evaluations. In this I differ from Ferrín and Kriesi (2016a), who base their extensive book on the notion that the level of expectations is relevant for what they call legitimacy - the relationship between expectations and evaluations. Accordingly, they weight the gap between the two with the level of expectations (Wessels 2016, 248), and consider this the most appropriate measure. While there are certainly good arguments for including levels into the analysis (the realization of something important to a person might matter more than the realization of something non-important), I believe that the question of distances is more interesting to explore. First, because it does address a notion that has been evoked in the public opinion literature recurrently: Is dissatisfaction a problem of too high expectations? In consequence, should citizens simply lower their expectations to be more satisfied? And secondly, because in the way I use distances - considering evaluations-surplus distances as well as expectations-surplus distances - I do not make any previous theoretical assumptions as Wessels (2016, 241ff.)

does, who, while testing for different legitimacy measures, always excludes evaluation-surplus cases from the beginning.

In the following, I first test for the effect of *direction* (evaluation-surplus vs. expectations-surplus distances), then the effect of *size* (large vs. small distances), and then of *size and direction* (large vs small evaluation-surplus and expectations-surplus distances). The next section explains the data and operationalization I use for this analysis.

4. Methodology

Data: In order to test the effect of expectations and evaluations on satisfaction, I rely on the European Social Survey Round 6 (ESS 2012), which entails a module on citizens' understandings and evaluations of democracy, and covers almost 50.000 respondents in 26 European countries.[2]

Explanatory variables: The ESS 2012, as previously explained, contains a set of questions about citizens' *expectations from democracy* in general as well as their *evaluations of the democratic reality*. The expectations items start with the wording: "And now thinking about democracy in general: How important do you think it is for a democracy…", followed by a democratic attribute such as "…that national elections are free and fair?" The evaluations items read "Now thinking about how democracy is working in your country today, please tell me to what extend you think the following statement applies in [country]", followed by the same attribute, for instance: "National elections are free and fair". Each statement can be answered on a scale from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies completely). The three dimensions of democracy that I use in my analysis are based on these items: Liberal and social democracy are additive indices of several items, and direct democracy is one item. All of them are (re)scaled to a 0 to 10 scale, and calculated for both expectations and evaluations. Each citizen, thus, has a specific position on all six scales: Liberal, social and direct expectations, as well as liberal, social and direct evaluations. The variables Exp_i and Ev_i measure expectations from and evaluations of democracy in each of the three dimensions.

Following the spatial model explained in section 3, I first compose a variable measuring the gap between individuals' expectations and evaluations in each of the three dimensions (i)[3]:

$G_i = Ev_i - Exp_i$

[2]Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

[3]I distract expectations from evaluations in order to make interpretation easier, so that negative numbers indicate expectation-surplus distances, whereas positive numbers indicate evaluation-surplus distances.

The distance D, then, is measured by[4]:

$$D_i = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} (Ev_i - Exp_i)$$

I use the distance D as a main explanatory variable, but also test whether effects for the simple gap G are the same or differ. To find out which effect the size of the distances has, I also introduce a squared term of the gap as well as the distance variable (G^2 and D^2). Substantially, these variables assume that not the direction of the distance, but rather the size determines satisfaction. The bigger the distance (or gap) between expectations and evaluations, the more dissatisfied are citizens, independent of the direction of the distance.

Further, as previously described, I also want to test which effect a combination of size and direction of the distance makes. To do so, I create a second version of the squared distance as well as gap measures, which differentiates between D^2+ (G^2+) and D^2- (G^2-), where the former assembles all cases based on positive distances, and the latter the ones based on negative distances.[5]

Additionally, I test for an interaction effect of expectations and evaluations ($I_i = Exp_i * Ev_i$) as a robustness check. An interaction between the two variables assumes that rather than the distance between them, evaluations matter depending on the level of expectations - evaluations, in other words, become relevant only when we multiply them with the importance someone attributes to this dimensions. This approach, which Wessels (2016, 239–40) also uses to create a legitimacy measure from the same variables, does not directly involve a comparison of the two measures, but rather a weighting. Additionally, levels are important: High legitimacy (or, in my case, satisfaction) is only possible when both expectations and evaluations are high. This makes the approach different from my original measure which, as explained, focuses on distances instead of levels.

Dependent variable: The ESS also includes the standard item to measure *satisfaction with democracy* (SWD), which is the main dependent variable in my analysis: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in [country]"? As mentioned above, SWD has been criticized as being a less than ideal indicator because its meaning often remains unclear, both to researchers and to respondents in surveys: Does it measure general support for democracy as a principle, or regime performance? I use satisfaction as a measure of citizens' general happiness with their democratic experience. To make sure these results are robust, I also use *political trust* as an alternative dependent variable. As Easton has stated, political trust may be

[4]As Figure 3 illustrates, D is one side of a right-angled triangle with two equal sides, which makes G its hypotenuse and leads to this formula.

[5]Cases of a distance or gap of 0 are excluded in this measure.

defined as "the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about […]. For the regime, such trust would reveal itself as symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which the country is run (Easton 1975: 447). Trust can thus be seen as an anticipative form of 'proactive' satisfaction, and is, although not the same, a similar concept that should at least strongly correlate with satisfaction. I use three items measuring trust in different democratic institutions (trust in the national parliament, trust in courts and trust in political parties), out of which I create an additive index ranging from 0 to 10 and use it as a substitute dependent variable. These robustness tests are reported in the appendix.

Control variables[6]*:* To control for socio-demographic factors on the individual-level, I use age, gender as well as education (in years). I further control for political interest, which has been proven to account for substantial individual variance in democratic satisfaction (Cutler, Nuesser, and Nyblade 2013; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), and according to the 'critical citizens' theory, should explain higher expectations. To account for country-level differences, I use a fixed-effects model, hence focusing on individual-level differences only[7].

5. Results: What explains (dis)satisfaction?

To test for my first hypothesis (the bigger the distance, the lower is satisfaction), I first look at the effects of distances on satisfaction with democracy. Figure 4 shows the results: In the first panel, we can see that distances indeed have the predicted effects on satisfaction - the bigger the expectations-surplus, the lower the satisfaction. The effect size is the highest in the liberal dimension, followed by the social, and the lowest in the direct dimension. The second panel shows the same for a slightly different measure, the gap between expectations and evaluations. Although the effect sizes are slightly smaller, the pattern stays the same: Apparently, the bigger the distance or the gap between citizens' democratic expectations and the reality in their countries, the more they are dissatisfied, especially when this applies to liberal or social democracy. Wanting more democracy than one 'gets' is clearly a source of dissatisfaction. At the same time, distances (as well as gaps) do not explain all the individual-level variance, but are about as big (in the case of gaps even smaller) in size as the effect of political interest, which I use as a control variable.

[6]See Table 2 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables.

[7]The standard fixed-effects model takes the following form: $Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta X_{ij} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where i=1,... (for N individuals) and for j=1,... (for J countries). Both intercepts (α) and slopes (β) are held constant across countries. In my specific models, for each dimension of democracy the standard equation takes the form: $SWD_j = \alpha + \beta_1 Exp_j + \beta_2 Ev_i + \beta_3 Distance_i + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{ij}$.

Figure 4: Coefficient plots for determinants of satisfaction with democracy.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix. Dependent variable: Satisfaction with democracy. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

The fact that distances show a stronger effect than gaps, although they have a smaller variance[8], support my assumption that they are a more appropriate measure for the relationship between expectations and evaluations. I use gaps as an alternative measure throughout the rest of the analysis nonetheless, to understand if there are further differences between the two approaches. In order to better understand the data, I then also test for the impact of expectations and evaluations separately.

As we can see in the bottom panel, effects again differ quite a lot across dimensions of democracy, with comparatively strong effects of the liberal dimension, followed by the social and the direct dimension. Expectations seem to matter less than evaluations when it comes to explaining (dis)satisfaction, and are more ambiguous: While high expectations about liberal democracy go along with more satisfaction, higher expectations about social and direct democracy lead to more dissatisfaction. Hence, high expectations towards democracy are not genuinely a cause for dissatisfaction with democracy. Rather, holding high liberal democratic expectations leads to higher levels of satisfaction, even after controlling for socio-demographic criteria as well as for democratic evaluations. High demands on democracy in the social or direct dimension, however, decrease satisfaction. The effect of evaluations on the other hand is genuinely positive, implying that good evaluations of their own democracy matter for citizens' levels of satisfaction. Again, the effects differ considerably depending on the dimension of democracy, with the biggest effect sizes for the liberal dimension of democracy, smaller effects for the social dimension, and very small effects for the direct dimension. Replacing satisfaction with democracy by political trust as a robustness test leads to consistent results, as additional models in Tables 2 to 4 in the appendix show.

Next, I include the squared distance term (as well as the squared gap term) to see whether it is the size of the distance rather than just its direction that matters. I assumed that not just expectation-surplus, but also evaluation-surplus distances have a negative effect on satisfaction, and that this effect takes place in the social and direct dimension rather than in the liberal one. As the quadratic prediction plots in Figure 5 show, the distance variable (left column) indeed has a curvilinear effect on the level of satisfaction with democracy: Negative values (hence, expectation-surpluses) lead to lower levels of satisfaction. Values around zero - hence, expectations which are met by evaluations - produce the highest levels of satisfaction.

[8]See Table 2 in the appendix - the range of values as well as the standard deviation in each of the three dimensions are smaller for distances than for gaps.

Figure 5: Quadratic prediction plots for the effects of distances and gaps on SWD.



Notes: Dependent variable: Satisfaction with democracy. Quadratic prediction plots. (Left column: distances, right column: gaps). Full models see Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Yet, the curve flattens again when values become higher than zero, implying that evaluation-surplus distances tend to make citizens more dissatisfied, too. The same pattern can be seen in the plots based on the gap-measure in the right column, which, apart from a larger scale, do

not differ from the distance plots. Substantially, this means that not high expectations per se, but rather the combination of expectations which are perceived to be not met by the reality lead to dissatisfaction. At the same time, also a surplus of evaluations leads to less satisfaction, pointing to the fact that democracy can also be 'too much' or 'the wrong type of democracy'. Interestingly, this effect is least pronounced in the liberal dimension of democracy, where evaluation-surplus distances do not seem to matter as much as in the other two dimensions. Apparently, features of liberal democracy like competition, freedom and transparency are considered as essential by most European citizens, and cannot be implemented 'too strongly'. That is different in the two other dimensions - social and direct democracy - where the curve shows a stronger turn. These results, supporting hypothesis H2, suggest that procedural criteria of liberal democracy are indeed about democratic quality - about 'good' or 'bad', and are not optional. Democratic models, however, are: Input dimensions like direct participation and substantial output criteria like social justice can work in both directions. If someone does not want democracy to be strong on these dimensions, seeing them fulfilled in reality causes dissatisfaction, just like wanting these qualities in a democracy but not having them realized.

At the same time, when looking at the actual distribution of cases on this curve (Figure 6 in the appendix), we can also see that most cases - citizens - are to be found on the left side of the graph, hence, have an expectations-surplus distance. Cases of evaluation-surpluses, and thus of the wrong model of democracy, are more rare than those of expectations exceeding evaluations. Given the fact that, as described above, high democratic expectations are, at least in the liberal dimension, associated with more satisfaction, we can assume that the cause for dissatisfaction here rather lies in the low democratic expectations than in the high evaluations. In the social and direct dimension, however, high expectations are actually associated with lower satisfaction – in this case, the dissatisfaction might actually be caused by the (perceived) realization of direct or social democratic principles which are not valued highly. Lastly, I also tested for a combination of size and direction by using the D^2+ and D^2- variables, where the former assembles all cases based on positive distances, and the latter the ones based on negative distances. Table 5 in the appendix shows that both variables have a negative effect on satisfaction in all three dimensions, meaning that both distance and size matter. The D^2+ variable, however, is only significant in the direct democratic dimension, and not in the other two. This might be due to the very small N in this group, which is below 400, and thus only 1 percent of my original sample. Given the small number of respondents who have evaluation-surplus distances in all three dimensions, the results should be interpreted

with caution. However, the fact that negative effects prevail also for this type of distances supports my previous results about the effect of size, and hypothesis H2. The gap measure, if coded in the same way, shows very similar results, as Table 5 also displays.[9]

6. Conclusion and outlook

In sum, why are citizens dissatisfied with democracy? They are dissatisfied because they do not get what they want. This result, simple as it may be, has not been tested systematically yet in the public opinion literature. Using a spatial model of democratic demand and supply, this paper shows that satisfaction with democracy is indeed consistently related to the discrepancy between what 'should be' and what 'is'. In the first part of my analysis, I show that the distance between expectations and evaluations matters, as bigger distances decrease citizens' satisfaction in all three dimensions of democracy. The same holds true when using the gap measure instead. So, dissatisfaction can be caused by expectations that are not met by the democratic reality. Accordingly, the notion that there is a coherent relationship between the demands citizens make to democracy, the quality of institutions that is realized in their country, and their levels of satisfaction is right. This is good news from a methodological perspective, given that this assumption is the explicit or implicit base for much of the literature that aims at explaining satisfaction with democracy with differing levels of institutional quality across countries. Does this mean that citizens want 'too much', as Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) warned several decades ago? Should they lower their expectations? On the one hand, that would potentially decrease the distance between the 'ought' and the 'is' of existing democracies.

On the other hand, looking at expectations and evaluations separately shows that there is actually little evidence for the 'critical citizens' claim that high expectations are a strong cause of dissatisfaction: Holding high standards concerning liberal democracy actually makes citizens more satisfied. Wanting high democratic quality in a liberal sense, in terms of competition, transparency, accountability and pluralism, leads to more satisfaction with its functioning in general. Yet, this mechanism does not work when it comes to the social dimension of democracy - the question whether democracy should also be responsible for

[9]Additionally, a robustness test using the interaction term of expectations and evaluations instead of the distance measure (see Table 7 in the appendix) shows that that the interaction effect is particularly strong in the liberal dimension (Figure 7 in the appendix). This point to the fact that in the liberal dimension, the level of expectations affects the strength of the effect evaluations have on satisfaction - the higher the expectations, the stronger the effect. In the other two dimensions, the effects are also positive, but less strong. These results underline the finding that liberal democracy is about quality, of which one cannot have too much. This dimension is highly supported by most people, and its effect on satisfaction depends on the importance citizens attribute to it.

providing its citizens with social security and ensure a certain level of economic equality - as well as direct participation, where high expectations decrease satisfaction. If anything, citizens should lower their expectations concerning 'optional' democratic dimensions that go beyond liberal democratic standards. Wanting 'less democracy', or a less good democracy, is clearly not a way to increase satisfaction.

This important distinction between dimensions of democracy when it comes to their effects on satisfaction can also be seen in the second part of my analysis: When testing for the effects of size in addition to the direction of distances, I find that not just expectation-surplus distances matter, but also evaluation-surplus distances - citizens do get dissatisfied if their democracy realizes too much of a dimensions they do not support. Yet, this is only the fact for the social and direct dimension, which are 'optional' models of democracy that some citizens want and some do not. Democratic quality in liberal democratic terms, however, can never be realized too strongly. Moreover, these results support the finding that the distance between expectations and evaluations is a useful measure to conceptualize the relationship between citizens' democratic attitudes. The use of a spatial model, borrowed from the political competition literature, turns out to be a valuable contribution to the research on satisfaction with democracy. The fact that the distance measure worked even better in explaining satisfaction than the (simpler) gap measure implies that the spatial model is an appropriate way to conceptualize support for democracy.

Generally, these results suggest that we should be careful to assume that dissatisfaction is mainly an expression of rising demands to the democratic system. While 'wanting too much' can be a source of dissatisfaction, it is not about wanting too much democracy, but about wanting a different democracy. As the previous chapters of this dissertation have already elaborated, democracy is a multidimensional construct, also in the minds of citizens. This obviously also affects satisfaction: When asking respondents how satisfied they are with democracy, the answer is a product of different considerations, and of different aspects of democracy being weighted differently. While they might be happy with some aspects of democracy, they are lacking others, or even feel that some dimensions of democracy should be less strong. This also gives some insights on what SWD as an indicator means: It offers merely an aggregate version of different attitudes mixed together. This does not mean that one should not use it - it obviously is linked to expectations and evaluations in a consistent way. Yet, to really understand why a person is satisfied or not, one should consider a more multidimensional approach to democracy, and a more detailed analysis of the attitudes underlying support. The ESS data (as well as for example the WVS battery on understandings

of democracy) is certainly a good example of diversifying the items measuring democratic support.

There are of course limitations to the analysis done here: I look uniquely at the individual level, and do not analyse country-level differences. This is because I am interested in the relationship between different attitudes towards democracy on the individual level - what does satisfaction with democracy mean to citizens? However, after establishing that the relationship between expectations, evaluations and satisfaction is indeed coherent and understanding better how to measure it, an important next step is to find out which groups of people are dissatisfied on what grounds, and how that varies across countries. This is what I do in the next chapter.

References

Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. “Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter?” *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 5–18. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.005.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, Christopher J. 1998. “Political satisfaction in old and new democracies.” *Institute for European Studies Working Paper* 98.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems.” *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 66–81. doi:10.2307/2952259.

Bernauer, Julian, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. “Can't get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy.” *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (4): 435–68.

Bühlmann, Marc, Wolfgang Merkel, Lisa Müller, and Bernhard Wessels. 2012. “The democracy barometer: A new instrument to measure the quality of democracy and its potential for comparative research.” *European political science*. 11 (2012), H. 4, 519-536.

Campbell, R. 2013. “Winners, losers and the Grand Coalition: Political satisfaction in the Federal Republic of Germany.” *International Political Science Review.* doi:10.1177/0192512113505246.

Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The crisis of democracy: Report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral Commission.* New York NY: New York University Press.

Curini, Luigi, Willy Jou, and Vincenzo Memoli. 2012. “Satisfaction with Democracy and the Winner/Loser Debate: The Role of Policy Preferences and Past Experience.” *Brit. J. Polit. Sci.* 42 (02): 241–61. doi:10.1017/S0007123411000275.

Cutler, Fred, Andrea Nuesser, and Ben Nyblade. 2013. “Evaluating the Quality of Democracy with Individual Level models of Satisfaction: Or, a complete model of satisfaction with democracy.” *Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, 4–7 September 2013*.

Dahlberg, Stefan, Jonas Linde, and Sören Holmberg. 2013. “Dissatisfied Democrats: A Matter of Representation or Performance?” *QoG Working Paper Series* (8-2013).

Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies.* Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4): 435–57.

ESS. 2012. “European Social Survey Round 6 Data: Data file edition 2.3.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway.Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

Ferrín, Mónica. 2012. *What is Democracy to Citizens? Understanding Perceptions and Evaluations of Democratic Systems in Contemporary Europe.* Florence: European University Institute.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. 2016a. *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy*. First edition. Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016b. “Introduction: Democracy - the European verdict.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a, 1–20.

Fuchs, Dieter, and Edeltraut Roller. 2006. “Learned Democracy? Support of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.” *International journal of sociology* 36 (3): 70–96.

Hernández, Enrique. 2016. “Europeans' views of democracy: The core elements of democracy.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth democracy: Americans' beliefs about how government should work.* Cambridge studies in political psychology and public opinion. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/academiccompletetitles/home.action.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kornberg, Allan, and Harold D. Clarke. 1994. “Beliefs about Democracy and Satisfaction with Democratic Government: The Canadian Case.” *Political Research Quarterly* 47 (3): 537–63. doi:10.2307/448843.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Willem Saris, and Paolo Moncagatta. 2016. “The structure of Europeans' views of democracy: Citizens models of democracy.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a.

Laver, Michael, and Michel Schilperoord. 2007. “Spatial models of political competition with endogenous political parties.” *Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences* 362 (1485): 1711–21. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2062.

Linde, Jonas, and Joakim Ekman. 2003. “Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics.” *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 391–408.

Magalhães, Pedro C. 2014. “Government effectiveness and support for democracy.” *Eur J Polit Res* 53 (1): 77–97. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12024.

Mishler, W., and R. Rose. 2001. “What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1): 30–62. doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government:* Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2014. “Communist socialization and post-communist economic and political attitudes.” *Electoral Studies* 33 (0): 77–89. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.008.

Ruiz-Rufino, Rubén. 2013. “Satisfaction with Democracy in Multi-ethnic Countries: The Effect of Representative Political Institutions on Ethnic Minorities.” *Political Studies* 61 (1): 101–18. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00955.x.

Schäfer, Armin. 2013. “Affluence, inequality and satisfaction with democracy.” In *Society and democracy in Europe*, edited by Oscar W. Gabriel and Silke I. Keil, 139–61. Routledge advances in European politics 89. London: Routledge.

Schedler, Andreas, and Rodolfo Sarsfield. 2007. “Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect measures of democratic support.” *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (5): 637–59.

Seyd, Ben. 2014. “How Do Citizens Evaluate Public Officials? The Role of Performance and Expectations on Political Trust.” *Polit Stud*, (forthcoming). doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12163.

Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle, and Adrian Vatter. 2012. “Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland.” *Polit Behav* 34 (3): 535–59. doi:10.1007/s11109-011-9164-y.

Stecker, Christian, and Markus Tausendpfund. 2016. “Multidimensional government-citizen congruence and satisfaction with democracy.” *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (3): 492–511. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12147.

van der Meer, Tom, and Paul Dekker. 2011. “Trustworthy States, Trusting citizens? A Multilevel Study into Objective and Subjective Determinants of Poltical Trust.” In *Political*

trust: Why context matters, edited by Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe, 95–116. Studies in European political science. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

Wagner, Alexander F., Friedrich Schneider, and Martin Halla. 2009. “The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe — A panel analysis.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 25 (1): 30–41. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.001.

Wessels, Bernhard. 2016. “Democratic legitimacy: Concepts, measures, outcomes.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016a, 235–56.

Zmerli, Sonja, Kenneth Newton, and José R. Montero. 2007. “Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.” In *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis*, edited by van Deth, Jan W., José R. Montero, and Anders Westholm. Digital print, 35–67. Routledge research in comparative politics 17. London: Routledge.

Appendix

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all variables.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Explanatory variables					
Expectations “liberal”	45374	8.448662	1.513478	0	10
Evaluations “liberal”	43756	6.729267	1.923673	0	10
Distance “liberal”	42630	-1.202241	1.505557	-7.071	4.808
Distance “liberal” (squared)	42630	3.712032	6.74521	0	50
Gap “liberal”	42630	-1.700225	2.12918	-10	6.8
Gap “liberal” (squared)	42630	7.424065	13.49042	0	100
Expectations “social”	46812	8.424645	1.855974	0	10
Evaluations “social”	46172	4.009865	2.705728	0	10
Distance “social”	45498	-3.11415	2.462902	-7.071	6.717
Distance “social” (squared)	45498	15.76368	16.39676	0	50
Gap “social”	45498	-4.404073	3.483069	-10	9.5
Gap “social” (squared)	45498	31.52736	32.79353	0	100
Expectations “direct”	46647	8.29213	2.014664	0	10
Evaluations “direct”	45716	5.037842	3.145245	0	10
Distance “direct”	45069	-2.288224	2.504804	-7.071	7.071
Distance “direct” (squared)	45069	11.50987	15.069	0	50
Gap “direct”	45069	-3.236038	3.542327	-10	10
Gap “direct” (squared)	45069	23.01975	30.138	0	100
Dependent variables					
Satisfaction with democracy (SWD)	46692	5.232395	2.551885	0	10
Trust in the parliament	47179	3.997435	2.66601	0	10
Trust in political parties	47258	3.270452	2.414969	0	10
Trust in the legal system	47124	4.800611	2.805074	0	10
Control variables					
Gender (1=male)	48369	.4592611	.4983427	0	1
Education (years)	48386	12.52027	3.90489	0	20
Age (years)	48275	48.76151	18.57574	15	103
Political interest (1=high)	48194	.4457194	.49705	0	1

Notes: Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Table 2: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 1, expectations and evaluations).

	Model 1 Satisfaction with democracy	Model 1b Political trust (robustness test)
Expectations "liberal"	0.122***	0.0295***
	(14.63)	(3.99)
Evaluations "liberal"	0.345***	0.228***
	(49.30)	(36.50)
Expectations "social"	-0.0755***	-0.0387***
	(-12.07)	(-6.97)
Evaluations "social"	0.232***	0.214***
	(46.31)	(48.01)
Expectations "direct"	-0.0727***	-0.0842***
	(-12.32)	(-16.03)
Evaluations "direct"	0.0306***	0.0168***
	(7.44)	(4.59)
Gender (male)	-0.0319	-0.132***
	(-1.61)	(-7.47)
Education (years)	0.0155***	0.0321***
	(5.38)	(12.51)
Age	-0.00408***	-0.00527***
	(-7.10)	(-10.27)
Political interest	0.166***	0.564***
	(7.72)	(29.53)
Constant	2.005***	2.029***
	(24.18)	(27.49)
N Level 1	40288	39839
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	168239.2	156626.7
BIC	168333.8	156721.2

*Notes: Fixed effects multilevel model. T- statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 3: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 2, distances).

	(Model 2) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 2a) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 2b) Political trust (robustness test)
Distance "liberal"	0.259***	0.0183	0.0421***
	(28.68)	(1.30)	(3.45)
Distance "social"	0.221***	0.0302*	0.0295**
	(39.11)	(2.70)	(3.05)
Distance "direct"	0.0668***	-0.0128	0.0518***
	(12.49)	(-1.38)	(11.23)
Distance "liberal" (squared)		-0.0589***	-0.0387***
		(-19.59)	(-15.00)
Distance "social" (squared)		-0.0333***	-0.0292***
		(-19.29)	(-19.75)
Distance "direct" (squared)		-0.0138***	-0.0108***
		(-9.08)	(-8.15)
Gender (male)	0.00747	0.0418*	-0.0932***
	(0.36)	(2.03)	(-5.20)
Education (years)	0.0336***	0.0284***	0.0383***
	(11.25)	(9.63)	(14.88)
Age	-0.00188**	-0.00169**	-0.00389***
	(-3.10)	(-2.84)	(-7.45)
Political interest	0.380***	0.357***	0.677***
	(17.04)	(16.23)	(35.21)
Constant	5.581***	3.767***	3.053***
	(88.96)	(46.11)	(41.16)
N Level 1	40288	40288	39839
N Level 2	26	26	26
AIC	172481.9	171274.7	158084.4
BIC	172550.7	171369.4	158179.0

*Notes: Fixed effects multilevel model. T-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 4: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 3, gaps).

	(Model 3) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 3a) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 3b) Political trust (robustness test)
Gap "liberal"	0.183***	0.0129	0.0387***
	(28.68)	(1.30)	(4.46)
Gap "social"	0.156***	0.0213*	0.0291***
	(39.11)	(2.70)	(4.22)
Gap "direct"	0.0472***	0.00902	0.00141
	(12.49)	(1.38)	(0.25)
Gap "liberal" (squared)		-0.0295***	-0.0172***
		(-19.59)	(-13.09)
Gap "social" (squared)		-0.0167***	-0.0134***
		(-19.29)	(-17.74)
Gap "direct" (squared)		-0.00690***	-0.00541***
		(-9.08)	(-8.15)
Gender (male)	0.00747	0.0418*	-0.0866***
	(0.36)	(2.03)	(-4.83)
Education (years)	0.0336***	0.0284***	0.0384***
	(11.25)	(9.63)	(14.90)
Age	-0.00188**	-0.00169**	-0.00380***
	(-3.10)	(-2.84)	(-7.28)
Political interest	0.380***	0.357***	0.679***
	(17.04)	(16.23)	(35.36)
Constant	5.909***	5.792***	4.369***
	(105.20)	(104.27)	(89.86)
N Level 1	40288	40288	39839
N Level 2	26	26	26
AIC	172481.9	171274.7	158084.4
BIC	172550.7	171369.4	158179.0

*Notes: Fixed effects multilevel model. T- statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Figure 6: Quadratic prediction plots for the effects of distance and gaps on SWD, with cases.



Notes: Quadratic prediction plots. (Left column: distances, right column: gaps). Full models see Table 3 and Table 4 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Table 5: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 4, positive and negative distances and gaps).

	(Model 4a) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 4b) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 4c) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 4d) Satisfaction with democracy
Dist. "liberal" (+ squared)	-0.0594			
	(-1.33)			
Dist. "social" (+ squared)	-0.0163			
	(-1.38)			
Dist. "direct" (+ squared)	-0.0416*			
	(-1.81)			
Dist. "liberal" (- squared)		-0.0598***		
		(-29.05)		
Dist. "social" (- squared)		-0.0376***		
		(-35.52)		
Dist. "direct" (- squared)		-0.0138***		
		(-13.45)		
Gap "liberal" (+ squared)			-0.0297	
			(-1.33)	
Gap "social" (+ squared)			-0.0115	
			(-1.38)	
Gap "direct" (+ squared)			-0.0208*	
			(-1.81)	
Gap "liberal" (- squared)				-0.0299***
				(-29.05)
Gap "social" (- squared)				-0.0188***
				(-35.52)
Gap "direct" (- squared)				-0.00691***
				(-13.45)
Gender (male)	0.524*	-0.00604	0.524*	-0.00604
	(2.45)	(-0.23)	(2.45)	(-0.23)
Education (years)	0.0414	0.0242***	0.0414	0.0242***
	(1.29)	(6.29)	(1.29)	(6.29)
Age	-0.000258	-0.00266***	-0.000258	-0.00266***
	(-0.05)	(-3.33)	(-0.05)	(-3.33)
Political interest	0.451	0.291***	0.451	0.291***
	(1.94)	(10.15)	(1.94)	(10.15)
Constant	5.150***	5.807***	5.150***	5.807***
	(9.71)	(78.80)	(9.71)	(78.80)
N Level 1	372	23475	372	23475
N Level 2	26	26	26	26
AIC	1567.8	99503.8	1567.8	99503.8
BIC	1536.4	99439.3	1536.4	99439.3

*Notes: Fixed effects multilevel model. T-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 6: Explaining satisfaction with democracy (Model 5, interaction effects).

	(Model 5) Satisfaction with democracy	(Model 5b) Political trust (robustness test)
Expectations "liberal"	0.0753***	0.0223
	(3.50)	(1.17)
Evaluations "liberal"	0.274***	0.217***
	(9.06)	(8.02)
Interaction "liberal"	0.00781*	0.00128
	(2.31)	(0.42)
Expectations "social"	-0.0975***	-0.0408***
	(-8.96)	(-4.23)
Evaluations "social"	0.180***	0.209***
	(8.85)	(11.60)
Interaction "social"	0.00593*	0.000541
	(2.63)	(0.27)
Expectations "direct"	-0.0910***	-0.0788***
	(-9.94)	(-9.66)
Evaluations "direct"	-0.0107	0.0279*
	(-0.70)	(2.06)
Interaction "direct"	0.00474*	-0.00129
	(2.78)	(-0.85)
Gender (male)	-0.0305	-0.132***
	(-1.54)	(-7.47)
Education (years)	0.0154***	0.0321***
	(5.35)	(12.52)
Age	-0.00419***	-0.00527***
	(-7.28)	(-10.26)
Political interest	0.165***	0.564***
	(7.68)	(29.52)
Constant	2.785***	2.061***
	(14.80)	(12.33)
N Level 1	40288	39839
N Level 2	26	26
AIC	168215.2	156631.8
BIC	168335.7	156752.1

*Notes: Fixed effects multilevel model. T- statistics in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Figure 7: Interaction effects from Model 5, marginal effects (on SWD).



Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms in Table 6. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Chapter Four: Why perceived deprivation matters: Social status and support for democracy in Europe

Abstract

Why do losers like democracy less than winners? The fact that social status has an impact on satisfaction with democracy is, while empirically established, often overlooked in the literature. This paper analyses the effects of subjective and objective social status on citizens' expectations from democracy and evaluations democracy. I argue that relative deprivation, defined as the notion of being left behind in society and disadvantaged by social inequality, systematically affects the way citizens judge their own democracy: The lower their status, the more they support substantive over procedural democracy, and the more critical they see their own democracies. Using data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6, I test whether citizens' attitudes towards democracy are affected by perceived deprivation as well as objective socio-economic status. Results show that a low status leads citizens to value democratic dimensions differently - they prefer social justice over liberal criteria. Additionally, low status citizens also evaluate the performance of their own democratic system in all dimensions significantly more critical than their higher status counterparts. These two effects combined create a bigger 'distance' between low-status citizens' expectations and evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be more prone to democratic dissatisfaction. I further find differences across countries: Citizens in former communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis generally have higher expectations from democracy, while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems more negatively. In Western Europe, on the other hand, social status affects citizens' attitudes more strongly than in the other country groups.

1. Introduction

Citizens, as the previous chapters of this dissertation have established, vary in their position on scales of democracy. They can expect democracy to be more or less liberal, social, or direct and find these dimension more or less implemented in their own democracy. Dissatisfaction, then, can be described as a function of what democracy should be and what it actually is: Citizens want more democracy, or they want a different democracy - one that is more or less liberal, social or direct. These findings prompt more questions: Which groups of people are dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries?

This chapter wants to find answers to these questions by analysing how citizens' social status matters for their democratic expectations and evaluations. Why should we look at status to explain individual-level differences in democratic support? The question of social status - or social class, as it has been called traditionally - is an old one: Lipset and Rokkan (1967) believed that the class-cleavage was essential in determining political behaviour, and while it was long considered as a factor with declining importance (Knutsen 2007, 457–58), factors like income, education and occupation (summarized as socio-economic status) are still commonly used to explain political behaviour such as turnout (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015), political participation (Quintelier and Hooghe 2013) or vote choice (Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2012), and have been shown to account for substantive variance. As Ceka and Magalhães (2016, 92) have observed, the fact that people with higher status tend to support democracy more than their low-status counterparts "has often passed unremarked". Some authors, however, have analysed the relationship between socio-economic status and democratic support: Schäfer (2013) for example finds that satisfaction with democracy is higher for people with higher education and incomes, and that country-level inequality additionally lowers satisfaction. Carlin (2006) argues that education and income increase diffuse support for democracy and values of self-expression. But this evidence that 'losers do not like democracy' (Anderson et al. 2005) does not explain why exactly that is the case, which is what the following chapter wants to do.

I assume that the status position of citizens influences their expectations from and evaluations of democracy. Theoretically, I take two steps: First, does status explain which democratic dimensions people want more, and which ones they miss more? And secondly, in which countries does deprivation matter more, in in which less? I define social status as the relative position in society (compared to other citizens), which is a subjective measure, but also test the same models with the traditional three indicators for objective socio-economic status;

income, education and occupation. For my analysis, I use data for 26 countries from the European Social Survey 6. I also take into account the country-level variance by testing these effects across different groups of European democracies: I assume that social status matters more in post-communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis. This chapter start by stating my hypotheses on the effects of social status, and their differences across countries. Next, I explain how I conceptualize social status, and proceed to the empirical analysis. Lastly, I discuss and interpret the results.

2. Democratic dissatisfaction and the role of perceived deprivation

Procedure vs. substance: How status affects democratic attitudes

As the previous chapters of this dissertation have established, I use a threefold concept of support for democracy, based on *expectations from democracy*, *evaluations of democracy*, and s*atisfaction with democracy*. Chapter One found that democracy is a multidimensional construct in citizens' attitudes, which is not just about more or less, or about good or bad democracy. Rather, democracy has different dimensions, and citizens vary in their position on these dimensions. The structure of this democratic space is the same across citizens and countries: Liberal democracy and social democracy build the two main dimensions. Additionally, I also use direct democracy as a third dimension. Citizens then vary in their position on these scales: They can expect democracy to be more or less liberal, social, or direct and find these dimension more or less implemented in their own democracy. Chapter Two has analysed how regime-specific socialization experiences affect citizens' expectations. Chapter Three, then, has shown that these three attitudes are linked to each other in a meaningful way: The distance between what citizens want democracy to be (expectations) and what they see realized in their own countries (evaluations) determines their levels of satisfaction. Dissatisfaction, in other words, can be described as a function of what democracy should be and what it actually is: Citizens want more democracy, or they want a different democracy - one that is more or less liberal, social or direct. Hence, there are different causes for dissatisfaction. This finding prompts more questions: Which groups of people are dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries? This chapter wants to answer these questions by analysing how citizens' status matters for their democratic expectations and evaluations.

My first argument is that social status influences what citizens want from a democracy: Procedural or substantial fairness. Why would status matter for that? Social dominance theory, which tries to understand how group-based social hierarchy is formed and maintained,

suggests that there are behavioural asymmetries between dominant and subordinate groups. The social, psychological and ideological forces that help sustain group dominance work better for people in dominant than in subordinate groups, making them more prone to support these forces (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, 280). Subordinate groups, in consequence, are more likely to reject the status quo, while privileged groups who benefit from this status quo strive to preserve it (Turner and Reynolds 2003, 201). Ceka and Magalhães (2016) confer this argument to democratic attitudes, arguing that high-status citizens should be more likely to support democracy in its current liberal, procedural form than low-status citizens, as their social privilege make them profit from this status quo. Low-status citizens, on the other hand, feel that they do not profit from the liberal democratic reality, and should be more likely to want a change of the democratic system (*ibid.*: 93ff). A similar argument has been made by Aarts, Thomassen, and van Ham (2014), who claim that citizens with a low socio-economic status are more negatively affected by globalization while simultaneously being less represented by parties, which makes them more dissatisfied with democratic procedures. While the idea that more education and income make citizens more supportive and convinced of liberal democratic and emancipative values is an established part of modernization theory (cf. Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013), the difference is that social dominance theory is about the relative level of resources, or status, in a society. Modernization theory claims that, independently of context, more material and cognitive resources lead people to embrace liberal democracy. Social dominance theory claims that a relatively higher status compared to those in the same society makes dominant groups embrace the political status quo, which, in the case of established democracies, happens to be a liberal one (Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 94).

This notion also refers to the concept of relative deprivation (i.e. Merton 1938; Gurr 1970), claiming that rather than absolute poverty or deprivation, it is the feeling of having an unfavourable social position and being deprived of status, money or other valuable societal assets compared to others that sparks people's discontent and makes them push for social change (Pettigrew 2002, 352). A relatively lower social status, accordingly, should go along with a desire to change the political status quo - liberal democracy. It should also make citizens more motivated to change that status to a more fair one: Being at the (perceived) lower end of the social hierarchy should lead to more support for substantial aspects of democracy, while dominant groups oppose ideas of more social justice, as this would most likely mean a redistribution to their disadvantage (Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 95). This is in line with research showing that welfare and redistribution preferences differ according to

socio-economic status (Gilens 2005; Dion and Birchfield 2010). When it comes to democratic preferences, then, status should determine whether citizens support procedural fairness of democracy, or focus on substantial social justice as an outcome. Indeed, analysing democratic support in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton (2006) finds that while poor people are dissatisfied with the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, they prefer to bypass formal democratic channels and use informal, often clientelist channels to address their economic grievances.

Based on this theoretical background, I expect perceived deprivation - the notion of being left behind in society and disadvantaged by social inequality - to play an important role for democratic support. I expect a high status to increase support for liberal and procedural elements, and lower status to go along with favouring substantial, output aspects of democracy, as Figure 1 illustrates:

Figure 1: The effect of social status on democratic expectations.



This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: The higher citizens' perceived status, the higher their support for procedural democracy.

H2: The lower citizens' perceived status, the higher their support for substantial democracy.

Moreover, I expect that the perceived social position also affects the way citizens evaluate their own democracy. The resource model of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 271) assumes that participation and accordingly internal and external efficacy

increases as socio-economic resources grow. The most crucial determinant of political activity is resources - money, time and civic skills (Blais 2007, 631). High-status citizens are thus better able to use social institutions, and possess the resources to defend their interests, so that they are more likely to also be political winners. This increases their trust in political institutions compared to losers, who lack education, resources, and networks to influence, understand and profit from societal and political institutions, and hence do not trust them to operate in their favour. This is confirmed by the literature on social and political trust: Zmerli and Newton (2011, 85) find that low social status and low education are generally associated with lower social and political trust, and that 'winners' are more trusting than 'losers'. Interestingly, their results also show that citizens perceived status as a societal winner or loser matters for their levels of trust, not their ascribed status. As Mishler and Rose (2001, 54) have stated, effects of national political and economic performance on individual levels of political trust "are indirect and mediated at the micro level by an individual's […] perceptions".

Hence, individual perceptions seem to play an important role in generating political trust by channelling and mediating the impact of macro-level conditions (cf. Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). These perceptions could also contribute to forming citizens evaluations of one's own democratic system: High-status citizens who possess resources have had more positive experiences with democracy, and are more likely to feel their interests represented. Further, they know better how to use existing political institutions, making them more likely to find them working well and to their advantage than low-status citizens. Concretely, I suppose that a perceived low social status leads citizens to systematically evaluate their own democracy more critically than citizens with a perceived high status do:

H3: The lower citizens perceived status, the more negative are citizens' evaluations of their own democracy.

In conclusion, this would also mean that the distance between citizens' expectations and evaluations should be bigger for citizens with a low position in society, especially for the social dimension; democracy as substance.

Relative deprivation in Europe: Where do the dissatisfied live?

Secondly, I want to know if the causes of dissatisfaction differ across countries. The second chapter of this dissertation has shown that regime-specific socialization affects democratic expectations, providing supports for findings on country-level differences in democratic support by other authors (Hernández 2016; Kriesi, Saris, and Moncagatta 2016). But how would the effect of perceived or relative deprivation differ according to *where* in Europe

people live? First of all, as described in Chapter Two, we know that differing socialization experiences in post-authoritarian countries impact citizens democratic attitudes: In countries democratized in the 'third wave' starting in the 1970s (Huntington 1991) the concept of democracy was often linked to the idea of economic reforms and development in order to catch up with Western Europe and North America. This connection between economic wellbeing and democracy, according to Bochsler and Hänni (2015), led citizens of third wave countries to see political rights and better economic life conditions as two sides of the same medal, leading to a more performance-based support for democracy. Economic prosperity is especially important in these countries because it signals the degree to which elites do deliver as promised (Keman 2014). Magalhães (2017) makes the argument that in younger democracies with less developed institutions, economic outcomes are generally more important for legitimacy, and citizens tend to base their democratic support on performance.

Liberal democracies, on the other hand, ideally dispose of a more procedural legitimacy, where the perceived fairness of rules leads to support for democracy independently of outputs (Gilley 2006). The more established a democracy is, the more advanced should its level of procedural support be (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008). Accordingly, citizens of post-authoritarian democracies should be more likely to take social and economic output criteria of a democracy into account, and to be critical of the liberal 'status quo', especially if they feel deprived of a societal status they felt they were promised by (or that they held before) democratization. While this theory applies to all former authoritarian countries, Chapter One and Two have shown that post-communist countries often differ most strongly from their Western European counterparts, while citizens from former authoritarian countries in Southern Europe do not show strong differences in their democratic attitudes. Additionally, as Chapter Two has explained in more detail, socialization differed quiet strongly in communist countries as compared to liberal democracies, focusing on (and gaining legitimacy through) outputs in from of social and economic wellbeing rather than procedural fairness. Based on this, I focus on post-communist countries in this analysis, and assume that living in these countries makes the aforementioned effects of perceived relative deprivation on democratic support stronger:

H4: Living in former communist countries reinforces the positive effect of status on support for procedural democracy.

H5: Living in former communist countries reinforces the negative effect of status on support for substantive democracy.

H6: Living in former communist countries reinforces the negative effect of status on democratic evaluations.

In addition, the data I use has been collected in 2012, and thus at the height of the Eurozone crisis. Given the broad political and economic repercussions for the affected countries and their democratic systems, one could assume that citizens of crisis-struck countries differ in their attitudes. First of all, the economic crisis has certainly created more economic 'losers', and sharpened the difference between higher and lower status citizens. Further, the crisis has also shifted the political focus on social and economic factors rather than democratic procedures. Some countries were even objected to severe limitations of their democratic autonomy by international institutions (and several changed their government as a direct result, such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland), which could have led to more critical perspective on democracy amongst its citizens, especially those on the lower end of the social strata. Pennings (2017) argues that especially in times of economic crisis, support for democracy is conditional on the functioning of social welfare and safeguarding of income levels. Citizens living in countries hit strongly by the Eurozone crisis and the following austerity measures, where social welfare and wages were cut and unemployment rose, should thus focus more on substantial than on procedural aspects of democracy than others.

H7: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the positive effect of status on support for procedural democracy.

H8: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the negative effect of status on support for substantive democracy.

H9: Living in Eurozone crisis countries reinforces the negative effect of status on democratic evaluations.

4. Data and operationalization

To test my hypothesis, I use the European Social Survey Round 6 data (ESS 2012) described in the previous chapters for individual-level data. For data on the country-level, I use the Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016) and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2016). See Table 1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables.

Dependent variables: As operationalized in the previous chapters, I use the additive indices from the ESS 2012, measuring expectations from as well as evaluations of democracy for liberal, social and direct democracy on a scale from 0 to 10. Procedural democracy is measured by the liberal democratic dimension, while substantial democracy is measured by

the social democratic dimension. Direct democracy, the third dimension used throughout this thesis, would rather fall under procedural than substantive democracy. I test the same models with this third dimension as a robustness test, and report the results in the appendix.

*Explanatory variable*s: As described in the previous section, I am interested in the effects of social status from a perceived deprivation perspective: I want to know which impact citizens perceived status compared to other citizens has on their democratic support. Socio-economic status is traditionally measured with three indicators: Education, income, and occupation. These indicators, however, measure absolute rather than relative deprivation (or status) - they are about levels. Yet, as Chapter Three has established, I focus on distances rather than on levels in explaining support. Consequently, I am more interested in the relative than the absolute position in society, and on individual perceptions rather than 'objective' status. This is why I use respondents' self-identified status as a main explanatory variable: Their place in society, measured on an 11-point scale (0=bottom of the society, 10=top of the society).[1] This question is a newer version and replacement of the traditional social class self-assessment and is the most adequate indicator for perceived status the ESS 2012 offers.

To assure that I do not miss on the potential effects of objective socio-economic status, I also test the same models with the traditional socio-economic status indicators. The three indicators are the total net household income, measured in deciles (1= first decile, 10 = 10th decile), education (in years) as well as occupation (9=professional and technical occupations, 8=higher administrator occupations, 7=clerical occupations, 6=sales occupations, 5=service occupations, 4=skilled worker, 3=semi-skilled worker, 2=unskilled worker, 1=farm worker).

Country groups: Based on the hypotheses listed in Section 3, stating that effects might differ in former communist countries, I code 11 countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine) as *post-communist countries*. I also assume that being affected by the Eurozone crisis and its following austerity measures and government changes increases the effects of social status. Accordingly, I code Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal as *Eurocrisis countries* - all countries which have had interventions by the ECB and IMF, the implementation of austerity measures, and government changes as a result of the crisis.

Control variables: On the individual level, I control for gender and age. On the country level, controls depend on the model: In models with social democracy as a dependent variable, I use the Gini coefficient as well as e the level of redistribution by the state (Solt 2016) to capture

[1]The exact wording of the question is: "There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and people who tend to be towards the bottom. On this card there is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you place yourself on this scale nowadays?"

differences in wealth distribution and social welfare that could systematically affect citizens' attitudes towards social justice. Further, I use the age of democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2016) and democratic quality (Merkel et al. 2016) in the models that test for the effect of former communist countries and Euro crisis countries, to account for their effects on support for that I found in Chapter Two.

5. Results

Individual-level effects

To start, I analyse the effects of subjective as well as objective status on citizens' expectations from democracy. Figure 2 shows the individual level results of a multilevel regression model as coefficient plots.

Figure 2: Effects of subjective and objective status on expectations from democracy.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

We can see that subjective status - citizens' self-assigned place in society - has the expected effects: The higher the perceived status, the higher are liberal democratic expectations, and the lower social democratic expectations. This confirms hypotheses H1 and H2: A low social status goes along with higher substantial democratic expectations, and a high status with higher procedural democratic expectations. The model with the indicators of objective socio-

economic status income, education, and occupation shows similar results: All three variables have a positive effect on liberal democratic expectations, and a negative effect on social democratic expectations. Yet, the effects of perceived status are bigger than those of objective socio-economic status. An additional model testing the effects of status on direct democratic expectations as robustness tests (Table 4 in the appendix) shows that, interestingly, direct democracy follows the same pattern as social democracy, and is stronger supported by those with lower status. Lastly, we can see a strong effect of the control variable gender: Men support liberal democracy more strongly, while women rather support social democracy[2].

Next, I look at how citizens' evaluations of democracy are affected by status. Figure 3 shows the coefficient plots for the models using democratic evaluations as a dependent variable.

Figure 3: Effects of subjective and objective status on evaluations of democracy.



Notes: Plots of regression coefficients, non-standardized. Full models see Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. Data source: European Social Survey (ESS 2012). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Subjective status measured by the place in society has a strong and positive effect on both liberal and social evaluations, supporting hypothesis H3: The higher citizens' status, the better their evaluations of their own democracy. Objective socio-economic status shows more mixed results: Income and occupation have a positive, though smaller, effect on evaluations, while

[2]This finding can actually be explained by social dominance theory as well, as gender is another factor creating a hierarchy in society, where women have a systematically lower status position than men (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, 273).

education has a mixed effect. Gender, again, is a strong predictor, with men evaluating their own democracies better than women. The model with direct democracy as a dependent variable (Table 7 in the appendix) again supports the results for subjective status, which has a positive effect on evaluations, but shows negative effects for education and occupation, giving again a less clear picture for objective status.

Country-level effects

So far, the individual level hypotheses have been confirmed, showing that social status - especially perceived status - affects the way citizens view and evaluate democracy. But how do these effects differ across country groups? I start again with expectations from democracy: Hypotheses H4, H5, H7 and H8 assumed that living in post-communist and Eurocrisis countries reinforces the effects of status on democratic expectations, meaning that citizens of both these country groups should have a stronger positive effect of status on liberal democratic expectations, and a stronger negative effect of status on social democratic expectations. To test these hypotheses, I introduce a cross-level interaction term between the country group (Post-communist countries, Eurocrisis countries, and 'the rest' - Western European countries) and subjective status (citizens' place in society). The full models are in the appendix (Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 and 3). To illustrate the interaction effects better, Figure 4 shows marginal effect plots.

Figure 4: Marginal effects of subjective status on democratic expectations across country groups.



Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. Other variables are held constant at their mean. Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

In the left panel, we can see that there are indeed significant differences between country groups in the strength of the effect of status on liberal democratic expectations. They are, however, contrary to my hypotheses: The positive influence of status on liberal democratic

expectations is weaker in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries, and stronger in the remaining Western European countries. In the right panel, we see the same pattern: The negative effect of status on social democratic expectations is strongest in Western Europe, weaker in post-communist countries and not significant in crisis-struck countries. This proves all four hypotheses wrong.

To understand the interaction of macro and micro level variables better, I also plotted the predicted levels of expectations in both dimensions across the three country groups, which are depicted in Figure 5. They show again that the slope of the effects of status on expectations (positive on liberal democratic expectations and negative on social democratic expectations) is steeper in the 'remainder category' of Western European countries. At the same time, we can also see that the *levels* of expectations in both dimensions, but especially in the social dimension, are higher in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries. Most notably, citizens in Eurocrisis countries have substantially higher levels of social expectations, as the right panel shows.

Figure 5: Predicted levels of democratic expectations according to status across country groups.



Notes: Predicted margins of place in society and country group on the level of expectations from democracy. Other variables are held constant at their mean. Full models see Table 2 and Table 3 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Next, I look at the effects of the same cross-level interaction on evaluations of democracy. In hypotheses H6 and H9, I assumed that the positive effect of social status on evaluations in all dimensions of democracy - the higher someone's status, the better their evaluations of democracy - is stronger for citizens of post-communist and Eurocrisis countries than for others. Again, I illustrate the effects using marginal effect plots. Figure 6 shows the plots of the marginal effects of subjective status measured by place in society in three country groups on evaluations of liberal democracy (left) and social democracy (right).

Figure 6: Marginal effects of subjective status on democratic evaluations across country groups.



Notes: Average marginal effects for interaction terms from Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. Other variables are held constant at their mean. Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

We can see that, again, the hypotheses cannot be fully confirmed: The left panel shows that the positive effect of status on liberal democratic expectations is indeed stronger in post-communist countries, but substantially weaker in Eurocrisis countries. The right panel shows that the positive effects of status on social democratic evaluations are significantly weaker in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries. This partly confirms H6 - the effects of status are stronger in post-communist countries, but only for liberal, not for social expectations - and contradicts H9 completely, as Eurocrisis countries showed weaker effects of status on evaluations than all others. As previously, I plot the predicted levels of democratic evaluations according to status in both dimensions for all three country groups in Figure 7.

We can see a similar pattern again: As the marginal effects plots have confirmed, the slopes of the positive effect of status are generally steepest for Western Europe, and less steep for the other two country groups, especially for Eurocrisis countries. At the same time, we can also see that levels differ: In the case of evaluations, the levels of liberal, and even more strongly social expectations, are consistently lower in post-communist as well as Eurocrisis countries. In other words, while the combined effect of status and country group is stronger in Western Europe, there is a direct and negative effect of the country-level on evaluations in post-communist and Eurocrisis countries.

Figure 7: Predicted levels of democratic evaluations according to status across country groups.



Notes: Predicted margins of place in society and country group on the level of evaluations of democracy. Other variables are held constant at their mean. Full models see Table 5 and Table 6 in the appendix. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.

Lastly, additional models using direct democratic expectations and evaluations as a dependent variable for robustness tests (Model 4 in Table 4 and Table 7 in the appendix) confirm the previous results: The negative effect of status on direct democratic expectations and the positive effect on direct democratic evaluations are less strong in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries. Levels of direct democratic expectations, like social democratic evaluations, are generally higher in these country groups. Interestingly though, as Table 7 shows, direct democratic evaluations are substantially higher in both post-communist and Eurocrisis countries as well. Apparently, Southern and Eastern European citizens (perceive to) have more direct participation opportunities.

6. Conclusions and outlook

What can we learn from these results? To start with, the assumption that social status is systematically linked to citizens' expectations from and evaluations of democracy is confirmed. While the finding that status affects citizens support for democracy is not new, as Section 3 has discussed, my analysis sheds some light on the reasons why this is the case: First, a social status influences the demands that citizens make to their democracies. A low social status causes them to prefer substantial over procedural democracy, to value outputs in the form of social justice more strongly than liberal democratic criteria. This confirms the expectations derived from social dominance theory, where the status quo of liberal democracy is more strongly supported by those in high status positions. Secondly, status also systematically affects how citizens evaluate democracy: The higher their status, the more positively people judge the functioning of their own democracy, both in procedural and in

substantial terms. Democratic quality, thus, is not an objective measure, but depends on citizens' position in society. High-status citizens have more positive experiences with democracy than their lower-status counterparts.

Most importantly, my arguments based on relative deprivation theory claiming that subjective status - the perceived position we hold in society compared to others around us - matters for democratic support were confirmed. Perceived deprivation is indeed a strong predictor of attitudes towards democracy. While objective deprivation, measured by socio-economic status, has the same effects, subjective status has a stronger explanatory power, especially when it comes to democratic evaluations. The feeling of having an unfavourable social position, as relative deprivation theory suggests, makes citizens more prone to support substance over procedure, and more likely to see their own democracy in a critical light.

While the individual level results were in line with the theoretical expectations, the country-level results were more surprising: Contrary to what I assumed, social status actually matters less in post-communist countries and countries affected by the Eurocrisis. The effect of status on both expectations and evaluations is strongest in the remaining Western European countries. At the same time, I also found that levels of expectations, especially social democratic expectations, were generally higher in post-communist and Eurocrisis countries, while expectations were substantially lower. Accordingly, there are two different effects: On the one hand, confirming results from Chapter Two, citizens in general have higher social democratic expectations in former communist countries, but also in countries affected by the crisis. These expectations are then also more likely to be disappointed by the democratic reality in their countries, which they evaluate substantially more critical than people in Western Europe do. On the other hand, social status matters more for citizens of Western European democracies, where democratic expectations and evaluations differ more strongly depending on perceived deprivation.

This brings us back to the question posed in the beginning of this chapter: Which groups of people are dissatisfied on what grounds? And how does that vary across countries? Given that Chapter Three has established a link between distances and dissatisfaction, we know more now: First of all, the common finding that low status also goes along with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (Carlin 2006; Schäfer 2013) can be explained by higher substantial democratic expectations, and lower evaluations in both dimensions. These two factors combined lead to a bigger distance between low-status citizens' expectations and evaluations, especially in the social dimension, causing them to be more prone to democratic dissatisfaction. This also offers some support for Schäfer (2013, 154) who claims that

dissatisfaction in Europe is not necessarily a sign of people being against democracy as a principle, but rather of being unhappy with the outcomes it provides. Interestingly, this effect is most pronounced in established, Western democracies, supporting the idea that developed countries are moving towards a "two-thirds democracy" (Petring and Merkel 2011), in which the less well-off part of society is exceedingly excluded from the public and political sphere. Variance across countries, then, is also a matter of levels: While social status is less important for democratic attitudes in former communist and Eurocrisis countries, the levels of attitudes differ: Citizens in Southern and Eastern Europe have higher expectations from democracy, while simultaneously evaluating their own democratic systems more negatively, which leaves them with bigger distances than the average citizen in Western Europe - again, this effect is most pronounced in the social dimension of democracy.

Accordingly, the cause for dissatisfaction does not necessarily seem to be a lack of (liberal) democratic quality. Unsatisfied citizens rather find that democratic mechanisms and institutions do not produce the output they expect it to: Social justice and redistribution, which is especially important for those on the lower end of the social strata. This is even more relevant in the (mostly younger) democracies in Eastern and Southern Europe, which have not only been more affected by the Eurocrisis but also tend to have a lower quality of democratic institutions and welfare states in general. Secondly, these results point to the importance of perceptions for democratic support: Apparently, perceived deprivation - feeling excluded and left behind by society, and seeing individual economic circumstances as insufficient - strongly affects how Europeans judge macro-level conditions. Democracy, in other words, is not the same for all its citizens, but is evaluated differently according to one's status.

At the same time, the fact that more than 'objectively measured' deprivation it is rather perceived deprivation that matters is another interesting result. Perceived relative deprivation, no matter if objectively justified or not, is a real driving force of individual political attitudes. This reminds of Honneths (2004) social recognition theory, claiming that social justice it is not (just) about the classic elimination of inequality, but also about the avoidance of 'humiliation' or 'disrespect', and that social injustice is measured in the withholding of some kind of recognition that individuals strive for. Of course one could ask if this dissatisfaction is actually still about democracy itself, or if it is rather about socio-economic grievances that bias citizens' views on democracy, but are beyond its reach or responsibility. The answer eventually depends on one's definition of democracy - is democracy a procedure or a substance? Apparently, as this chapter has shown, for quite a lot of citizens democracy is (also) substance, and a perceived lack of this substance is a reason for dissatisfaction. These

citizens tend to live in Southern and Eastern Europe, and on the (perceived) lower end of the social strata in Western Europe.

If there is a way for established democracies to address their dissatisfaction, it would thus be via an improvement of social justice, and a focus on democratic outputs rather than procedures. Further, the importance of individual grievances should not be underestimated - perceived status, which is not necessarily the same as ascribed status, affects citizens' political views and behaviour. The issue of (real, relative or perceived) deprivation in European populations is a serious problem that liberal democracies should tackle if they want to persist against populist, authoritarian and illiberal agendas.

References

Aarts, Kees, Jacques Thomassen, and Carolien van Ham. 2014. “Globalization, representation, and attitudes towards democracy.” In *Elections and democracy: Representation and accountability*, edited by Jacques J. A. Thomassen. 1. ed., 201–31. Comparative study of electoral systems. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Anderson, Christopher J. et al. 2005. *Losers' consent: Elections and democratic legitimacy.* Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Blais, André. 2007. “Turnout in elections.” In Dalton, Klingemann, and Goodin 2007, 619–35.

Bochsler, Daniel, and Miriam Hänni. 2015. “Converting the crisis into political capital: Voting for oppositions in established and in new democracies.” *Working paper, University of Zurich*.

Bratton, Michael. 2006. “Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa.” *Afrobarometer Working Paper Series.* Working Paper No. 56, available online at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo56.pdf.

Carlin, Ryan E. 2006. “The Socioeconomic Roots Of Support For Democracy And The Quality In Latin America.” *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)* 26: 48–66.

Ceka, Besir, and Pedro C. Magalhães. 2016. “The structure of Europeans' view of democracy: A social dominance approach.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016, 90–110.

Dalton, Russell J., Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Robert E. Goodin, eds. 2007. *The Oxford handbook of political behavior.* The Oxford handbooks of political science. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Dion, Michelle L., and Vicki Birchfield. 2010. “Economic Development, Income Inequality, and Preferences for Redistribution1.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 315–34. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00589.x.

ESS. 2012. “European Social Survey Round 6 Data: Data file edition 2.3.” *NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway.Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.*, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

Ferrín, Mónica, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. 2016. *How Europeans view and evaluate democracy.* First edition. Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gilens, M. 2005. “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (5): 778–96. doi:10.1093/poq/nfi058.

Gilley, Bruce. 2006. “The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries.” *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (3): 499–525.

Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why men rebel.* Princeton N. J: Princeton Univ. Press.

Hernández, Enrique. 2016. “Europeans' views of democracy: The core elements of democracy.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016.

Honneth, Axel. 2004. “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice.” *Acta Sociologica* 47 (4): 351–64.

Huang, Min-hua, Yu-tzung Chang, and Yun-han Chu. 2008. “Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis.” *Electoral Studies* 27 (1): 45–62. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.002.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* 4. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kasara, Kimuli, and Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2015. “When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (3): 613–27. doi:10.1111/ajps.12134.

Keman, Hans. 2014. “Democratic Performance of Parties and Legitimacy in Europe.” *West European Politics* 37 (2): 309–30. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.887877.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 2007. “The decline of social class?” In Dalton, Klingemann, and Goodin 2007, 457–80.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Willem Saris, and Paolo Moncagatta. 2016. “The structure of Europeans' views of democracy: Citizens models of democracy.” In Ferrín and Kriesi 2016.

Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. 1992. “Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters Remain the Same.” *American Political Science Review* 86 (3): 725–36. doi:10.2307/1964134.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction.* New York: The Free Press.

Magalhães, Pedro C. 2017. “Economic Outcomes, Quality of Governance, and Satisfaction with Democracy.” In *Myth and Reality of the Legitimacy Crisis: Explaining Trends and Cross-National Differences in Established Democracies*. Vol. 1, edited by Carolien van Ham, Jacques Thomassen, Kees Aarts, and Rudy Andeweg 1: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, Monty, and Ted R. Gurr. 2016. “POLITY™ IV PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015.” *Centre for Systemic Peace.* 1st ed. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm.

Merkel, Wolfgang, Daniel Bochsler, Karima Bousbah, Marc Bühlmann, Heiko Giebler, Miriam Hänni, Lea Heyne, Lisa Müller, Saskia Ruth, and Bernhard Wessels. 2016. “Democracy Barometer: Version 5.” *Aarau: Zentrum für Demokratie*, www.democracybarometer.org.

Merton, Robert K. 1938. “Social Structure and Anomie.” *American Sociological Review* 3 (5): 672–82. doi:10.2307/2084686.

Mishler, W., and R. Rose. 2001. “What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (1): 30–62. doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

Pennings, Paul. 2017. “When and where did the great recession erode the support of democracy?” *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 11 (1): 81–103. doi:10.1007/s12286-017-0337-x.

Petring, Alexander, and Wolfgang Merkel. 2011. “Auf dem Weg zur Zweidrittel-Demokratie: Wege aus der Partizipationskrise.” *WZB-Mitteilungen* 143(2011): 30–33.

Pettigrew, T. F. 2002. “Summing up: Relative deprivation as a key social psychological concept.” In *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration*, edited by I. Walker and H. J. Smith, 351–73. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin. 2006. “Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward.” *European Review of Social Psychology* 17 (1): 271–320. doi:10.1080/10463280601055772.

Quintelier, Ellen, and Marc Hooghe. 2013. “The Impact of Socio-economic Status on Political Participation.” In *Democracy in Transition: Political Participation in the European Union*, edited by Kyriakos N. Demetriou, 273–89. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30068-4_14.

Schäfer, Armin. 2013. “Affluence, inequality and satisfaction with democracy.” In *Society and democracy in Europe*, edited by Oscar W. Gabriel and Silke I. Keil, 139–61. Routledge advances in European politics 89. London: Routledge.

Solt, Frederick. 2016. “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database.” *Social Science Quarterly* 97 (5): 1267–81.

Turner, John C., and Katherine J. Reynolds. 2003. “Why social dominance theory has been falsified.” *The British journal of social psychology* 42 (Pt 2): 199-206; discussion 215-23. doi:10.1348/014466603322127184.

Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics.* Cambridge Mass. u.a. Harvard Univ. Press.

Welzel, Christian. 2013. *Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers, and Marcel Lubbers. 2012. “Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right.” *European Union Politics* 14 (2): 183–205. doi:10.1177/1465116512469287.

Zmerli, Sonja, and Ken Newton. 2011. “Winners, losers and three types of trust.” In *Political trust: Why context matters*, edited by Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe, 67–94. Studies in European political science. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

Zmerli, Sonja, Kenneth Newton, and José R. Montero. 2007. “Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.” In *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis*, edited by van Deth, Jan W., José R. Montero, and Anders Westholm. Digital print, 35–67. Routledge research in comparative politics 17. London: Routledge.

Appendix

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Individual-level variables (explanatory)					
Place in society (10=top)	47391	5.437087	1.847648	0	10
Households total income (10= 10th decentil)	39187	5.118381	2.830176	1	10
Education (years)	48386	12.52027	3.90489	0	20
Occupation	41134	4.117907	2.478067	1	9
Gender (1=male)	48369	.4592611	.4983427	0	1
Age (years)	48275	48.76151	18.57574	15	103
Individual-level variables (dependent)					
Expectations liberal democracy	45374	8.448662	1.513478	0	10
Evaluations liberal democracy	43756	6.729267	1.923673	0	10
Expectations social democracy	46812	8.424645	1.855974	0	10
Evaluations social democracy	46172	4.009865	2.705728	0	10
Expectations direct democracy	46647	8.29213	2.014664	0	10
Evaluations direct democracy	45716	5.037842	3.145245	0	10
Country-level variables					
Gini inequality index (0=equal)	26	29.16775	4.082261	21.917	36.544
Reduction in income inequality in %	26	32.41536	12.80693	7.6427	51.218
Age of democracy (years)	26	53.30069	36.76969	15	164
Democratic quality	26	58.01453	8.143321	42.835	72.583

Notes: Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016).

Table 2: Effects of status on liberal democratic expectations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	0.0763***		0.0981***	0.0796***
	(0.00416)		(0.00571)	(0.00457)
Gender (male)	0.131***	0.129***	0.132***	0.132***
	(0.0139)	(0.0156)	(0.0143)	(0.0139)
Age	0.00304***	0.00771***	0.00263***	0.00306***
	(0.000383)	(0.000468)	(0.000396)	(0.000383)
Household total income		0.0279***		
		(0.00307)		
Education (years)		0.0579***		
		(0.00240)		
Occupation		0.0363***		
		(0.00352)		
Country groups: Direct effects				
Post-communist			0.0868	0.616***
			(0.301)	(0.178)
Crisis country			0.229	0.590*
			(0.250)	(0.219)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				-0.0640***
				(0.00887)
Crisis country				-0.0765***
				(0.0134)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			-0.00322	
			(0.00297)	
Democratic quality			0.00462	
			(0.0137)	
Constant	7.849***	7.051***	7.629***	7.488***
	(0.0826)	(0.0904)	(0.914)	(0.125)
Var (Constant)	-0.946***	-0.907***	-1.083***	-0.942***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.141)
Var (Residual)	0.380***	0.324***	0.387***	0.379***
	(0.00335)	(0.00395)	(0.00342)	(0.00335)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	44608	32042	42842	44608
AIC	160587.5	111858.8	154890.9	160528.3
BIC	160639.7	111925.8	154977.5	160615.3
Chi2	473.2	1372.5	462.1	541.2

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 3: Effects of status on social democratic expectations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	-0.0629***		-0.0654***	-0.0812***
	(0.00494)		(0.00513)	(0.00752)
Gender (male)	-0.204***	-0.192***	-0.204***	-0.204***
	(0.0167)	(0.0193)	(0.0172)	(0.0167)
Age	0.00609***	0.00521***	0.00578***	0.00618***
	(0.000455)	(0.000577)	(0.000469)	(0.000457)
Household total income		-0.0446***		
		(0.00382)		
Education (years)		-0.0110***		
		(0.00297)		
Occupation		-0.0261***		
		(0.00438)		
Country groups: Direct effects				
Post-communist			0.0808	0.313*
			(0.356)	(0.123)
Crisis country			0.438	0.394*
			(0.289)	(0.238)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				0.0243*
				(0.0105)
Crisis country				0.0631***
				(0.0159)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			-0.00363	
			(0.00368)	
Democratic quality			-0.00232	
			(0.0185)	
Gini Household Income			-0.00876	
			(0.0249)	
% Redistribution			-0.0122	
			(0.0107)	
Constant	8.616***	8.799***	9.527***	8.419***
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(1.473)	(0.137)
Var (Constant)	-0.659***	-0.714***	-0.978***	-0.870***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.141)
Var (Residual)	0.573***	0.551***	0.582***	0.573***
	(0.00330)	(0.00390)	(0.00337)	(0.00330)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	45928	32828	44111	45928
AIC	183103.2	129494.7	176648.8	183086.2
BIC	183155.6	129561.9	176753.1	183173.5
Chi2	534.8	632.8	514.9	563.5

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 4: Robustness test: Effects of status on direct democratic expectations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	-0.0125*		-0.0112*	-0.0275***
	(0.00549)		(0.00567)	(0.00832)
Gender (male)	-0.104***	-0.124***	-0.102***	-0.104***
	(0.0185)	(0.0215)	(0.0189)	(0.0185)
Age	0.000263	-0.00100	0.0000390	0.000212
	(0.000506)	(0.000643)	(0.000520)	(0.000506)
Household total income		-0.0131**		
		(0.00424)		
Education (years)		-0.0143***		
		(0.00331)		
Occupation		-0.00980*		
		(0.00486)		
Country groups: Direct effects				
Post-communist			0.586	0.260
			(0.319)	(0.187)
Crisis country			0.569*	0.384*
			(0.266)	(0.230)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				0.0300*
				(0.0117)
Crisis country				0.0161*
				(0.0106)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			0.00513	
			(0.00315)	
Democratic quality			-0.00760	
			(0.0146)	
Constant	8.425***	8.738***	8.220***	8.257***
	(0.0987)	(0.108)	(0.971)	(0.134)
Var (Constant)	-0.788***	-0.783***	-1.026***	-0.918***
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.141)
Var (Residual)	0.674***	0.657***	0.678***	0.674***
	(0.00331)	(0.00391)	(0.00337)	(0.00331)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	45770	32719	43964	45770
AIC	191753.6	135945.6	184504.8	191748.3
BIC	191806.0	136012.7	184591.8	191835.7
Chi2	38.15	92.06	44.48	52.39

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 5: Effects of status on liberal democratic evaluations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	0.160***		0.159***	0.153***
	(0.00485)		(0.00497)	(0.00734)
Gender (male)	0.126***	0.143***	0.142***	0.143***
	(0.0162)	(0.0187)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)
Age	0.00721***	0.00884***	0.00738***	0.00758***
	(0.000447)	(0.000561)	(0.000453)	(0.000455)
Household total income		0.0549***		
		(0.00368)		
Education (years)		0.00681*		
		(0.00287)		
Occupation		0.0114*		
		(0.00422)		
Country groups: Direct effect				
Post-communist			-0.440	-0.750*
			(0.418)	(0.404)
Crisis country			-0.153	-0.138
			(0.348)	(0.338)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				0.0391***
				(0.0106)
Crisis country				-0.0855***
				(0.0157)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			-0.00162	
			(0.00413)	
Democratic quality			0.0682***	
			(0.0191)	
Constant	5.399***	5.813***	1.733	2.010+
	(0.163)	(0.177)	(1.273)	(1.219)
Var (Constant)	-0.209	-0.148	-0.751***	-0.794***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Var (Residual)	0.513***	0.492***	0.507***	0.506***
	(0.00341)	(0.00401)	(0.00348)	(0.00348)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	43103	31174	41392	41392
AIC	166678.4	119300.7	159536.6	159478.1
BIC	166730.4	119367.5	159622.9	159581.7
Chi2	1346.1	517.5	1368.2	1438.7

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 6: Effects of status on social democratic evaluations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	0.214***		0.212***	0.248***
	(0.00640)		(0.00654)	(0.00986)
Gender (male)	0.176***	0.168***	0.181***	0.182***
	(0.0216)	(0.0255)	(0.0219)	(0.0219)
Age	-0.000817	0.000118	-0.000876	-0.000771
	(0.000591)	(0.000764)	(0.000603)	(0.000591)
Household total income		0.0524***		
		(0.00504)		
Education (years)		-0.0137***		
		(0.00392)		
Occupation		0.0196***		
		(0.00578)		
Country groups: Direct effect				
Post-communist			-1.027*	-0.804*
			(0.391)	(0.363)
Crisis country			-0.650*	-0.338
			(0.317)	(0.297)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				-0.0564***
				(0.0140)
Crisis country				-0.0847***
				(0.0204)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			0.0111*	
			(0.00404)	
Democratic quality			0.0361	
			(0.0203)	
Gini Household Income			-0.0781**	
			(0.0273)	
% Redistribution			0.00618	
			(0.0118)	
Constant	2.799***	3.750***	2.707	2.497
	(0.254)	(0.278)	(1.616)	(1.470)
Var (Constant)	0.238	0.317*	-0.887***	-0.985***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.149)
Var (Residual)	0.824***	0.824***	0.819***	0.818***
	(0.00332)	(0.00392)	(0.00339)	(0.00339)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	45343	32497	43560	43560
AIC	203583.8	145926.1	195056.2	195035.3
BIC	203636.2	145993.3	195160.3	195156.9
Chi2	1211.7	190.2	1405.3	1485.7

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), SWIID (Solt 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*

Table 7: Robustness test: Effects of status on direct democratic evaluations.

	Model 1 b/se	**Model 2** b/se	**Model 3** b/se	**Model 4** b/se
Individual-level variables				
Place in society	0.145***		0.143***	0.101***
	(0.00810)		(0.00828)	(0.0124)
Gender (male)	-0.0993***	-0.0926**	-0.0917***	-0.0910***
	(0.0272)	(0.0322)	(0.0276)	(0.0276)
Age	0.00613***	0.00295**	0.00688***	0.00616***
	(0.000748)	(0.000965)	(0.000762)	(0.000748)
Household total income		0.0100		
		(0.00635)		
Education (years)		-0.0608***		
		(0.00496)		
Occupation		-0.0259***		
		(0.00728)		
Country groups: Direct effects				
Post-communist			2.215***	1.655*
			(0.658)	(0.661)
Crisis country			1.265*	1.277*
			(0.548)	(0.553)
Country groups: Interaction with place in society (Baseline: Western Europe)				
Post-communist				-0.101***
				(0.0177)
Crisis country				-0.0120
				(0.0262)
Country-level variables				
Regime Durability			0.0225***	
			(0.00650)	
Democratic quality			0.122***	
			(0.0300)	
Constant	4.060***	5.834***	-5.350*	-5.086*
	(0.243)	(0.269)	(2.001)	(1.993)
Var (Constant)	0.181	0.256	-0.299*	-0.303*
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Var (Residual)	1.053***	1.053***	1.047***	1.047***
	(0.00334)	(0.00394)	(0.00340)	(0.00340)
N Level 1	26	26	26	26
N Level 2	44918	32223	43155	43155
AIC	222252.8	159441.4	213003.4	212968.4
BIC	222305.1	159508.5	213090.1	213072.5
Chi2	381.7	276.8	405.9	445.6

*Notes: Linear Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p< 0.005, ***p<0.001. Data sources: European Social Survey (ESS 2012), Democracy Barometer (Merkel et al. 2016), Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2016). Weighted with ESS post-stratification and population size weights.*